Essays on financial contracts and business cycles by Duncan, Alfred James Michael
Glasgow Theses Service 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
theses@gla.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Duncan, Alfred James Michael (2015) Essays on financial contracts 
and business cycles. PhD thesis. 
 
 
 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/7267/  
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study 
 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format 
or medium without the formal permission of the Author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 
awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 
 
ESSAYS ON FINANCIAL CONTRACTS
AND BUSINESS CYCLES
Alfred James Michael Duncan
BSc BCA
Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of PhD in Economics.
Adam Smith Business School
College of Social Sciences
University of Glasgow
September 2015
1
Financial Contracts and Business Cycles
2
INTRODUCTION
ABSTRACT
This dissertation studies the intersection between the sharing of individual
specific risks and business cycle risks. Individual specific or idiosyncratic risk
sharing is typically hampered by moral hazard, and in Chapter 2 we propose
a new theory of debt finance as an effective mechanism for sharing idiosyn-
cratic risks. But business cycle or systemic risk sharing is also affected by the
means of idiosyncratic risk sharing. Departures from full systemic risk shar-
ing can dampen the incentive compatibility constraint allowing a greater de-
gree of idiosyncratic risk sharing (Chapter 1). Entrepreneurs’ productive risk
can quickly transform into low employment, as wages fall below marginal
revenue products of labour (Chapter 3). Market prices for systemic risk in-
surance do not necessarily internalise balance sheet externalities, resulting in
excessive swings in leverage and factor market wedges of inefficiency (Chap-
ter 4). Sometimes, agents have private information about the risks faced by
their projects, and how they correlate with the broader economy. When this is
the case, optimal systemic risk sharing arrangements must allocate business
systemic risk in a way that deters entrepreneurs from herding among their
peers (Chapter 5).
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E´mile Zola’s novel Germinal is a story of hardship and tensions between workers and
capital owners in Post Revolutionary France. It is clear that even during ‘good’ times,
the workers of Village 240 in the coal mining town of Montsou have little to eat and
suffer terrible, dangerous working conditions. Gross inequality between workers and
capitalists appears timeless in Montsou. Yet it is when the price of coal falls, bringing
down wages and employment that brings to light important questions about how this fall
in coal prices should be shared across workers, entrepreneurs and rentier shareholders.
And it is these questions of fairness that are amplified when workers and entrepreneurs
alike have near exhausted any reserves and lines of credit. The interaction between the
sharing of idiosyncratic and systemic risks is the main theme of this dissertation. What
we show is that the problem of how to share business cycle risk is deeply tied to the
problem of sharing idiosyncratic risks, when idiosyncratic risk sharing is made difficult
by information asymmetries relating to effort and individual specific luck.
The families in Montsou experience a variety of idiosyncratic or individual specific
financial risks in addition to aggregate, or systemic risks, associated with commodity
prices. While there is some insurance within multiple income households, the Maheu
family, who are followed closely throughout the novel, earns income solely from coal
mining. Individual miners enjoy different compensation packages, subject to the risk of
finding high quality coal in their allocated seams. They also face the very real risk of
unemployment. Sickness and injury pose further serious risks to household consumption,
with only partial insurance provided by employers. Credit markets appear to be open to
households and entrepreneurs alike to help smooth consumption in the wake of income
risks. But the debts incurred by households and entrepreneurs do not offer any insurance
against aggregate or systemic risks. Furthermore, under the weight of debts drawn dur-
ing the previous recession in the case of the Maheu family, or during the boom in the
case of the entrepreneur Deneulin, both the Maheu family and Deneulin find themselves
unable to increase their borrowing to maintain consumption and investment during the
current downturn—or at least unwilling to bear the potential risks associated with further
borrowing.
The Maheu family’s mining yield depends on individual specific luck associated with
the quality of the seam allocated to them, it also depends on their efforts exerted at the
coal face. It is straightforward to see why their compensation scheme remunerates them
according to the quantity and quality of the coal in their tubs, even though this leaves
12
INTRODUCTION
them highly exposed to idiosyncratic risk. A constant wage income independent of the
amount of coal returned would clearly result in a moral hazard problem with imperfect
monitoring at the coal face.
Similarly, the entrepreneur Deneulin is the sole shareholder in his firm. His income
and net worth are heavily dependent on the revenues earned at his mines, after returning
fixed interest and principal payments to creditors. Again, there is a clear moral hazard
problem explaining exactly why creditors would be unwilling to share a large amount of
idiosyncratic risk with Deneulin, who has a large degree of control over the investment
projects and labour bargains that are crucial determinants of his firm’s success or failure.
But what is not so obvious is why Deneulin and the Maheu family appear to have
limited access to insurance against systemic risks which are outside their control but to
which they are heavily exposed, apparently moreso than other agents in Zola’s novel.
Neither the Maheu family nor the entrepreneur Deneulin are ‘responsible’ for the falls
in the prices of coal and other commodities which so severely reduce incomes earned
in Montsou. There is no obvious moral hazard problem preventing them from writing
systemic risk insurance contracts with other agents in the economy who are in a better
position to weather the current storm.
In Zola’s novel, it appears that markets for insurance against systemic risks could be
open. Labour contracts are reasonably sophisticated and the long term nature of min-
ing employment relationships within Montsou certainly allow for the possibility of risk
sharing between workers and shareholders. The wealthy rentier Le´on Gre´goire has ample
opportunity to arrange a risk sharing agreement with his cousin Deneulin, but resists these
opportunities apparently in accordance with his very low tolerance for risk. In sum, it is
not clear that the individual actors in Montsou are constrained by arbitrary restrictions
on contracts that prevent any risk sharing that would be possible under a richer set of
contracts.
So why do systemic risk sharing arrangements in Montsou appear to be neither fair
nor efficient? Would more effective risk sharing have reduced the massive costs of hunger,
unemployment and civil unrest provoked by the fall in coal prices?
The first chapter of this dissertation considers the relationship between idiosyncratic
and systemic risk sharing in a simple two-period endowment economy. A straightforward
13
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but intriguing result is shown: information asymmetries relating to individual specific
risks do in fact hamper the sharing of systemic risks under constrained efficient alloca-
tions. The intuition behind this result is that any agent falsely claiming to have suffered
bad luck, and hiding away their ill-gotten gains, has a greater demand for exposure to busi-
ness cycle risk than truthful unlucky agents. Optimal risk sharing contracts can use this
differentiated demand for protection or exposure to business cycle risk to identify truth-
telling and misreporting agents. Partially closing markets for business cycle risk further
exacerbates the difference between the demands of fraudulent and truth-telling agents,
helping identify those who are lying about their luck. This allows increased sharing of
individual specific risks across agents without encouraging fraud.
Straight away, in a simple endowment economy model with a basic private informa-
tion constraint, we can see how information asymmetries or frictions that hamper the shar-
ing of individual specific risks will also affect the sharing of business cycle or systemic
risks that are commonly observed. That is, they are not obviously affected by information
asymmetries.
The next step in our analysis is to develop a richer theory of debt contracts as a re-
sponse to information asymmetries about individual specific risks. The first chapter as-
sumes that individual specific risks were private information not available at any cost to
monitors or outsiders, an assumption that quickly yields simple non-contingent debt-like
contracts as an optimal contract used by individual agents to manage idiosyncratic risks
through delaying or bringing forward consumption between the current and future peri-
ods.
But, it is perhaps unrealistic to think of private information as being unobtainable to
outside monitors at any cost. In practice, financial contracts typically allow for some form
of costly information acquisition by monitors, and these audits reveal a useful signal of
the veracity of the claims made by the reporting agent. In order to consider how risk shar-
ing evolves throughout the business cycle, we need a model that allows for endogenous
variation in the degree of risk sharing between agents, and can explain important features
of real life contracts, such as debt, default, and limited liability.
In Chapter 2 we develop such a model. We relax the assumption of strict private
information considered in Chapter 1 and we permit an audit technology that reveals an ex
post signal testifying to the veracity of the claims made by the monitored agent, at some
14
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cost and with imperfect precision. Essentially, as the cost of audit increases, or the signal
weakens in precision, the model converges to strict private information as in Chapter 1.
What we show is that it is the imprecision of the audit technology, rather than the cost,
which is important for explaining the standard form of debt contract. These debt contracts
allow for limited risk sharing except following extreme circumstances. Following low
reports, an auditing process resembling default is initiated, and the eventual repayment
leaves the entrepreneur with strictly positive real wealth. That is, the entrepreneur enjoys
limited liability. When the precision of the audit technology is high, optimal contracts
resemble equity. These equity contracts exhibit a high degree of risk sharing even if audit
costs are relatively high, and even as firms’ profits go from good to great. Any marginal
increase in revenues results in a marginal increase in repayments, or dividends, to outside
investors.
The model considered in Chapter 2 focuses on the funding of productive investments
by entrepreneurs, like Deneulin in Zola’s novel. Deneulin is the sole shareholder in his
firm, having offered an equity stake to M. Gre´goire, but having been unable to agree terms.
In the end, Deneulin raises all his external finance through debt issuance. This leverage
through debt finance leaves Deneulin highly exposed to volatility in coal prices. When
coal prices fall, Deneulin struggles to cope with the risk, even following reductions in
wages. Eventually, Deneulin decides that he cannot absorb the risks of production, prices
and wages, and he sells his firm to The Company, the firm owning all of the other mines
in Montsou. Following the sale, wages fall further, even though coal prices appear to have
stabilised. It appears as though any wedge that had existed between workers wages and
workers’ marginal revenue product has increased.
In Chapter 3, we develop a financial macroeconomic model with wage-earning house-
holds and credit constrained, risk averse entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs raise external fi-
nance for their contracts via the contracts studied in Chapter 2. We show that the in-
formation asymmetries that encourage the use of debt finance result in a time-varying
wedge between wages and the marginal productivity of labour. A lack of entrepreneurial
risk sharing has turned into an inefficiency wedge in the labour market, dramatically in-
creasing the costs of systemic risk for wage earning households. This wedge tends to be
counter-cyclical in response to productivity shocks, smoothing the path of real wages. But
the labour wedge is procyclical in response to financial shocks, amplifying their effects
on output and employment.
15
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Deneulin’s debts do not include contingencies for variation in the price of coal, the
key macroeconomic risk his firm is exposed to. A market for systemic risk insurance, ei-
ther through derivative-like contracts or through contingencies written into standard debt
finance contracts would allow Deneulin to insure his firm against volatile swings in coal
prices, if he desired to do so.1 In Chapter 4, we study the role of markets for systemic
risk insurance in our macroeconomic framework. Could these markets help internalise
the costs to wage earning households of the time varying labour wedge, and discourage
large swings in entrepreneurs’ leverage? The short answer is that systemic risk markets
in our environment can actually make things worse. The prices of systemic risk insur-
ance do not internalise the balance sheet externalities that amplify business cycles in our
model. The invisible hand prioritises individual-level consumption insurance over busi-
ness cycle stabilisation, allowing the labour and capital market wedges of inefficiency to
vary excessively. Indeed, when systemic risk markets are open in our model, risk tolerant
entrepreneurs tend to sell insurance against downturns, increasing their exposure to these
business cycles and thereby the volatilities of their net wealth and leverage.
It was not Deneulin’s fault that coal prices fell. Yet it cost him his fortune and resulted
in the closing of his mines which paid workers higher wages than the mines owned by his
competitors. A bailout could have saved Deneulin, and helped to keep his mines open.
Possibly even a bout of high inflation could have saved him through a real reduction in his
nominal debts. Certainly at a first glance this looks like it could be helpful in Montsou,
protecting Deneulin from events out of his control and encouraging investment and pro-
duction throughout the downturn. On the other hand, one can’t help but wonder whether
Deneulin was acting in the interests of the village in the first place when he levered his
considerable net worth toward an investment in the re-opening of old coal mines. Most of
the working families in Village 240 relied solely on wages from coal mining. If Deneulin
had instead invested in a different industry, providing jobs whose wages were not tied
to the volatile price of coal, then the insurance benefits of diversification in household
income sources could perhaps have been beneficial. The reader cannot be certain that
in Montsou, Deneulin’s investment in coal mining was inefficient, and that the invisible
hand was not allocating investment resources toward their best use. But what we do show
in Chapter 5 is that a monetary policy of nominal output targeting can have precisely the
effect of preventing the invisible hand from allocating resources efficiently into diversi-
1Of course, these same markets would allow Deneulin to increase his exposure to the volatility of coal
prices, if he so desired.
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fied projects. While Deneulin cannot control the price of coal, it was certainly his choice
to invest in coal production, knowing the risks this entailed. Shielding Deneulin from the
volatility of coal prices would have provided further incentives ex ante to devote addi-
tional resources into herding with other coal producers in Montsou, rather than investing
in projects that would have provided diversification for the wage earners of Montsou.
Before moving on to the main chapters of this dissertation, we review some of the
main stylised facts and puzzles motivating this analysis, before considering the role of
policy intervention in incomplete-market economies suffering from difficulties with risk
sharing.
STYLISED FACTS AND MAJOR PUZZLES
We start with the prevalence of debt finance in modern (and also historical) economies.
Fact 1. The widespread use of debt finance is an important determinant of economies’
responses to shocks, and disturbances emerging from within the financial sector are an
important source of business cycle fluctuations.
Schularick and Taylor (2012) document the paths of credit booms gone bust. Rapid in-
creases in credit growth they argue leave economies vulnerable to shocks that have devas-
tating consequences. The financial accelerator model of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1999) and the credit cycles model of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) have been influential in
helping to form a consensus around the interaction between debt finance and business cy-
cle volatility. These papers show that when entrepreneurs finance their projects with debt,
fluctuations in asset prices cause volatility in entrepreneurs’ leverage ratios, raising fi-
nancing costs and reducing the demand for investment. In turn, the required deleveraging
and reduction in investment further reduces asset prices, amplifying the cycle.
Extensions of these models have also shown that shocks from within the financial sec-
tor, that is, disturbances that affect the intermediation of credit directly are also important
determinant of business cycle volatility (Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno, 2014, Nolan
and Thoenissen, 2009).
Fact 2. During periods of financial stress, the prevailing distribution of burden sharing
of business cycle risk is often seen as unfair and/or inefficient.
17
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In Zola’s novel Germinal it is not until the recession that the seeds of socialist rev-
olution are sown. This is in spite of the fact that the inequalities in consumption during
Zola’s recession appear to have changed little since the preceding boom—both the cap-
ital owners and wage earners have lost a large amount of their income. This highlights
the political tensions amplified during episodes of financial stress, and these tensions are
further exacerbated when political actions appear to favour one group over another. That
is, when Wall Street receives a bailout but Main Street does not.
Mian and Sufi (2015) and Shiller (2008) among others have argued that existing
market arrangements regarding mortgage finance leave homeowners unfairly exposed to
volatility in broader trends in real estate prices. This is not just a fairness argument but
an efficiency argument: These authors argue that there are opportunities for mutual ben-
efit between borrowers and lenders if mortgage contracts were linked to house prices. In
other words, the state-contingent intertemporal marginal rates of substitution for home-
owners differs from non-homeowners. Homeowners would be willing to give up some
consumption during periods of rising house prices in turn for insurance against falls in
house prices, and other households would be willing to take the other side of this trade,
giving up some consumption in downturns in order to enjoy greater consumption during
periods of rising house prices.
On the other hand, during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-08, several Govern-
ments including the United States and the United Kingdom have extended financial sup-
port directly to ailing firms, particularly in the banking sector but also in the auto industry
in the case of the United States. The presumption behind this financial support being that
the weight of losses on these firms would result in inefficient outcomes through unem-
ployment, balance sheet externalities and potential disruption of the monetary transmis-
sion mechanism.2 Even Adam Smith argued that the invisible hand could not be relied on
to ensure the efficient allocations of systemic risk, calling for some regulation of lending
and deposit issuance (Smith, 1776, II (ii) 94).
Fact 3. During periods of financial stress, there is high unemployment.
Perhaps the most striking feature of financial crises is the labour market response.
2Calomiris and Khan (2015) provide an excellent discussion of the stated objectives of the Troubled
Asset Relief Programme (TARP), which was the primary vehicle for US bank recapitalisation during the
crisis. Goolsbee and Krueger (2015), provide a useful and broadly favourable review of the rescue of the
US automotive industry.
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During the Great Depression, the unemployment rate in the United States peaked at 26%
in May 1933.3 During the recent Global Financial Crisis, unemployment in the United
States peaked at 10% in October 2009.4
It is helpful to think about the employment and wage responses to financial stress
through the idea of the labour wedge, the difference between the real marginal product of
labour (the economy’s work-consumption marginal rate of transformation) and workers’
consumption leisure marginal rate of substitution:
−UN(C,N)
UC(C,N)
= (1− τN)FN(K,N).
Here, the left hand side is the consumption-leisure marginal rate of substitution, τN is
the labour wedge and FN(K,N) is the marginal product of labour, which is the marginal
rate of transformation from work to consumption. Defining the labour wedge in this way,
we can see that the effects of the labour wedge resemble variations in payroll and labour
income taxes. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007, Figure 1) estimate that the increase in
the labour wedge between 1929 and 1934 is over 30%.5
Fact 4. The unfavourable tax treatment of equity finance relative to debt finance cannot
explain the prevalence or the features of standard debt contracts.
Throughout this study, we motivate the use of debt finance as an alternative to equity
finance by appealing to information asymmetries. These information asymmetries make it
difficult to enforce the the link between dividend repayments and good or bad luck associ-
ated with equity contracts. An alternative motivation for the prevalence of debt finance is
the preferable tax treatment enjoyed by debt finance over equity finance for incorporated
firms in many countries.6 Typically, firms’ earnings attract corporate income tax before
their disbursement as dividends to shareholders, whereas debt interest payments can be
deducted from revenues when calculating taxable income.
The disadvantageous tax treatment of equity finance relative to debt finance must
3Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve Fred Database. Unemployment Rate for United States
(M0892AUSM156SNBR).
4Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve Fred Database. Civilian Unemployment Rate (UNRATE).
5Note that Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007, Figure 1) refer to (1 − τN ) as the labour wedge.
Throughout this study, we will refer to τN as the labour wedge, which is also a common definition, and
is more intuitive in our opinion. Under our definition, it will typically be the case that when the labour
wedge is large in absolute terms, actions and allocations are further from the first-best efficient allocations.
6Notably, this is the motivation employed by Jermann and Quadrini (2012), who we will refer to fre-
quently in later chapters.
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Figure 1: Statutory corporate income tax rates. Selected OECD countries. For the tax
year ending in 2015. Includes local government taxes where applicable (Source: OECD).
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surely influence firms’ financing decisions in favour of debt finance. Still, there are im-
portant reasons to believe that taxation plays only a minor role in explaining the preva-
lence of debt finance. Corporate income tax rates across countries vary considerably as
shown in Figure 1. Debt remains the predominant form of external finance contract in
countries with little or no debt-equity tax distortion. Further, the recent financial cri-
sis starting in 2007 has not spared countries with small debt-equity tax distortions. In
Ireland, severely hit by the global financial crisis, the corporate income tax rate is only
13%. In New Zealand, a generous company tax imputation credit scheme is employed,
dramatically reduces any tax distortions between debt and equity finance. Nevertheless,
New Zealand’s equity markets are not very well capitalised by international standards (see
for example Cameron, 2007) and the New Zealand economy suffered from the failure of
highly-leveraged ‘finance companies’ in 2007-08 (NZHR, 2011).
Unlike differences in tax treatment, the information asymmetries including those we
study in this volume do an excellent job not only of explaining why debt finance can be
favourable to equity, but also in explaining some of the specific features of real world debt
contracts, including default, the limited liability company, and interest rate spreads. The
specific features of debt contracts, which determine to what extent risk is shared between
agents across states, are crucial determinants of the extent to which debt finance provides
an efficient mechanism for project finance and intertemporal consumption insurance.
If the prevalence of debt finance were the result of tax distortions alone, our policy
prescription would be straightforward: remove the tax distortion. Immediately, agents
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would issue equity contracts and repay their debts, and the economy would revert to
first best efficient allocations and actions. If the prevalence of debt finance is in part the
rational response of agents to information asymmetries, then the policy problem is much
more tricky.
Puzzle 1. What are the important features of a microfoundation for debt finance?
There remains much debate over the important features of a microfoundation for debt
finance. In this study we focus on approaches to the microfoundation for debt that rely
on some form of asymmetric information about the revenue of the firm. When this in-
formation is completely private, and only idiosyncratic risks are present, then it is widely
known that the optimal risk sharing contract takes the form of a non-contingent debt con-
tract (Cole and Kocherlakota, 2001). The seminal paper of Townsend (1979) showed
that the introduction of an auditing technology can motivate what we might think of as
a standard debt contract: Following moderate and high reports, the borrower makes a
fixed repayment to the lender. Following low reports, the borrower is audited and a lower
repayment is returned to the lender—a process that resembles bankruptcy. At least this is
the case if lenders cannot use stochastic audit strategies.
If lenders can randomise their audits, then it turns out the story changes. Standard
debt is no longer optimal. It becomes worthwhile to audit even relatively high reports.
A low probability of audit combined with a large penalty can have a big deterrent effect
preventing misreporting (Border and Sobel, 1987, Mookherjee and Png, 1989).
The contracts derived in the aforementioned studies require the lender to be able to
commit to an auditing strategy ex ante, knowing that ex post, all borrowers are truth-
telling and the audit costs incurred will be wasted. Krasa and Villamil (2000) show that
relaxing this commitment assumption can restore standard debt contracts. The decision
to audit is now taken ex post: if the expected returns to auditing are high, these audits will
be undertaken with certainty.
It is surely the case that some lenders cannot credibly commit to audit schedules, but it
seems unlikely that banks would be unable to make and sustain this commitment through
delegation or some form of reputation equilibrium (Melumad and Mookherjee, 1989). We
assume in this study that lenders can commit ex ante to ex post audit strategies, and show
in Chapter 2 that standard debt contracts can indeed be optimal if costly audits provide
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only a noisy signal, and if borrowers are risk averse. The noise associated with the audit
signal provides an incentive to use contracts with lower penalties where possible, limiting
the deterrent effect from stochastic audit strategies and promoting the deterministic audit
strategies that characterise debt. As the audit technology improves in its precision, the
costs of audit errors decline, more severe penalties can be applied, audits are used more
sparingly over a greater range of reported incomes and contracts converge to a form that
resembles equity.
Another important approach towards a microfoundation for debt include the incom-
plete contracts literature, where debt contracts specifying a fixed repayment serve as a
starting point for renegotiation following outcomes that could not have been predicted
ex ante (Hart and Moore, 1988). Aghion and Bolton (1992) study optimal incomplete
contracts where information about managers’ effort is privately observable. Optimal con-
tracts allocate control of assets and risk with managers, in a similar way to debt finance.
One of the key advantages of the incomplete contracts approach is that it can explain the
transfer of control rights from shareholders to debtholders in default.
Jensen (1986) argues that large amounts of free cash flow offers an opportunity to
managers to extract pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits from the firm. Debt finance
restricts free cash flow, allocating some of these funds to creditors and thereby dampening
the associated moral hazard problem. Ellingsen and Kristiansen (2011) describe a model
with unobservable managerial effort and show that the optimal financial structure in this
model can include a mixture of debt and equity.
Puzzle 2. What are the mechanisms through which financial stress affects the labour
wedge, the wedge of inefficiency between the economy’s work-production marginal rate
of transformation and workers’ consumption-leisure marginal rates of substitution?
In a frictionless environment, the labour wedge τN will equal zero. Households will
equate their consumption-leisure marginal rate of substitution to the real wage rate, and
firms will equate their marginal labour productivity to the same real wage rate. Denoting
the real wage rate by W , our condition for first best efficiency is the following:
−UN(C,N)
UC(C,N)
= W = FN(K,N).
We can think of frictions acting on both sides of this market for labour. One the supply
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side preventing unemployed workers from entering jobs at acceptable wage rates, on the
demand side preventing firms from offering wages that are as high as the marginal product
of labour.
Figure 2 presents two measures describing the cyclical behaviour of the inverse of the
demand side of the labour wedge, the ratio of real wages to marginal labour productivity.
The left hand panel presents the path of the labour share of national income
(
WN
F (K,N)
)
,
and the right hand panel presents the ratio of real wages to (average) nonfarm labour pro-
ductivity
(
W
F (K,N)/N
)
. Differences in the two series result from variation in the sam-
ple of the economy considered and in methods of measurement. Under the assumption of
a Cobb-Douglas production function (F (K,N) = AKαN1−α), average labour produc-
tivity is proportional to marginal labour productivity (αF (K,N)/N = FN(K,N)) and
these series present the paths ofW/FN(K,N) over these four recessions. We focus on the
demand side of the labour wedge because this is where our model described in Chapter
3 predicts the financial friction to directly affect the labour wedge. Both measures show
modest short run decreases in the labour wedge at the onset of the 1974 and 1981 reces-
sions (or increases) in the ratio of wages to labour productivity), followed by increases in
the longer run. Both measures show large persistent increases in the labour wedge in the
recent 2001 and 2008 recessions. This behaviour of the demand side of the labour wedge
is broadly consistent with the predictions of our model, with negative technology shocks
producing a short run increase and long run fall in the labour wedge as in the 1974 and
1981 recessions, and negative financial shocks producing a large increase in the labour
wedge, as in the 2001 and 2008 recessions.
Table 1 gives a mapping of the key frictions that together form the labour wedge,
broken up into price setting rigidities, matching frictions and financial frictions.
The first class of frictions is price setting rigidities, also referred to as sticky prices or
New Keynesian frictions.7 When product or labour markets are imperfectly competitive,
and firms and workers face non-trivial costs of price or wage adjustment, markups will be
time varying. Retail markups are the difference between the marginal revenue produce of
labour and marginal labour costs or wages per unit of effective labour, and wage markups
are the difference between real wages and households’ consumption-leisure marginal rate
of substitution. That is, when retail markups are large, wages offered by firms are rel-
7See for example, the models described by Galı´ (2008) and Woodford (2003)
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Figure 2: Labour income and productivity in US NBER recessions (Recession starting 1974Q1 dashed
o, 1981Q4 solid , 2001Q2 dashed, 2008Q1 solid). Left hand panel: Labour share of National Income
(BEA NIPA Table 2.1). Right hand panel: Nonfarm real wages relative to labour productivity (BLS
PRS85006102, PRS85006092. Nominal wages deflated by the consumer price index, St. Louis Fed-
eral Reserve FRED Database CPIAUCSL). Both series normalised to one at the onset of the respective
recessions.
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atively low. When wage markups are large, wages offered by firms are above the level
that would be acceptable to an unemployed worker, but the quantity of employment de-
manded is low, resulting in unemployment—unemployed workers are willing to work at
current wage rates but cannot find a job. Importantly, while steady state markups are the
result of market power, and desirable to the individuals holding that power (retail markups
are desirable to firms and wage markups are desirable to workers) variation in both retail
and wage markups over the business cycle is mostly undesirable and the consequence of
costs associated with changing prices. When New Keynesian markups are high, this is
because firms and workers would like to offer lower prices and wages respectively, but
are prevented from doing so.
The second class of frictions is matching frictions and follows the literature on va-
cancy posting and worker-employee matching pioneered by Diamond (1982) and Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994). In typical labour search and matching models, firms’ vacancy
postings suffer a real resource cost, which must be reclaimed in expectation through the
difference between real wages and marginal labour productivity. When the unemploy-
ment rate is low, the labour market is considered to be tight and it is difficult to find
suitable workers for particular job openings, this increases the expected resource cost to
firms of hiring additional workers, and results in a rationing equilibrium where not all
unemployed workers can be matched in any given period, and wages can remain above
workers’ consumption-leisure marginal rates of substitution.
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Table 1: Breaking down cyclical variation in the labour wedge
Class of friction
Price setting frictions Matching frictions Financial frictions
Demand side
Marginal labour productivity
- Retail markups
- Vacancy costs
- Risk premium
= Real wages
Supply side
Real wages
= Wage markups
+ Vacancy rationing
+ Consumption-leisure marginal rate of substitution
Financial frictions can also directly affect the labour wedge. In Jermann and Quadrini
(2012), this is a consequence of tax distortions that encourage entrepreneurs to use im-
perfect debt products to finance their wage bill. In Chapter 3, we show that wages offered
by entrepreneurs will be lower than labour’s marginal product if risk averse entrepreneurs
cannot fully pass on idiosyncratic productivity risks to outside investors. That is, if en-
trepreneurs must finance their projects with debt.
These three classes of frictions interact with each other. Financial frictions acting
solely on the intertemporal wedge can still create and amplify volatility in the labour
wedge when New Keynesian price setting frictions are present through the effects of the
financial friction effects on the natural rate of interest and real wages in the flexible price
counterfactual.8 This interaction between financial and New Keynesian frictions goes in
both directions. As we show in Chapter 3, New Keynesian price setting frictions can slow
down the adjustment of real interest rates to shocks, making it difficult for firms to restore
their financial health during periods of financial stress. Financial frictions in the model we
describe in Chapter 3 will also drive an efficiency wedge in vacancy posting when search
and matching frictions are present.
8The intertemporal wedge between the consumption-savings marginal rate of substitution and the gross
marginal product of capital.
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Puzzle 3. What is the extent to which agents can hedge against business cycle risks?
Ideally, business cycle risk should be allocated such that (1) those agents who are
more risk tolerant bare a greater share of business cycle risk, providing insurance to those
who are less risk tolerant, and (2) those agents whose actions have a greater impact on
the extent of business cycle risk themselves bear a significant portion of that business
cycle risk, such that their incentives are aligned with an optimal solution to the trade-off
between systemic risk and expected income if such a tradeoff exists.
It can be difficult to imagine how real world contractual arrangements can achieve
this allocation of systemic risk. There don’t appear to be markets open for trade in Arrow
securities contingent on a full set of all possible future paths for GDP, inflation or produc-
tivity. At least, it is not clear that individual households hold sophisticated portfolios of
these assets. The debt contracts that dominate intertemporal trade between across house-
holds and between households and firms do not typically allow for automatic writedowns
of principal or interest in response to systemic risks.
One plausible interpretation of the lack of trade in GDP or productivity linked secu-
rities is that in practise, these systemic risk insurance markets are closed. Perhaps the
necessary contracts are too complicated to define and enforce, so agents respond by just
using relatively simple debt contracts that do a good job of sharing idiosyncratic risk in
the presence of information asymmetries.
An alternative interpretation, and one that we will seriously consider throughout this
work, is that the same simple that do a good job of managing idiosyncratic risk are also ef-
fective at managing systemic risk. Under this interpretation, the reason we see little trade
in complicated securities contingent on business cycle risks is not because these markets
are closed but instead that there is actually little opportunity for mutually beneficial trade
in these securities.
Figure 3 presents the recent historical evolution of US household and non-profit as-
set holdings. The top panel displays holdings of relatively safe assets: pension assets
(which are typically diversified portfolios of debt and equity instruments), money-like in-
struments and credit securities. The lower panel presents holdings of more risky assets:
equity in non-corporate firms, equity in corporate firms and equity in real estate. The
picture that emerges from Figure 3 is that households do in fact have considerable choice
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Figure 3: US Household and non-profit asset holdings, major components (2005 $USD billions). Top
panel: Pension assets (—), currency, deposits and money market mutual fund shares (- -), credit securities
(· · ·). Bottom panel: Equity holdings in non-corporate firms (—), Equity holdings in corporate firms (- -),
Equity held in real estate (· · ·). Source: Federal Reserve Board Z.1 Tables. Shaded bars indicate NBER
recession dates. Nominal series converted into 2005 dollars via deflation by the Consumer Price Index, St.
Louis Federal Reserve FRED Database CPIAUCSL)
over their exposure to real estate, stock market and duration risks, and their portfolios of
these assets evolve considerably over time. Even without markets for derivative contracts
contingent on house price indexes, individual households certainly have some choice over
how much real estate risk they are exposed to. The same goes for other systemic risks re-
alised through equity prices.
Puzzle 4. When markets for individual risk sharing are hampered by moral hazard, is
there a conflict between competitive and socially optimal arrangements for systemic risk
sharing?
Mian and Sufi (2012) argue that in the context of housing risk, there is no conflict
between competitive and socially optimal arrangements for systemic risk sharing. In their
view, the problem is that markets for housing market risks are simply not open. If they
were, leveraged mortgage borrowers with high marginal propensities to consume out of
income would not be so exposed to house price volatility, and house price fluctuations
would not have such dramatic effects on aggregate demand.
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Farhi and Werning (2013) suggest that systemic risk sharing markets cannot restore
constrained efficiency when markets suffer from New Keynesian price setting rigidities
and consequently from aggregate demand externalities. Systemic risk insurance prices do
not take into consideration the effects of insurance transfers on the demands for goods
in markets that are heavily distorted by price setting rigidities. When monetary policy
is constrained, the equilibrium allocations can exhibit large inefficiency wedges. This is
not to say that allocations would improve if systemic risk markets were closed in Farhi
and Werning (2013)’s model, but it does mean that there is some conflict between agents’
trade in systemic risk insurance markets and constrained efficiency.
Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian (2014) study systemic risk sharing markets in the
financial accelerator model of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). Krishnamurthy
(2003) and Nikolov (2014) introduce systemic risk sharing markets into the credit cycles
model of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Each of these studies shows that the introduction
of systemic risk markets eliminates or nearly eliminates the financial amplification mech-
anisms that amplify business cycles in these frameworks. There is no conflict between
competitive trade in systemic risk markets and socially efficient outcomes, and indeed
the resulting equilibria when systemic risk markets are open are approximately identi-
cal to the first best efficient outcomes. In these models, when systemic risk markets are
open, entrepreneurs buy insurance against downturns. The resulting flows of wealth from
households to entrepreneurs during periods of financial stress immediately restore en-
trepreneurs’ balance sheets, dampening the volatility in leverage that amplifies recessions
when systemic risk markets are closed.
But this raises a few questions. First, the argument of Mian and Sufi (2012) ap-
pears to suggest that efficient systemic risk insurance trade would result in flows toward
indebted households during downturns, while the analysis of Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paus-
tian (2014) suggests that these transfers would flow toward entrepreneurs in downturns.
Consider the case of AIG, the insurance group that was spectacularly rescued by an equity
injection from the US government in 2008. Prior to the crisis, AIG had dramatically in-
creased their exposure to the volatility of US house prices through sales of credit-default-
swaps linked to US subprime mortgages. Effectively, AIG sold insurance against volatil-
ity in US house prices, the opposite of what would be predicted by Carlstrom, Fuerst,
and Paustian (2014), Krishnamurthy (2003) and Nikolov (2014). In Chapter 4, we show
that the aforementioned studies can be thought of as special cases within the broader fi-
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nancial macroeconomic framework. In general, entrepreneurs’ demand for systemic risk
insurance does not necessarily align with social efficiency. In periods of financial stress,
entrepreneurs’ return to wealth is high, but is also more risky, as it is more difficult to
pass on this risk to lenders during these periods. Ex ante, entrepreneurs heavily discount
the high returns earned during periods of financial stress, reducing their demand for sys-
temic risk insurance. There is a conflict between privately optimal trade in systemic risk
insurance markets and broader efficiency objectives.
In Chapter 1 we outline an alternative mechanism through which systemic risk in-
surance conflicts with idiosyncratic risk insurance. In an endowment economy, we show
that misreporting agents receiving high idiosyncratic shocks have a different demand for
systemic risk than truth-telling low reporting agents, and this information can be used to
identify these misreporting agents. Perturbing the allocation of systemic risk away from
the competitive allocation can relax the truth-telling constraint on agents receiving high
idiosyncratic shocks, allowing for greater sharing of idiosyncratic risks.
A MECHANISM DESIGN APPROACH
The primary methodological approach employed in this work follows the tradition of
mechanism design.9 Specifically, the mechanism design approach to the study of finan-
cial markets is the search for environments where simple real world institutions emerge as
a response to information asymmetries and other forms of transactions costs. Technically,
this approach takes the starting point of analysis to be arbitrarily sophisticated mecha-
nisms, institutions or contracts that could emerge to implement the optimal allocations
given the information asymmetries and transactions costs present. Then, we consider
whether the optimal outcomes obtainable through these sophisticated mechanisms could
be implemented with simpler, real world contracts and institutions.
It might be useful to compare the mechanism design approach with a popular alterna-
tive approach, which is to start from an environment where many markets are exogenously
closed, and then to introduce simple financial instruments one by one. This latter ap-
proach favours simple contractual forms (such as non-contingent debt) that might appeal
to real-world contracts.
9Some examples which we have found influential in encouraging this approach include Green and Oh
(1991), Kiyotaki (2010) and Wallace (2010).
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The key difference between the two approachs is that under the mechanism design
approach, simple institutions must emerge as optimal. Under the latter approach, simple
institutions can be favoured over more sophisticated institutions by preference for sim-
plicity. This latter approach tends to offer more support for policy interventions, if policy
institutions can replicate the payments associated with the missing sophisticated contracts
and institutions, and in particular if policies are not restricted to the simplicity assumed
to restrict private contracts. Under the mechanism design approach, there is typically a
lesser role for policy interventions. Any sophisticated policy introduced by the policy
maker is subject to the same information asymmetries that prevented the relevant markets
from opening in the first place.
It is important to note this distinction, which we will continue to refer to throughout
this work. In our view, neither approach is unambiguously favourable for policy exper-
iments in general, and at times we will employ the second approach where it provides
useful insights. It is plausible that in practise, agents prefer to use simple, standardised
contracts that may reduce transactions costs not present in our model, and that policymak-
ers may have a comparative advantage in developing state-contingent contracts in some
settings.10 On the other hand, it is certainly the case that in many circumstances, markets
are closed as a direct result of information asymmetries or other frictions which cannot
be overturned by policymakers.
THE ROLE OF POLICY
Throughout our analysis we will consider two distinct motivations for policy. In some of
the models we study, agents will be restriced arbitrarily from trade in securities that are
contingent on particular sets of states. For example, agents may be restricted to contracts
that are not contingent on commonly observable business cycle risks. In this case, agents
may want to trade contracts contingent on technology, output or inflation, but cannot, and
we may look for policy interventions contingent on these same risks that may improve
outcomes. Typically, but not always, we can think of these interventions as replicating the
payments that would have occured in the missing market.
10An example that macroeconomists will be familiar with is the study of monetary policy in sticky-
price New Keynesian models. Retailers are exogenously restricted from indexing their posted prices to
inflation, but monetary policymakers are free to adjust interest rates in response to inflation. This approach
assumes that the monetary policy authority has a comparative advantage in adjusting their control variable
in response to the observable variable, inflation.
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This motivation for policy intervention can be somewhat unsatisfying. We cannot
explain why agents are not trading in securities contingent on certain states, yet we expect
that the policymaker can easily commit to policy plans that are contingent on these same
states. We may rightly wonder why individual agents are passing up opportunities for
mutually beneficial trade.
The second motivation for policy will be in environments where we allow agents in
the economy to trade in a full set of state-contingent securities, subject to information
asymmetries. In these cases, the policymaker, who suffers from the same information
asymmetries as the agents, cannot replace the markets that have been endogenously closed
as a consequence of the friction. Nevertheless, there may still be a role for policy inter-
ventions in these environments (Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis, 2008, Greenwald and
Stiglitz, 1986). But the desirability of these policy interventions, an example of which
is described in the following sections, depends on the extent to which agents are free to
trade long term contracts and rights to participate in markets in future periods (Kilenthong
and Townsend, 2014). It is easiest to see the practical implications of the arguments of
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986) and Kilenthong and Townsend (2014) through an example.
AN EXAMPLE: THE MARKET FOR HEALTH INSURANCE
The market for health insurance suffers from moral hazard.11 Health insurance reduces
the cost of ill-health to the policy holder, and to that extent it reduces the incentive to live
a healthy lifestyle. Health risks taken by policyholders impose costs on their insurers,
and this conflict between policyholders and insurance companies can increase the costs
of policy provision, decrease the extent to which health risks can be pooled across agents
and also result in the excessive taking of health risks.
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986) show us that applying a subsidy on healthy behaviour,
such as a gym membership, can improve welfare by aligning the price schedule of the
policyholders with the social benefits of the healthy behaviour that are shared across all
insurance policyholders. This dampens the moral hazard problem, and can result in a
Pareto welfare improvement even if the subsidy is funded by distortionary taxes.12 Note
11The health insurance market also suffers from adverse selection, as individuals have private information
about their own health before purchasing insurance. This example will focus on the implications of moral
hazard.
12For an interesting discussion of this result and some qualifications, see Dixit (2003).
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that this intervention does not require the government to have any special information
about the behaviour of the policyholder that is not also known to all other agents in the
economy. Borrowing the language of Dixit (2003), it is assumed that the government is
benevolent, but not necessarily omniscient.
Kilenthong and Townsend (2014) show that decentralised trade could also achieve the
same constrained efficient outcome, as long as agents can commit to restrict their future
trade to particular markets. It may be difficult to think about what that means at first, what
it means for two agents in the real world to be trading “in different markets”, but it is not
as bizarre as it sounds and in fact is not uncommon.
Currently, a major UK health insurance firm offers its customers a 50% discount on
gym membership fees.13 Presumably, this health insurance firm finds it worthwhile to
encourage healthy lifestyles of policyholders (note that this offer would also to encourage
applicants who have a high demand for gym memberships, dampening the problem of
adverse selection). If private firms like this insurance company can bundle products in
a way that dampens the effects of moral hazard and adverse selection, this must surely
weaken the arguments of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (2008) and Greenwald and
Stiglitz (1986), reducing the desirability of government intervention in these markets.
In this example of a bundled offer of health insurance and gym services, policyholders
of this health insurance company face a different price schedule, and are effectively trad-
ing in a different market for gym memberships than non-policyholders. This means that
policyholders’ marginal rate of substitution between gym services and other goods does
not equate to the marginal rate of transformation faced by the producers of gym services.
It also means that policyholders’ marginal rate of substitution between gym services and
other goods will not equate to other consumers’ marginal rates of substitution, as they
face a different price schedule of gym services relative to other goods.
With the voucher in hand, it may be in an individual policyholder’s best interest to sell
the voucher to another agent who has a greater demand for gym services, equating ex post
marginal rates of substitution between gym services and other goods across policyholders
and non-policyholders. This ex post trade would eliminate any ex ante improvement in
the moral hazard and adverse selection problems that was obtained through the voucher
13http://www.pruhealth.co.uk/vitality/partners/virgin-active/ Accessed 5
July 2015.
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bundling scheme. It is clear that if private agents are to trade in bundled products of finan-
cial services, markets must have mechanisms for market exclusion for certain agents who
would wish to trade at current market prices. In our example, gym membership vouch-
ers offered by health insurance companies must not be transferable. The extent to which
these non-transferability exclusions are difficult to enforce may be a useful determinant
of the potential gains from policy intervention. When non-transferability exclusions are
straightforward to enforce in markets, then market mechanisms may work well to inter-
nalise externalities associated with information asymmetries. When non-transferability
exclusions are difficult to enforce, perhaps there is greater scope to for government inter-
vention through Pigouvian taxes along the lines of the suggestions of Geanakoplos and
Polemarchakis (2008) and Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986).
Many of the policy interventions we consider in this paper will be subject to the cri-
tiques developed by Kilenthong and Townsend (2014). We have not been able to find
an equivalent to our health insurance - gym membership bundle that would apply in the
specific scenarios we consider, and we think that within the specific examples we con-
sider, the re-trading restrictions that are required to implement the constrained efficient
competitive equilibria described by Kilenthong and Townsend (2014) are unlikely to be
enforceable. Nevertheless, we encourage the reader to bear this critique in mind when
considering the policy problems we derive in later chapters.
ROADMAP
Chapter 1 shows in an endowment economy model how departures from full systemic
risk sharing can dampen the incentive compatibility constraint, allowing a greater degree
of idiosyncratic risk sharing. In Chapter 2 we propose a new theory of debt finance as
an effective mechanism for sharing idiosyncratic risks, based on the costly state verifica-
tion framework. In Chapter 3, we show how entrepreneurs’ productive risk can quickly
transform into low employment, as wages fall below marginal revenue products of labour.
Chapter 4 considers markets for systemic risk insurance, showing that the market prices
for this insurance do not necessarily internalise balance sheet externalities, resulting in ex-
cessive swings in leverage and factor market wedges of inefficiency. Chapter 5 presents a
model where sticky nominal factor compensation contracts motivate herding externalities
under nominal income targeting monetary regimes.
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CHAPTER 1
PRIVATE INFORMATION AND RISK SHARING IN AN
ENDOWMENT ECONOMY
When individuals have private information about their own luck and income,
the sharing of idiosyncratic risks is hampered by moral hazard. It turns out
that these frictions acting on idiosyncratic risk sharing also affect the optimal
sharing of systemic risks. Restricting trade in systemic risk insurance can
assist agents in identifying those who have misreported their idiosyncratic or
individual specific risks. This relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint
relating to moral hazard and increases the extent to which idiosyncratic risks
can be shared.
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INTRODUCTION
This chapter considers the role of debt finance in an economy with aggregate risk, and
serves as a further, analytical introduction to the key themes of this dissertation. More
specifically, how do individual-specific information asymmetries, which limit the risk
sharing of idiosyncratic risks, interact with the sharing of common shocks that are freely
observable to all agents?
We explore this question within the simple 2 period endowment economy model de-
scribed by Green and Oh (1991) and Kiyotaki (2010). The model can also be thought
of as a two-period version of the model of Cole and Kocherlakota (2001). We’ll derive
the well-known result that in an economy with no aggregate risk but with private infor-
mation about idiosyncratic risk, constrained efficient allocations can be implemented by
competitive trade in simple risk-free debt contracts (Proposition 1.1).
Then we will introduce aggregate (or systemic) risk through a common shock to en-
dowments. When aggregate risk is present, constrained efficient allocations cannot be
supported by risk-free debt contracts alone (Proposition 1.2). Compared with constrained
efficient allocations, the competitive allocations under simple debt contracts allocates too
much risk to the borrower agents who received a low endowment in the first period. A
Pareto welfare improvement can be obtained by either (1) the opening of markets for se-
curities contingent on the common shock, or (2) through a policy intervention that repli-
cates the missing market for securities contingent on the common shock by redistributing
wealth from creditors to debtors when the common shock is small, and from debtors to
creditors when the common shock is large.
We’ll then show that opening systemic risk markets (or replicating their effects with
fiscal transfers) does not result in constrained efficient allocations (Proposition 1.3). Con-
strained efficient allocations require deviations from full across-aggregate state risk shar-
ing that are not consistent with sequential trade in aggregate state-contingent debt con-
tracts.
Compared with the competitive equilibrium with sequential trade in aggregate state-
contingent debt contracts, the constrained efficient allocations dampen the sensitivity of
low reporting agents’ consumption to aggregate risks. This perturbation relaxes the truth-
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telling constraint, as this aggregate risk insurance plan is undesirable to misreporting high
endowment households who would prefer to bear a greater share of aggregate risk in
return for higher expected consumption.
This Chapter concludes with discussions about the efficiency of risk sharing in de-
centralised markets in economies that experience booms and recessions, the difficulties
of determining whether or not risk markets are closed, and if closed, whether or not this
closure is inefficient, and the importance of assumptions about systemic risk sharing ar-
rangements for policy analysis in macroeconomic models. These discussions are set in
the wider context of the literature on business cycle stabilisation policy.
1.1 THE MODEL
A unit measure of ex ante identical agents live for two periods. Agents enjoy con-
sumption with c according to utility function U(c), where U is in the Decreasing Ab-
solute Risk Aversion (DARA) class of preferences (U ′,−U ′′ > 0, A′(c) < 0, where
A(c) = −U ′′(c)/U ′(c) is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion).1 Agents’
discount second period instantaneous utility by factor β. In the first period, individ-
ual agents receive endowment yl with probability pil and yh with probability pih, where
yl < yh and pil + pih = 1. In period 2, all agents receive common endowment z, where
yl < z < pilyl + pihyh. That is, the second period endowment received by all agents is
less than the expected first period endowment, but greater than the first period endowment
received by low income agents. There exists a durable good, which converts the period 1
consumption good into the period 2 consumption good. First period savings x return Rx
units of the period 2 consumption good, where R = 1/β. Without loss of generality, the
consumption enjoyed by an individual agent earning yl in period 1 is denoted c1l.
Within the class of problems we consider in this Chapter, the revelation principle
holds, and we can consider the constrained efficient allocations of any given problem to be
attainable by a direct mechanism implemented by a benevolent social planner. Through-
out this chapter, we’ll consider the planner’s solutions to the problems we consider, before
considering whether or not these solutions can be obtained through decentralised trade us-
ing only a small set of simple contracts.
1The DARA class of preferences includes as a subset the class of utility functions exhibiting Constant
Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA), where relative risk aversion is defined as cA(c).
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The social planner aims to maximise the ex ante expected discounted utility of agents.
Note that there is no conflict between agents at time zero, before the idiosyncratic risk y
is drawn. The planner’s objective function is
max
c,x
pilU(c1l) + pihU(c1h) + β[pilU(c2l) + pihU(c2h)] (1.1)
The planner’s first and second period resource constraints are as follows and we attach
Lagrange multipliers λ1, λ2 to them respectively:
pilyl + pihyh ≥ pilc1l + pihc1h + x (1.2)
z +Rx ≥ pilc2l + pihc2h (1.3)
The first period budget constraint (1.2) states that the sum of first period consumption
across agents and savings (RHS) must be less than or equal to the total first period en-
dowment income across agents (LHS). The second period budget constraint (1.3) states
that total second period consumption (RHS) cannot exceed the sum of second period in-
come and the gross return to first period savings (LHS). It is clear that in constrained
efficiency requires that both resource constraints (1.2,1.3) are binding. If either constraint
were not binding, it must be the case that there is an individual agent whose consumption
could be increased without violation of any of the constraints faced by the social planner.
1.2 PERFECT INFORMATION
With perfect information, the planner solves (1.1) subject to the resource constraints
(1.2,1.3). The first order necessary conditions can be written as follows
c1i : λ1 = U
′(c1l) = U ′(c1h)
c2i : λ2/β = U
′(c2l) = U ′(c2h)
x : λ1 = Rλ2
From the first order necessary conditions, we can see that under the planner’s solution,
agents enjoy full consumption insurance, with consumption equated across high and low
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income agents. Agents also enjoy perfect consumption smoothing, with
c1l = c1h = c2l = c2h =
1
1 + β
[pilyl + pihyh + βz] .
This solution characterises the first-best efficient allocations in our model. The incomes of
high endowment and low endowment agents are shared, as though all agents hold equity
shares in each others’ incomes. The storage technology is used to smooth the consumption
of all households over the two periods.
1.3 PRIVATE INFORMATION
Now, consider the same model, but where the planner cannot directly observe which
agents have received the high endowments, and which have received the low endowments.
It is also assumed that individuals savings held in the durable good cannot be observed by
the planner.2 Agents now have the option of lying about their endowment to the planner,
and saving any excess income they do not wish to consume in the first period, earning
return R on all savings. The revelation principle holds in our environment, and optimal
allocations can be implemented by the planner, whose problem is now subject to the
following truth-telling constraint to which we attach the Lagrange multiplier µ:
U(c1h) + βU(c2h) = V (c1l + yh − yl, c2l). (1.4)
The value function V represents the expected discounted utility obtainable by an agent
who receives a high endowment and fraudulently declares a low endowment. In the first
period, they recieve a transfer from the planner equal to c1l − yl, which is added to their
true endowment of yh. In the second period they receive transfer c2l − z, which they can
add to their endowment z and the gross return from any private savings in the durable
good.
It is clear to see that any similar constraint to ensure truth-telling from agents receiving
a low endowment would not be binding under any optimal consumption plan. The primary
objective of the planner is to provide insurance to agents receiving low endowments, and
2The assumption that storage is hidden is important. When storage is observable, misreporting high type
agents are unable to smooth consumption. This inability to smooth consumption can be manipulated by the
social planner to provide some consumption insurance across high and low type agents that is not possible
when storage is hidden. See Green and Oh (1991) and Kiyotaki (2010) for details.
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it is always in the interest of those agents to declare their endowments truthfully.
We now solve for the value attainable by a recipient of a high endowment who misre-
ports their endowment before returning to the planner’s problem.
1.3.1 THE VALUE OF MISREPORTING
Consider a recipient of a high endowment who reports a low endowment. We denote their
consumption allocations in periods 1 and 2 by cˆ1 and cˆ2 respectively. As storage is hidden,
this agent can use the storage technology to smooth consumption across the two periods.
The misreporting agent solves the following problem
V (c1l + yh − yl, c2l) = max
cˆ,x
U(cˆ1) + βU(cˆ2)
subject to the resource constraints
c1l + yh − yl ≥ cˆ1 + xˆ,
Rxˆ+ c2l ≥ cˆ2.
The left hand side of the first resource constraint adds the difference between high and
low endowments (the hidden part of the endowment) to the consumption allocation of a
truth-telling low endowment agent. The left hand side of the second resource constraint
adds the gross return of any hidden savings to the consumption allocation of a truth-telling
low endowment agent. The solution to this problem is
cˆ1 = cˆ2 =
1
1 + β
[c1l + yh − yl + βc2l]
V (c1l + yh − yl, c2l) = (1 + β)U
(
1
1 + β
[c1l + yh − yl + βc2l]
)
(1.5)
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1.3.2 THE PLANNER’S SOLUTION
The planner maximises (1.1) subject to the resource constraints (1.2,1.3) and the truth-
telling constraint (1.4) with the solution (1.5). The first order necessary conditions are
c1l : pilλ1 = pilU
′(c1l)− µU ′
(
1
1 + β
[c1l + yh − yl + βc2l]
)
c2l : pilλ2 = pilβU
′(c2l)− µβU ′
(
1
1 + β
[c1l + yh − yl + βc2l]
)
c1h : pihλ1 = pihU
′(c1h) + µU ′(c1h)
c2h : pihλ2 = pihβU
′(c2h) + µβU ′(c2h)
x : λ1 = Rλ2
It is straightforward to verify that the solution to this problem is
c1l = c2l =
1
1 + β
[yl + βz], c1h = c2h =
1
1 + β
[yh + βz]. (1.6)
1.3.3 COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM WITH NON-CONTINGENT DEBT
The solution described by Equation 1.6 is consistent with consumption smoothing over
time by individual agents (βU ′(c2l)/U ′(c1l) = 1/R), which under our specific restrictions
on parameter values (notably β = 1/R) means that individual consumption paths are
constant across time (c1j = c2j). But the solution also restricts the total present value of
consumption of each agent to be equal to the present value of their endowment paths (c1l+
βc2l = yl + βz). This indicates that there is no sharing of the idiosyncratic endowment
shocks across agents. There is no redistribution of present value wealth after endowments
are realised in period 1.
Proposition 1.1 shows that these constrained optimal allocations described in (1.6) can
be implemented through decentralised trade in one period non-contingent loans, where
this loan market opens after endowments have been realised in period 1. These loan
markets enable agents to bring forward or delay consumption from and to the future,
which offers an improvement in welfare terms relative to autarky, but little insurance
against endowment risks.
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Proposition 1.1 When aggregate income is constant, the constrained efficient allocations
under private information with hidden storage can be implemented with decentralised
trade in non-contingent one period debt contracts.
The proof of Proposition 1.1 is contained in Appendix 1.A.
1.4 SYSTEMIC RISK
Now we introduce systemic risk through an aggregate endowment shock in period 2. The
common endowment received in period 2 can take the values zL < zH , with probabilities
νL, νH respectively, where νL + νH = 1.
What we’re interested in is how the aggregate risk z is shared, and whether decen-
tralised trade in the simple debt contracts we considered in the previous section can still
implement constrained efficient allocations. We start by describing the planner’s problem
and the planner’s first order necessary conditions before considering whether these con-
ditions can be satisfied by decentralised sequential trade in non-contingent or aggregate
state-contingent debt securities. Then we return to solve the planner’s problem and derive
the intuition behind our result that decentralised trade in these simple contracts cannot
implement constrained efficient allocations.
1.4.1 THE PLANNER’S PROBLEM
When the economy suffers from systemic risk, the planner’s objective function takes ex-
pectations of individual utilities across individual agents and aggregate states (z). The
planner’s objective function can be written as follows,
max
c,x
pilU(c1l) + pihU(c1h) + β Ez [pi1U(c2l(z)) + pihU(c2h(z))] ,
subject to the budget constraints,
pilyl + pihyh ≥ pilc1l + pihc1h + x, (λ1)
Rx+ z ≥ pilc2l(z) + pihc2h(z) z ∈ {zL, zH}. (λ2(z))
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The first period budget constraint is the same as in the earlier cases with no systemic risk.
The second period budget constraints are contingent on the realisation of the common
shock (z).
The incentive compatibility constraints also change. Agents report their endowments
following realisation in period 1. Therefore, when deciding whether or not to report
truthfully, they must take expectations over the allocation policy rule (c2l(z)) and the
distribution of common shocks (z). The first incentive compatibility constraint is
U(c1h) + βEU(c2h(z)) ≥ V (c1l + yh − yl, c2l(z)), (µ)
where V (c1l + yh − yl, c2l) describes the value obtainable to a an agent who receives a
high endowment in the first period but declares a low income to the social planner.
The first step in solving the planner’s problem is to consider the value attainable by
high endowment agents who misreport their endowment.
1.4.2 THE VALUE OF MISREPORTING
A recipient of a high endowment who reports a low endowment solves the following
problem
V (c1l + yh − yl, c2l(z)) = max
cˆ,x
U(cˆ1) + βEU(cˆ2(z))
subject to the resource constraints
c1l + yh − yl ≥ cˆ1 + xˆ, (λˆ1)
Rxˆ+ c2l(z) ≥ cˆ2(z) ∀z. (λˆ2(z))
The agent’s first order conditions are
cˆ1 : λˆ1 = U
′(cˆ1)
cˆ2(z) : λˆ2(z) = βU
′(cˆ2(z))
x : λˆ1 = REλˆ2(z)
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The most important parts of this solution for our purposes are that the intertemporal
marginal rate of substitution for misreporting agents is equated to their marginal rate of
transformation—the return to the savings technology R, and that the difference in state-
contingent consumption allocations of the misreporting agents are equal to those same
differences for low reporting truth-telling agents. That is,
cˆ2(zH)− cˆ2(zL) = c2l(zH)− c2h(zL).
What this shows is that any high earning agent who misreports their wealth must enter
into the same systemic risk insurance plan as low endowment agents. We can summarise
these two results as follows:
V1 = REzV2(z)/P (z), and (1.7)
V2(zL)/P (zL)
V2(zH)/P (zH)
<
U(c2l(zL))
U(c2l(zH))
.3 (1.8)
As we’ll see, this creates an opportunity for the planner to implement some insurance
against idiosyncratic risks. Specifically, the planner can use the fact that systemic risk
insurance plans that are desirable to low wealth individuals are likely to be undesirable to
high endowment individuals. We can use this to elicit truth-telling from high endowment
agents even when this results in a small transfer of wealth.
1.4.3 THE PLANNER’S FIRST ORDER NECESSARY CONDITIONS
The planner’s first order necessary conditions are described by the following:
c1l : 0 = pilU
′(c1l)− pilλ1 − µV1(c1l + yh − yl, c2l(z))
c1h : 0 = pihU
′(c1h)− pihλ1 + µU ′(c1h)
x : 0 = λ1 −REλ2(z)
c2l(z) : 0 = P (z)pilβU
′(c2l(z))− P (z)pi1λ2(z)− µV2(c1l + yh − yl, c2l(z))
c2h(z) : 0 = P (z)pihβU
′(c2h(z))− P (z)pihλ2(z) + µβP (z)U ′(c2h(z))
3This makes use of the assumption of DARA preferences.
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1.4.4 THE PLANNER’S SOLUTION: KEY FEATURES
Eliminating µ from the planner’s first order conditions with respect to the consumption
allocations of high endowment individuals yields
U ′(c1h)
λ1
=
βU ′(c2h(z))
λ2(z)
Which ensures first that high endowment agents receive systemic risk consumption insur-
ance commensurate with the planner’s marginal value of second period wealth,
U ′(c2h(zL))
U ′(c2h(zH))
=
λ2(zL)
λ2(zH)
and second, when combined with the first order condition for aggregate savings x, that
the high endowment agents’ intertemporal marginal rates of substitution equate to the
intertemporal marginal rate of transformation specified by the storage technology, R,
EzβU ′(c2h(z))
U ′(c1h)
=
1
R
.
Turning to the low endowment households, eliminating µ from the first order conditions
for their consumption allocations yields
U ′(c1l)− λ1
V1(c1l + yh − yl, c2l(z)) =
U ′(c2l(z))− λ2(z)
V2(c1l + yh − yl, c2l(z))/P (z) .
Substituting the solutions 1.7 and 1.7 yields
U ′(c2l(zL))
U ′(c2l(zH))
<
λ2(zL)
λ2(zH)
, and
EzβU ′(c2l(z))
U ′(c1l)
=
1
R
.
The first equation shows that low endowment agents are protected from systemic risk (z),
to such an extent that their second period marginal utility is less sensitive to systemic risk
than that of high endowment agents:
U ′(c2l(zL))
U ′(c2l(zH))
<
U ′(c2h(zL))
U ′(c2h(zH))
. (1.9)
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The second equation shows that low endowment agents’ intertemporal marginal rates of
substitution are equated to the social marginal rate of transformation (the return on the
storage technology) under constrained efficient allocations.
We’ll show in the following sections that this is not consistent with competitive equi-
libria under trade in non-contingent or aggregate state-contingent loans, before returning
to the intuition behind this result and the lessons that we can learn from it.
1.4.5 COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM WITH NON-CONTINGENT DEBT
In period 1, upon realisaton of endowments, individual agent in receipt of endowment yi
can buy (+) or offer (-) unlimited quantities of non-contingent debt bi, each unit of which
returns one unit of the consumption good in the second period. The agent’s problem can
be written as follows:
max
ci,xi,bi
U(c1i) + βU(c2i)
subject to the resource constraints
yi ≥ c1i + xi +Qbi, (λ1i)
Rxi + bi + z ≥ c2i(z). (λ2i(z))
In symmetric equilibrium, the total supply of one period bonds must be equal to zero:
pilbl + pihbh = 0.
The first order necessary conditions are
c1i : λ1i = U
′(c1i)
c2i : λ2i = βU
′(c2i(z))
x : λ1i = REλ2i(z)
b : Qλ1i = Eλ2i(z)
Proposition 1.2 With systemic risk present, the competitive equilibrium with non-contingent
debt only is not constrained efficient.
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The proof of Proposition 1.2 is contained in Appendix 1.B.
The problem with the non-contingent debt contracts is that while they do provide
some intertemporal insurance in the form of consumption smoothing, they do not provide
sufficient insurance against systemic risks. Creditors (receivers of high endowments) and
debtors (low endowments) face identical absolute consumption risks in the second period
with respect to the systemic risk. But debtors have higher expected marginal utility in
the second period than debtors, and any absolute decrease in consumption results in a
greater increase in marginal utility than that suffered by a creditor following the identical
absolute change in consumption (under DARA preferences). That is, in the competitive
equilibrium with non-contingent debt,
U ′(c2l(zL))
U ′(c2l(zH))
>
U ′(c2h(zL))
U ′(c2h(zH))
,
which contradicts 1.9.
It is this difference in how each group’s marginal utilities respond to the systemic
risk that indicates that a market for systemic risk insurance, or an allocation mechanism
replicating the missing systemic risk insurance could yield a Pareto welfare gain.
Now, we introduce a market for systemic risk insurance into our competitive environ-
ment.
1.4.6 THE COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM WITH STATE-CONTINGENT DEBT CONTRACTS
We’ve shown that simple non-contingent debt contracts cannot implement constrained
efficient allocations when our endowment economy suffers from aggregate or systemic
risk. Ex ante, all individual agents are identical, but after the realisation of idiosyncratic
risk, some agents have greater wealth and consumption than others. These low wealth
individuals are less able and willing to bear systemic risk than the higher wealth individ-
uals. Since the outcome of the systemic risk is common knowledge, the planner is able to
construct a superior mechanism that does provide low wealth agents with some insurance
against the systemic risk shock, resulting in a Pareto welfare improvement.
In this section, we consider whether decentralised trade could achieve constrained
efficient allocations, if individual agents were able to trade a richer set of securities that
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allowed for payoffs that respond to the outcome of the systemic risk.
In period 1, upon realisaton of endowments, individual agent in receipt of endowment
yi can buy (+) or offer (-) unlimited quantities of state-contingent debt bi(z′), each unit
of which returns one unit of the consumption good in the second period if and only if the
realisation of z is z = z′. Each security b(z′) trades at price Q(z′) in period 1.
The agent’s problem can be written as follows:
max
ci,xi,bi
U(c1i) + βU(c2i)
subject to the resource constraints
yi ≥ c1i + xi +Q(z)bi(z), (λ1i)
Rxi + bi(z) + z ≥ c2i(z). (λ2i(z))
In symmetric equilibrium, the total supply of bonds contingent on state z must be equal
to zero:
pilbl(z) + pihbh(z) = 0 ∀z.
The first order necessary conditions are
c1i : λ1i = U
′(c1i)
c2i : λ2i = βU
′(c2i(z))
x : λ1i = REλ2i(z)
b(z) : Q(z)λ1i = λ2i(z) ∀z
We can see straight away that the agents in our economy do in fact utilise the state-
contingent contracts. There is full consumption risk sharing with respect to the systemic
risk, z:
U ′(c2h(z))
U ′(c1h)
=
U ′(c2l(z))
U ′(c1l)
= Q(z) ∀z. (1.10)
Proposition 1.3 With systemic risk present, the competitive equilibrium with state-contingent
debt is not constrained efficient.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 1.3 follows directly from consideration of equation 1.10,
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which directly contradicts equation 1.9.
When systemic risk markets are open, and loan contracts can be written to be contin-
gent on the aggregate state, there is full consumption insurance. High income and low
income agents experience the same variation in marginal utilities across aggregate states.
But what equation 1.9 shows us is that we can do better than this full systemic risk
insurance allocation by even further protecting low endowment agents from fluctuations
in systemic risk. By making their income more ‘sticky’ relative to total income.
The reason why this increased protection of low endowment individuals to systemic
risks is useful is that in decentralised trade, high wealth individuals are natural sellers of
insurance against systemic risks, increasing their exposure to systemic risks in exchange
for a small insurance premium paid for by low wealth individuals. Misreporting agents,
like truth-telling high income agents, are also tolerant of systemic risks and would wish
to sell insurance against them. But misreporting agents are restricted by the planner in
their exposure to systemic risk, such that their absolute consumption allocation varies
according to systemic risk to the same extent as that of truth-telling low income agents.
This restriction discourages high income agents from misreporting their incomes, relaxing
their incentive compatibility constraint and allowing the planner to achieve some sharing
of idiosyncratic risks. This increased insurance against idiosyncratic risks provide an ex
ante welfare gain to all agents.
The planner in our model identifies misreporting agents by their demand for a certain
good. In our case, misreporting agents have a higher demand for exposure to systemic
risk than truth-telling low type agents. If we were to relax the assumption that storage is
hidden then we can also identify misreporting agents by their demand for savings, which
is greater than truth-telling low reporting agents (Green and Oh, 1991). This identification
of misreporting agents through their differentiated demands for loans and systemic risk
is not unrealistic and should not be restricted to the blackboard. It is a feature of real
world contract and law enforcement. For a dramatic example, readers might recall the
1990 film Goodfellas. In one scene, short-tempered Tommy DeVito (played by Joe Pesci)
scolds his mob colleagues for purchasing fur coats and expensive cars immediately after a
successful heist. DeVito’s concern is that these conspicuous purchases might reveal their
recent windfall to polices, identifying them as suspects.
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It is important to stress that the insights developed in this section, and summarised
by Proposition 1.3, can only be derived when we approach the problem of systemic risk
sharing starting with a clear microfoundation for the use of non-contingent debt as a
mechanism for managing idiosyncratic risk. That is, starting from the assumption that
agents have private information about their individual specific idiosyncratic risks. If we
had instead taken non-contingent debt contracts as the starting point, restricting contracts
directly rather than as a response to the incentive compatibility constraint, we would have
missed the interaction between systemic risk sharing arrangements and the incentive com-
patibility constraint. We would have missed the insight that a small departure from full
systemic risk sharing can help agents share idiosyncratic risks.
1.5 CAN MARKETS IMPLEMENT THE CONSTRAINED EFFICIENT
ALLOCATIONS?
We’ve seen that with simple one-period debt instruments, and with slightly more sophis-
ticated one-period state-contingent debt contracts, competitive markets cannot implement
the constrained efficient allocations described in the previous section. This does not mean
that decentralised trade cannot implement constrained efficient allocations.
The mechanism implemented by the social planner at time zero provides an ex ante
welfare improvement to all agents, who would wish to enter into the mechanism or a
sophisticated set of contracts at time zero replicating the state-contingent transfers imple-
mented by the social planner in periods 1 and 2. Kilenthong and Townsend (2014) show
that decentralised trade in an appropriate set of multi-period contracts can implement
constrained efficient allocations in a generalised incomplete markets setting in which our
model can be thought of as a specific example.
These contracts would need to satisfy the condition (1.9). Equation 1.9 shows that un-
der the constrained efficient allocations, the across-state marginal rates of substitution are
not equated across agents. This means that under any constrained efficient mechanism,
individual agents would want to re-open systemic risk insurance markets prior to the reali-
sation of the systemic risk in period 2. Any re-opening of systemic risk insurance markets
in period 1 would result in the equation of across-state marginal rates of substitution, and
therefore would not be consistent with constrained efficiency.
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The question of whether decentralised trade can implement constrained efficient allo-
cations depends largely on whether agents can commit not to trade in future periods, or
whether trading institutions can be arranged such that any two agents who would wish to
trade in period 1 would be restricted from doing so.
This may be possible in some market environments. In the introduction to this dis-
sertation we described a health insurance company who offered a bundled package com-
bining health insurance with discounted gym membership in an effort to combat adverse
selection, by encouraging applicants who place a high value on gym memberships, and
moral hazard, by encouraging the use of gym facilities by health insurance customers. In
our environment, the time zero bundling of commitments to loan and savings instruments
as well as mechanisms for sharing the period 2 income at interest rates and prices that de-
viate from ex post market clearing rates and prices could plausibly enforce the deviations
from period 1 intertemporal and across-state risk sharing associated with the constrained
efficient allocations.
Green and Oh (1991) study a related example with no systemic risk but with observ-
able storage where the constrained efficient mechanism requires similar restrictions from
mutually beneficial trade in one-period loan contracts in period 1. They argue that ele-
ments of the solution can resemble a credit rationing behaviour, and that this behaviour
can explain some of the features of rural US financial markets with monopolistic banks.
An important feature of these markets is that the monopoly status of the bank means that
there is no opportunity for mutually-benificial side trades in loan contracts.
1.6 WHICH MARKETS ARE OPEN?
In Green and Oh (1991), which studies a similar environment but with observable storage,
efficient allocations require that loan markets are partially closed when future income is
expected to be low.4 Here, in a very similar framework, we’ve shown that efficient allo-
cations require systemic risk markets to be partially closed when future income is highly
risky or uncertain. In sum, these simple endowment economy models are suggesting that
during recessions and periods of uncertainty, private information relating to individual
specific risks can impair the functioning of non-contingent loan markets and systemic
4By ‘partially closed’ I mean that there exist individual pairs of agents who could realise mutual gains
from trade in these markets at period 1.
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risk insurance markets that would not normally be considered to be hampered by these
types of individual specific information asymmetries. Frictions which restrict the sharing
of individual specific risks also affect the sharing of aggregate risks.
It would be a mistake for the observer to conclude that the absence of apparently mu-
tually beneficial trade in loan and insurance markets is conclusive evidence of constrained
inefficiency that warrants policy intervention. Green and Oh (1991) provocatively refer
to their result as an “efficient credit crunch”. Our result described here can be thought of
as an efficient closing of systemic risk insurance markets, which perhaps doesn’t have the
same ring as “efficient credit crunch”, but still results in a departure from what might be
considered a fair allocation of business cycle risk. Some households experience greater
swings in marginal utility over the business cycle than others.
On the other hand, it is difficult to argue that the financial market disruption and
consequent shut down of credit markets in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis was the
constrained efficient response of an ex ante optimal mechanism of appropriately bundled
state-contingent securities. It is even more difficult to argue that widespread unemploy-
ment pursuant to the financial crisis was a necessary consequence of constrained efficient
market arrangements, or that the distributional sharing of business cycle risks observed in
2008 was efficiently unfair. Credit crunches and closed insurance markets are surely not
always and everywhere constrained efficient.
The picture that is emerging is that fiscal and monetary policymakers face a challeng-
ing problem when determining which markets are open and closed, and whether perceived
arrangements are consistent with efficient mechanisms and contracts or whether there is
a role for policy interventions in implementing Pareto superior allocations.
1.6.1 THE PLANNER’S PROBLEM IN RELATED LITERATURE
A number of recent papers in macroeconomics have considered economies where agents
are restricted to trading in non-contingent one period debt contracts. Christiano and Ikeda
(2011) consider the role of a series of government interventions in a sample of four popu-
lar financial macroeconomics models. In their analysis, which assumes that loan contracts
are not contingent to systemic risks, transfers from creditor households to entrepreneurs
during downturns tend to provide useful stabilisation gains.
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In Koenig (2011) and Sheedy (2014), agents are restricted to nominal debt contracts,
which are not contingent to aggregate risks. Monetary policy frameworks which aim to
stabilise nominal GDP tend to redistribute real wealth from creditors to debtors during
periods when real output is low. These real transfers, which do not occur under inflation
or price level targeting frameworks, replicate the missing transfers that would occur if
markets for securities contingent on aggregate states were traded.
In the above papers, the way that policy works is by replicating payments that agents
would wish to implement themselves, and could implement with sequential competitive
trade in one period systemic risk insurance markets. Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian
(2014) show in the popular financial accelerator model of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1999) that sequential trade in systemic risk insurance markets could bring the competitive
equilibrium of the model very close to the first-best efficient alternative. Krishnamurthy
(2003) and Nikolov (2014) show a similar result in the collateral amplification model of
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
What these models share is a common feature that when systemic risk insurance mar-
kets are open, the invisible hand allocates resources in such a way that consumption in-
surance (equating marginal utilities of consumption) is compromised in favour of stabil-
isation of leverage and financial market stress. More specifically, the market prices of
systemic risk insurance fully internalise the balance sheet externalities that drive depar-
tures from efficient outcomes in these models. In this way, the outcome of insurance trade
is to dampen financial crises.
What we show in Chapter 4 is that these two quite different models constitute special
cases of the general financial macroeconomic framework, in which there is no guaran-
tee that the invisible hand will forego consumption insurance against stabilisation of the
financial sector. Market prices of systemic risk insurance do not fully internalise bal-
ance sheet externalities. We also show that the payments and transfers associated with
complete systemic risk markets can resemble simple realistic institutions such as deposit
accounts. The implication is that financial stress is not necessarily conclusive evidence
that systemic risk insurance markets are closed, and that attempts to open these markets
may not bring the desired improvements in financial stability.
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1.A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.1
Proof. In period 1, upon realisaton of endowments, individual agent in receipt of endow-
ment yi can buy (+) or offer (-) unlimited quantities of non-contingent debt bi, each unit
of which returns one unit of the consumption good in the second period. The agent’s
problem can be written as follows:
max
ci,xi,bi
U(c1i) + βU(c2i)
subject to the resource constraints
yi ≥ c1i + xi +Qbi, (λ1i)
Rxi + bi + z ≥ c2i. (λ2i)
In symmetric equilibrium, the total supply of one period bonds must be equal to zero:
pilbl + pihbh = 0.
The first order necessary conditions are
c1i : λ1i = U
′(c1i)
c2i : λ2i = βU
′(c2i)
x : λ1 = Rλ2
b : Qλ1 = λ2
The agents’ first order necessary conditions can be rearranged to show that agents’ optimal
consumption profile exhibits constant consumption over periods 1 and 2:
c1h = c2h and c1l = c2l.
The value of c1i that satisfies c1i = c2i and the individual budget constraints for the agent
receiving endowment i is
c1i =
1
1 + β
[yi + βz],
which is identical to the solution 1.6.
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1.B PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.2
Proof.
Consider a mechanism that replicates the consumption allocations that are identical
to those enjoyed by agents under the competitive equilibrium with non-contingent debt.
Non-contingent debt does not allow for transfers of wealth contingent on the common
shock z. Given this, and the fact that the first order conditions of the individual agents
under competitive trade with non-contingent debt result in the gross interest rate being
equated to the gross return to hidden savings (1/Q = R), solving the value function of
misreporting agents yields the following:
V1(c1l + yh − yl, c2l(z)) = U ′(c1h)
V2(c1l + yh − yl, c2l(z)) = βP (z)U ′(c2h(z)).
Substituting these solutions into the planner’s first order necessary conditions, we obtain
the following:
µ = pil
[
U ′(c1l)− λ1
U ′(c1h)
]
= pih
[
λ1 − U ′(c1h)
U ′(c1h)
]
µ = pil
[
βU ′(c2l(z))− λ2(z)
βU ′(c2h(z))
]
= pih
[
λ2(z)− βU ′(c2h(z))
βU ′(c2h(z))
]
∀z.
These conditions can be rearranged to obtain
λ1
U ′(c1h)
− λ2(z)
βU ′(c2h(z))
= 0
U ′(c1l)
U ′(c1h)
=
U ′(c2l(zH))
U ′(c2h(zH))
=
U ′(c2l(zL))
U ′(c2h(zL))
. (1.11)
As non-contingent debt does not allow transfers between agents contingent on z, the in-
dividual agents’ budget constraints specify that the absolute difference in consumption
across the common shock (z) is equated across individual agents:
c2l(zH)− c2l(zL) = c2h(zH)− c2h(zL).
But, as non-contingent debt also does not allow transfers of wealth across agents, the
consumption smoothing by individual agents specified by their individual first order nec-
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essary conditions means that
c2l(z) < c2h(z) ∀z.
Under DARA preferences, it can be shown that U ′′′(c) > 0. It follows that under the
competitive equilibrium under non-contingent debt contracts,
U ′(c2l(zL))
U ′(c2l(zH))
>
U ′(c2h(zL))
U ′(c2h(zH))
.
This is a contradiction with 1.11, completing the proof.
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DISPUTES AND THE OPTIMALITY OF STANDARD DEBT
This chapter is co-authored with Charles Nolan.1
We show how the prospect of disputes over firms’ revenue reports promotes
debt financing over equity. These findings are presented within a costly state
verification model with a risk averse entrepreneur. The prospect of disputes
encourages incentive regimes which limit penalties and avoid stochastic mon-
itoring, even when the lender can commit to stochastic enforcement strate-
gies. Consequently, optimal contracts shift away from equity and toward
standard debt. For a useful special case of the model, closed form solutions
are presented for leverage and consumption allocations under efficient debt
contracts.
1Professor of Economics, University of Glasgow. Charles.Nolan@glasgow.ac.uk. An earlier
version of this chapter has been circulated as a discussion paper under the title Disputes, Debt and Equity,
University of Glasgow Economics Discussion Paper 2014-21. The authors would like to thank Andrew
Clausen, John Hardman Moore, Joel Sobel, Jonathan Thomas and Yiannis Vailakis in addition to confer-
ence and seminar participants at the University of Glasgow Macrotheory Seminar Series, the Reserve Bank
of New Zealand, the 2014 Money Macro Finance Annual Conference, the 2015 Western Economics Associ-
ation Annual Conference and the 2015 Royal Economic Society Annual Conference for helpful comments
and discussions. We would also like to thank the Scottish Institute for Research in Economics for generous
financial support. All errors are our own.
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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
What form should an optimal contract take to handle the prospect of wrongful penalties?
Our answer is that standard debt contracts are often optimal. We propose a theory of debt
and limited liability based on inaccurate auditing in a costly state verification framework.
As we detail presently, costly state verification environments typically imply that eq-
uity contracts are optimal. However, that conclusion is shown to rest crucially on the
efficacy of the audit technology. We introduce wrongful penalties through an imperfect
audit technology.2 With perfect auditing, optimal contracts can economize on audit costs
ex post by committing to sufficiently severe penalties ex ante. Consequently, deterministic
auditing is not optimal. Moreover, enjoying access to a perfect audit technology, agents
may write contracts which pass on small fluctuations in revenue to security holders. How-
ever, a key insight under imperfect auditing is that the prospect of disputes and wrongful
penalties restricts acceptable contracts to using smaller penalties than would otherwise be
the case.3 Smaller penalties come at the cost of encouraging fraudulent reports for any
given repayment schedule. So, whilst increasing the frequency of audits can help with
risk sharing, it also implies levying more wrongful penalties.
The key insight behind the result of this paper is the extent to which the marginal
benefit of an increase in the probability of auditing depends on the precision of the audit
technology.
When audits are perfect, all audited misreporting agents are exposed as misreporting
their individual revenue. If penalties are sufficiently large, agents can be deterred from
misreporting their even if the probability that they will be detected is low. When the prob-
ability of audit is sufficiently high, any marginal increase in the probability of audit yields
no further incentive benefits, but does suffer resource costs. This means that deterministic
audit strategies will not be used. On the other hand, starting from a contract with no risk
sharing and no audits, the marginal benefits from a small increase in the probability of
audit can be large, allowing a high degree of risk sharing with little resources spent on
2Our results carry over to other situations where the lender or bankruptcy court might erroneously dis-
pute the borrower’s revenue report.
3Our model is static, and our penalties are just units of the consumption good, but this reasoning car-
ries over to alternative settings where alternative enforcement schemes such as non-pecuniary penalties
or exclusion may be applied. When disputes are possible, even honest borrowers prefer the penalties for
dishonesty to be smaller, all else equal.
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audits, as even the small probability of audit can deter misreporting when combined with
large penalties.
When audits are imperfect, the story changes. Even if the probability of audit is high,
further increases in the probability of audit can always provide some marginal benefit
by allowing contracts to achieve the same insurance profile with smaller penalties. As
penalties are sometimes wrongly applied to truth-telling agents, any reduction in penalties
provides an ex ante expected welfare gain.4 On the other hand, starting from a contract
with no auditing and no risk sharing, a small increase in the probability of audit yields a
much smaller insurance benefit, for two reasons. First, penalties are limited by the welfare
costs of wrongful penalties. Second, imperfect audits don’t always catch misreporting
agents, even if these agents are audited. Both of these effects mean that the welfare gains
from a small increase in audits, starting from a low audit probability, are much smaller
when the audit technology is imperfect than when the audit technology is perfect.
In sum, The marginal insurance benefits of an increase in the probability of audit are
initially high but rapidly decreasing to zero in the probability of audit when the audit
technology is perfect. When the audit technology is imperfect, the marginal insurance
benefits of an increase in the probability of audit are initially relatively low, but unlike in
the perfect audits case they do not rapidly decrease as the probability of audit increases,
and they remain positive even as the probability of audit approaches one.
Faced by these very different marginal insurance benefit profiles offered by perfect
and imperfect technologies, we find that the optimal contracts under perfect audits can
look a lot like equity finance contracts, with low probability stochastic audits applied
across a wide range of possible reports. A large amount of individual risk is passed on to
outside investors and a small share of individual risk is retained by the entrepreneur.
Under imperfect audits, contracts can resemble standard debt. Under these standard
debt contracts, moderate or high reports are not audited, and any marginal income risk
between moderate and high states is absorbed by the entrepreneur, who simply pays the
principal plus interest. The cost of wrongful penalties and the small benefits obtainable by
audits that don’t capture misreporting agents with certainty mean that the optimal audit
probability across these states is zero. But in low states, where the marginal utility of
4Note that this feature of our model requires imperfect audits, and cannot be obtained with an exogenous
restriction on penalties alone.
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the entrepreneur is high, the insurance benefits from auditing start to outweigh the cost,
even when these audits don’t capture every misreporting agent and are accompanied by
the occasional wrongful penalty. Further, the marginal insurance benefit of audits remains
high even as the probability of audit increases.
The upshot is that we find that the optimal external finance contract often combines de-
terministic audits following low revenue reports with no audits for revenue reports above
a certain cutoff. Following most reports, the borrower’s repayment is independent of
marginal differences in revenue: the borrower simply repays the principal plus interest.
Moreover, when errors are rare, the optimal repayment following an overturned income
report is just equal to the contracted coupon plus principal of the loan. Such features re-
semble standard debt contracts.5,6 The key results are contained largely in Theorem 2.2
and Proposition 2.3 below.
In the previous chapter, we considered a model with private information, and showed
that simple non-contingent debt contracts could be an efficient contract when there were
no aggregate risks present. In this chapter we are relaxing the private information as-
sumption. Rather than assuming that private information can never be attained by outside
parties as we did in the previous chapter, here we are exploring what happens when pri-
vate information is obtainable at some cost. What we show is that it is the quality of audit
technologies, rather than the cost of audit technologies, which is the key to explaining
the standard form of debt contracts that we see in practise, which typically exhibhit some
bankruptcy mechanism providing some insurance to debtors following the worst possi-
ble outcomes. Within the simple private information environment we considered in the
previous chapter, there was no such bankruptcy mechanism even following low reports.
5Earlier contributions to CSV problems with audit errors have focused on insurance problems in the
context of a risky endowment. Haubrich (1995) shows that weakly informative audits are rarely used in
efficient contracts. Alary and Gollier (2004) study an example with no commitment to audits, showing that
the occurence of strategic default is dependent on the preferences of the agent. Imperfect signals are also
commonly employed in the law enforcement literature. See Polinsky and Shavell (2007) for an excellent
summary.
6A different literature assumes that project outcomes are observable, yet entrepreneurial actions are par-
tially observable. Efficient contracts must encourage entrepreneurs to exert privately costly effort. In these
models, the concepts of debt and equity finance are related solely to the optimal sensitivity of repayments
to project outcomes. A recent example which rationalises a combination of debt and equity in this setting
with partially observable actions and limited enforceability is Ellingsen and Kristiansen (2011).
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DETERMINISTIC INCENTIVE REGIMES AND LEVERAGE
Introducing imperfect audits encourages both deterministic audit regimes, when risk shar-
ing is considered to be of high value, and also the complete removal of audits, when risk
sharing is considered to be of low value. The interaction between leverage and costly,
imperfect auditing underpins the finding that deterministic incentive schemes are gener-
ally optimal. Note that leverage and audit probability are similar in that higher leverage
increases expected consumption and the spread of consumption outturns; so too does a
decrease in audit probabilities. So, for low levels of borrowing and hence low levels of
risk, audits are less desirable. However, if borrowing is very high there will be a large
impact on consumption if a low return is mistaken for a high return, what we call a Type-I
error. That implies that there is an endogenous borrowing limit and that the audit probabil-
ity goes to zero as borrowing approaches that limit. For intermediate levels of borrowing
equilibrium auditing is typically deterministic; that is, of probability one.
That non-monotonic relationship between audit probabilities and leverage is perhaps
surprising. However, more surprising is what we label a bang-bang result: Efficient con-
tracts can jump from being non-contingent to standard debt contracts with deterministic
auditing in low states, in response to marginal increases in project risk. Moreover, there
is a discontinuous decrease in optimal leverage, an increase in default, an increase in ex-
pected monitoring costs and a drop in average consumption. We are able to characterize
analytically the trade-offs that occur at the point when optimal contracts change in that
way. At that point, there are two contracts which deliver the same level of utility; one a
high-leverage/never-audit contract, the other a low-leverage/standard debt contract.
Audit costs also play an important role in determining optimal leverage. When audit
costs are low, optimal leverage is such as to permit large gains from insurance or auditing.
This is what Gale and Hellwig (1985) find in their seminal paper. In our case, ‘extreme’
incentive regimes tend to be optimal and auditing strategies are, again, deterministic.7
7Specifically, Gale and Hellwig (1985) also study the effects of audit costs and risk aversion on leverage
in a costly state verification model with perfect and deterministic audits. Our analysis permits stochastic
audit regimes, and finds alternative interactions between leverage and the contracting environment: leverage
has a dramatic impact on the nature of the efficient contract in our model, and it is the joint determination
of leverage and incentive regime which encourages debt contracts in our framework.
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2.1 LITERATURE
Equity finance typically allows issuers to reduce repayments or dividends in bad times
whilst reductions in the value of assets are shared between borrowers and lenders. Debt
finance is more rigid. Debts are only reduced or discharged in bankruptcy, which follows
large falls in income or asset values. So, surely it would be better if there was less debt
and more equity?
Townsend (1979) was first to propose an explanation for the prevalence of debt con-
tracts. He shows that when a risk averse borrower’s income is costly to verify a standard
debt contract is superior either to a strict debt contract, where repayments are constant
across states, or a standard equity contract, where repayments are proportional to the bor-
rower’s income. The difficulty with the equity contract is that to ensure the borrower
does not misreport income the investor needs to undertake a costly audit regardless of the
report. A superior contract prescribes audits and risk sharing only following sufficiently
low reports, when the borrower’s marginal utility and sensitivity to risk are highest. If
the borrower’s income is sufficiently high, they make a fixed repayment and absorb any
remaining income risk at the margin. Such a contract is the standard debt contract that is
widespread in personal and corporate loan markets.
Townsend’s analysis constrained agents to deterministic auditing regimes. However,
he suggested a better contract might employ a stochastic auditing schedule (Townsend,
1979, Section 4). Perhaps following a very low report an audit would be highly likely,
and following a high report less so. Using stochastic auditing schemes would allow more
risk sharing across states with fewer resources spent on audits across a portfolio of loans.
Border and Sobel (1987) and Mookherjee and Png (1989) confirm Townsend’s conjec-
ture. In fact, they show that deterministic audit strategies are never constrained efficient:
Audit strategies should be stochastic, and the probability of audit should be positive even
following relatively high revenue reports. Such a contract looks more like equity in the
sense that income need not be low before the contract specifies risk sharing.
That risk sharing comes at a cost. A cost that is not captured in the benchmark model.
In order to ensure truth-telling when the probability of audit is low, audits that contra-
dict the borrower’s report can result in penalties far larger than the amount borrowed. If
that audit technology were to contradict a truthful report, then the prospect of sizeable,
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wrongful penalties might render such contracts unacceptable to the borrower. Indeed,
even if the entrepreneur were merely to fear that audits may not be perfect, or that their
truthful report may be disputed by the lender or bankruptcy court, they would likely baulk
at a contract that leaves open the prospect of large penalties following disputed reports.
In short, equity-like contracts provide more insurance across states, but may exacerbate
already bad situations for a borrower. Hence the motivation of this paper.
2.1.1 FURTHER FEATURES OF OPTIMAL CONTRACTS
As in Townsend’s (1979) original analysis, our model motivates an endogenous form
of limited liability.8 Following default, entrepreneurs who successfully restructure their
debts enjoy strictly positive consumption—they are not personally liable for the repay-
ment of their firm’s debts. That is at least the case if there is no dispute over the en-
trepreneurs’ report. Following a disputed report, the entrepreneur is liable for the full
debt repayment, plus potentially an additional fee if the audit technology suffers Type-II
errors (that is, if the audit technology does not always identify misreporting high pro-
ductivity entrepreneurs). Making entrepreneurs fully liable for debt repayment following
disputes resembles the practise of piercing the corporate veil, which is relatively common
in the United States in cases of corporate fraud.9 In our model, the only form of fraud is
misreporting income.
One feature of the equilibrium we consider in this paper is that the only entrepreneurs
who are exposed as committing fraud are truth-telling agents. We would hope that in
practise, most of the convictions for corporate fraud are not errors! Within our frame-
work, purposeful fraud could certainly occur in response to poorly drafted contracts, or
in departures from fully rational strategies, and in the real world such actions are likely to
occur from time to time, indeed are likely to be more common than the Type-I audit er-
rors that drive our results. Yet even with a very low probability of occuring, or merely the
perception on the part of entrepreneurs that a Type-I error could occur, the main results of
8In applications of Townsend’s framework with risk neutrality, including Gale and Hellwig (1985) and
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), liability is only limited by the inability to pay, the lender simply
takes everything upon default..
9An excellent discussion of the law and economics of piercing the corporate veil is given by Macey and
Mitts (2014). In our model, the event of shifting liability to entrepreneurs following disputes is consistent
with the authors’ third justification of veil piercing, which is to prevent firm insiders from transferring cor-
porate assets to themselves during bankruptcy reorganisation. In effect, this is exactly what the entrepreneur
is accused of doing in the event of a Type-I error.
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this paper will hold—debt-like contracts with limited liability will be desirable.
In our model, when the audit technology is relatively accurate, the costs associated
with wrongful penalties and Type-I errors decline. Optimal contracts involve a high de-
gree of risk sharing, with larger penalties with lower audit probabilities. Essentially, these
contracts resemble equity even if the resource costs of audit are significant. In this sense,
our framework nests both equity-like contracts and debt-like contracts as optimal under
various parameterisations.
An important weakness of our model is that unlike Townsend (1979), we discretise
the state space as in Mookherjee and Png (1989). This means that the probability of
default in equilibrium is at best drawn from a discrete distribution and at worst fixed at
the probability of a low draw in the two-state model. This discretisation is required for our
analysis given the non-convexity of the incentive constraints and the absence of a single-
crossing condition on these constraints. Unfortunately, this makes the model unsuitable
for econometric analysis of the determinants of time-varying default probabilities. This
also restricts the variability of credit spreads somewhat. In our model, credit spreads are
more responsive to preferences for the sharing of risks across fixed probability default
and no-default states than to the fluctuations in the expected resource costs of auditing
(which drive fluctuations in credit spreads in the model described by Bernanke, Gertler,
and Gilchrist, 1999).
On the other hand, we are able to consider optimal contracts, without imposing any
ad-hoc restrictions on strategies, and the restriction to the simple two-state space re-
sults in tractable solutions. Further, as we show in Chapters 3 and 4, this model pro-
vides a straightforward way to generalise the preferences of entrepreneurs within finan-
cial macroeconomics models. Specifically, we show in Chapter 3 that this framework
provides intuition and microfoundation to the well established empirical link between fi-
nancial stress and the labour market wedge. In Chapter 4 we show that this framework
can help us understand the perceived lack of systemic risk sharing, and the consequences
for business cycle volatility and stabilisation policy.
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2.1.2 COMMITMENT
This paper, along with the aforementioned studies, considers an environment where the
lender is able to commit ex ante to an incentive regime which is wasteful ex post. That
commitment may indicate a concern for reputation, or delegation to a specialised auditor
or bankruptcy court as in Melumad and Mookherjee (1989). Krasa and Villamil (2000)
investigate what happens when lenders cannot commit to costly audits. That lack of
commitment means the revelation principle does not hold and in equilibrium borrowers
misreport their income with positive probability. It turns out that lack of commitment
means that determinstic audits may be a feature of the optimal contract. Audits can only
occur if the expected value of penalties levied following audits exceeds the audit costs.
If true for a particular reported income, then this report will be audited with certainty. In
short, for Krasa and Villamil (2000) the ability to commit implies equity-like contracts
are preferable, whereas for us it does not.
The rest of the paper is set out as follows. Section 1 lays out the model environment
and the nature of the auditing technology. Section 2 characterizes some key features
of efficient contracts. In section 3 we present the perfect audits benchmark. Section 4
explores the imperfect audits case, and contains the key contributions of the paper. Section
5 presents comparative statics for a special case of the model where closed form solutions
can be obtained. Section 6 provides a numerical example of a four state version of the
model. Efficient contracts under perfect and imperfect audits are compared. Section 7
offers concluding remarks. Appendices contain formal arguments and proofs. Figures are
contained in Appendix 2.E.
2.2 THE ENVIRONMENT
We study the one period problem of a risk averse and credit constrained entrepreneur. The
entrepreneur has access to a special technology offering high returns which are uncorre-
lated with other projects undertaken in the economy.
The outcome of the project is initially private information to the entrepreneur, limiting
the sharing of risk between the entrepreneur and their financier (the financial intermedi-
ary). Contract repayments are enforceable, but can only be conditioned on public infor-
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mation. The public information available to condition contracts includes any message
sent by the entrepreneur, and any audit signal produced by the audit technology.
The entrepreneur makes a take-it-or-leave it contract offer to the financial intermedi-
ary, who is well-diversified and perfectly competitive. An efficient contract maximises
the entrepreneur’s expected utility.
2.2.1 THE ENTREPRENEUR
The entrepreneur enjoys consumption at the end of the period according to U(x), where
U ′,−U ′′ > 0, and U ′(0) = ∞. The entrepreneur brings wealth α of the consumption
good into the period. Combining the entrepreneur’s wealth α with the net funds borrowed
from the financial intermediary b, the project produces the consumption good according to
stochastic gross return (α+ b)θ. In this section, we restrict revenue to be drawn from one
of two states, θ ∈ Θ, Θ = {θ¯, θ} and θ¯ > θ. This restriction assists the intuition behind
our key results, but is not essential for them. Section 6 extends the model to a four-state
version, exploring optimal risk sharing across states in the perfect and imperfect audit
models.
Following the realisation of their project, the entrepreneur can send a public signal
indicating the state and subsequent revenues of the project. Messages m are drawn from
M = {m¯,m}, where a message of m¯ corresponds to reporting that the entrepreneur has
received a high type shock θ¯, and a report of m implies a low type shock, θ.
2.2.2 THE FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY
There exists a well-diversified financial intermediary who can make credible commit-
ments to future actions.10 Any contract involving the entrepreneur and the financial inter-
mediary is small from the perspective of the financial intermediary’s balance sheet. Fur-
ther, the entrepreneur’s return shock θ is uncorrelated with other shocks in the economy,
and the returns of other assets/liabilities of the financial intermediary’s balance sheet. It
follows that the financial intermediary is risk neutral with respect to claims contingent on
10Efficient contracts will require commitment on behalf of the financial intermediary. One might think
of this as sustained either through the intermediary’s concern for its reputation, or through delegation to a
specialist bailiff or auditor as in Melumad and Mookherjee (1989).
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the entrepreneur’s return shock θ.
The financial intermediary operates in a perfectly competitive market. Their opportu-
nity cost of funds is given by ρ, and any contract offering an expected return on possibly
state contingent loans exceeding ρ is acceptable to the financial intermediary. This con-
dition is formalised in Definition 2.5. The opportunity cost of funds could be thought of
as some combination of the interest rate paid by a risk free bond, the interest rate paid by
the intermediary to their deposit holders, and the intermediary’s administrative costs.
The following two assumptions ensure that there are available positive (but finite)
gains from trade between the entrepreneur and financial intermediary.
Assumption 2.1 Expected project returns exceed the financial intermediary’s opportu-
nity cost of funds,
∑
θ∈Θ pi(θ)θ > ρ.
Assumption 2.2 In the low state, project returns are lower than the financial intermedi-
ary’s opportunity cost of funds, θ < ρ.
Assumption 2.1 ensures that there are economic gains from diverting resources to
the entrepreneur’s project, even when the entrepreneur has access to a deposit facility
at the bank yielding a risk free return equal to the bank’s opportunity cost of funds, ρ.
Assumption 2.1 is strong enough to ensure that b > −α.
Assumption 2.2 specifies that the entrepreneurs’ projects are risky. In bad states, a
project will yield lower returns than the risk free asset. Assumption 2.2 will be sufficient to
ensure that leverage is finite under efficient contracts when type-I audit errors are present,
a result shown in Proposition 2.3.
2.2.3 AUDITS
There exists an audit technology which produces a signal σ ∈ Σ providing information
about the outcome of the entrepreneur’s project ex post. The action to undertake an audit
is common knowledge, and so is the signal provided, σ. In other words, the entrepreneur
knows if (s)he has been audited, and the result of the audit. It is assumed that an audit
strategy, contingent on the entrepreneur’s reports, can be agreed and committed to ex ante.
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The audit technology cost is linear in assets, κ(α + b), where κ is a fixed parameter.
The signal produced by the audit technology maps from the space of realised shocks θ as
follows: If there is no audit, the audit signal is the empty set, σ = ∅. If there is an audit
and the true state is θ¯, the audit technology reports σ(θ¯) = σ¯ with probability (1− η(θ¯)),
and σ(θ¯) = σ with probability η(θ¯). If there is an audit and the true state is θ, the audit
technology reports σ(θ) = σ with probability (1 − η(θ)), and σ(θ) = σ¯ with probability
η(θ).
Assumption 2.3 Audits are informative: η(θ¯) + η(θ) < 1.
Definition 2.1 Conditional upon an audit, a Type-I error occurs when the audit technol-
ogy signals a high type return when the true return is low, σ(θ) = σ¯. A Type-II error
occurs when the audit technology signals a low type return when the true return is high,
σ(θ¯) = σ.
Audit strategies are defined in contracts, and implemented ex post by the financial
intermediary. An audit strategy specifies the probability of audit, conditional upon the
message sent by the entrepreneur, q(m).
2.3 CONTRACTS
Definition 2.2 A contract is an ordered set Γ = (b, q(m), z(m,σ), x(m,σ, θ)) where
b, q(m) are publicly observed actions; z(m,σ) : Θ × Σ → R is a function mapping
publicly observed information to the financial intermediary’s ex post receipt from the en-
trepreneur; and the entrepreneur’s consumption allocations are specified by x(m,σ, θ) :
M × Σ×Θ→ R+.
A key motivation for this paper is the search for environments where debt contracts
are efficient.
Definition 2.3 We specify the following two benchmark contracts.
a. A non-contingent debt contract is a contract with constant repayments across all
states and messages z(mi, σj) = z(mk, σl) ∀mi,mk ∈ M, σj, σl ∈ Σ. Any avail-
able audit signals are ignored, and therefore no audits are conducted (q(m) = 0).
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b. A standard debt contract specifies a constant repayment when either the entrepreneur’s
message or the audit signal is high, and a lower repayment following a verified low
report (z(m¯, ∅) = z(m, σ¯) > z(m,σ)). All low reports are audited (q(m) = 1).
Note that debt contracts in our model do not restrict the entrepreneur borrower to zero
consumption following default. In fact, in the examples that we consider, entrepreneurs
will enjoy strictly positive consumption in all circumstances, even following a default.
This positive consumption could represent income already paid to the entrepreneur dur-
ing the life of the project, or rights to future earned income after the discharging of debts
in bankruptcy.
Budget Constraints State contingent budget constraints are specified as follows:
(α+ b)θ = z(m,σ) + x(m,σ, θ) ∀(m,σ, θ) ∈M × Σ×Θ. (2.1)
The left hand side is the revenue received by the entrepreneur from their project, denom-
inated in the consumption good. Following the repayment z, the remainder available for
the entrepreneur to consume is x.
Definition 2.4 A contract is incentive compatible if and only if m∗(θ) = m,m∗(θ¯) = m¯
solves the following problem:
m∗(θ) ∈ arg max
m(θ)
(1− q(m(θ)))U(x(m(θ), ∅, θ)) + q(m(θ))[1− η(θ)]U(x(m(θ), σ = θ, θ))
+ q(m(θ))η(θ)U(x(m(θ), σ 6= θ, θ)), θ ∈ {θ, θ¯} (2.2)
The consumption allocations on the right hand side of equation 4.10 are bundles en-
joyed by misreporting agents. We can re-write the incentive compatibility constraint with
respect to bundles consumed in truth-telling contracts by substituting in the budget con-
straints (2.1):
m∗(θ) ∈ arg max
m(θ)
(1− q(m(θ)))U(x(m(θ), ∅, θ))
+ q(m(θ))[1− η(θ)]U [x(m(θ), σ = θ,m(θ)) + (α+ b)(θ −m(θ))]
+ q(m(θ))η(θ)U [x(m(θ), σ 6= θ,m(θ)) + (α+ b)(θ −m(θ))], θ ∈ {θ, θ¯}
(2.3)
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Definition 2.5 A contract is acceptable to the financial intermediary if and only if
∑
m∈Θ
∆(m)
[ ∑
σ∈Θ∪∅
∆(σ|m, q(m))z(m,σ)− q(m)(α + b)κ
]
≥ bρ, (2.4)
where ∆(·) is an operator generating unconditional probability measures over its ar-
guments. The state of nature θ is unobservable to the financial intermediary, therefore
expectations in (2.4) are formed over the probability measure constructed over the en-
trepreneur’s possible reports, which combines the likelihoods of shocks θ with the en-
trepreneur’s ex post best response reporting strategy.
Definition 2.6 A contract is feasible if and only if it is acceptable, and satisfies the budget
constraints.
Definition 2.7 An incentive compatible contract is efficient if and only if it maximises the
entrepreneur’s utility subject to feasibility
max
Γ
∑
θ∈Θ
pi(θ)
∑
σ∈Σ∪∅
∆(σ|m, q(m))U(x(m,σ, θ)) (2.5)
subject to
(2.1), (4.10), (2.4), q(m) ∈ [0, 1].
Proposition 2.1 In any efficient contract:
1. The financial intermediary’s participation constraint (2.4) is binding,
2. high type reports are never audited, q(m¯) = 0, and
3. the downward incentive compatibility constraint (equation 4.10, where θ = θ¯) is
binding when either (a) Type-I audit errors occur (η(θ) > 0), or (b) utility is
bounded below (U(0) = 0).
A short description of Proposition 2.1 follows, while Appendix 2.A provides formal
perturbation arguments for Parts 2 and 3.
For Part 1, note that if the intermediary’s participation constraint were slack, repay-
ments following high type reports z(m¯, ∅) could be reduced. That would increase the
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expected utility of the entrepreneur without breaching the incentive compatibility con-
straint.
The intuition for Part 2 is as follows: Let it be the case that audits are required to pre-
vent low type agents from declaring high type reports. Such a contract must be increasing
rather than reducing consumption risk relative to some strictly superior non-contingent
contract.
Proposition 2.1 part 3 shows that if high type entrepreneurs strictly prefer to report
truthfully their income, then it must be the case that either high type consumption could
be transferred to low states, or the auditing probability and expense could be reduced,
allowing a direct increase in expected utility, or relaxing the participation constraint re-
spectively. Note that the proof provided for Proposition 2.1 part 3(a) does not require the
entrepreneur to freely choose the audit probability q. When audit signals are imperfect,
the incentive compatibility constraint is binding even when all low reports are audited.
Corollary 2.1 Let the audit probability q be constrained arbitrarily. Subject to this con-
straint, the downward incentive compatibility constraint (equation 4.10, where θ = θ¯) is
binding for any efficient contract when Type-I audit errors occur (η(θ) > 0).
We can now re-write the problem as a Kuhn-Tucker problem:
L = p¯i U(x(m¯, ∅, θ¯)) + pi(1− q(m)) U(x(m, ∅, θ))
+ piq(m)(1− η(θ)) U(x(m,σ, θ)) + piq(m)η(θ) U(x(m, σ¯, θ))
+ λ
 (α+ b)(E(θ)− ρ− piq(m)κ) + αρ− p¯ix(m¯, ∅, θ¯)− pi(1− q(m))x(m, ∅, θ)
−piq(m)(1− η(θ))x(m,σ, θ)− piq(m)η(θ)x(m, σ¯, θ)

+ µ

U(x(m¯, ∅, θ¯))− (1− q(m))U [x(m, ∅, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ)]
−q(m)(1− η(θ¯))U [x(m, σ¯, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ)]
−q(m)η(θ¯)U [x(m,σ, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ)]

+ ν0q(m) + ν1(1− q(m)). (2.6)
The Lagrange multipliers λ and µ are attached respectively to the participation constraint
and the incentive compatibility constraint, and the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers, ν0 and ν1,
to the upper and lower bounds on the probability of audit respectively. Proposition 2.1
ensures that the participation and incentive compatibility constraints are binding under
any efficient contract. The upper and lower bounds on the audit probability q(m) are
occasionally binding constraints.
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The first order necessary conditions are described in detail as they will be used at
various points to establish certain facts about efficient contracts. Hence:
x(m¯, ∅, θ¯) : 0 = p¯i U ′(x(m¯, ∅, θ¯))− λp¯i + µU ′(x(m¯, ∅, θ¯)) (2.6a)
x(m, ∅, θ) : 0 = pi(1− q(m)) U ′(x(m, ∅, θ))− λpi(1− q(m))
− µ(1− q(m))U ′[x(m, ∅, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ)] (2.6b)
x(m,σ, θ) : 0 = piq(m)(1− η(θ)) U ′(x(m,σ, θ))− λpiq(m)(1− η(θ))
− µq(m)η(θ¯)U ′[x(m,σ, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ)] (2.6c)
x(m, σ¯, θ) : 0 = piq(m)η(θ) U ′(x(m, σ¯, θ))− λpiq(m)η(θ)
− µq(m)(1− η(θ¯))U ′[x(m, σ¯, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ)] (2.6d)
b : 0 = λ(E(θ)− ρ− piqκ)
− µ(θ¯ − θ)

(1− q(m))U ′[x(m, ∅, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ)]
+q(m)(1− η(θ¯))U ′[x(m, σ¯, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ)]
+q(m)η(θ¯)U ′[x(m,σ, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ)]
 (2.6e)
q(m) : 0 = −pi U(x(m, ∅, θ)) + pi(1− η(θ)) U(x(m,σ, θ)) + piη(θ) U(x(m, σ¯, θ))
+ λ [pix(m, ∅, θ)− pi(1− η(θ))x(m,σ, θ)− piη(θ)x(m, σ¯, θ)]
+ µ

+U [x(m, ∅, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ)]
−(1− η(θ¯))U [x(m, σ¯, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ)]
−η(θ¯)U [x(m,σ, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ)]

− λ(α+ b)piκ+ ν0 − ν1. (2.6f)
The general problem is non-convex, owing to the uncertainty faced by misreporting
high type agents. Numerical results in the following sections indeed confirm that multiple
locally efficient contracts may result.
2.4 PERFECT AUDITS
In the introduction we stated that the interaction between leverage and costly, imperfect
audits underpins the optimality of deterministic contracts. Before establishing that, and
other, results it is insightful to analyse the case of perfect audits. We find, as did Mookher-
jee and Png (1989), that debt contracts are not optimal. Moreover, we go on to show that
optimal leverage is unbounded, absent other restrictions.
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Theorem 2.1 (Mookherjee and Png (1989)) When audits yield correct signals with cer-
tainty (η(θ) = η(θ¯) = 0), standard debt contracts are inefficient, q∗(m) 6= 1.
The proof proceeds as follows. First, Lemma 2.1 shows that when audits are perfect,
any allocation which is feasible under a standard debt contract can be achieved while the
incentive compatibility constraint is slack. Then, Proposition 2.1 part 3 shows that the
downward incentive compatibility constraint cannot be slack under any efficient contract.
Therefore, all allocations which are feasible under a standard debt contract are inefficient.
Lemma 2.1 Let audits yield correct signals with certainty (η(θ) = η(θ¯) = 0), consump-
tion be positive in all states x(·) > 0, and the probability of audit of low type reports
be equal to 1, q(m) = 1. Any feasible allocation can be implemented with the incentive
compatibility constraint slack.
Proof. To prove Lemma 2.1, first re-write the downward incentive compatibility con-
straint (equation 4.10, where θ = θ¯), with q = 1 as follows: U(x(m¯, ∅, θ¯) ≥ U [(α +
b)θ¯ − z(m, σ¯)]. Under perfect audits, the observable pair (m, σ¯) correctly identifies mis-
reporting high type entrepreneurs with certainty. Under a truth-telling equilibrium, the
repayment z(m, σ¯) is not made by any agent. Any feasible allocation can be perturbed
by increasing z(m, σ¯), which does not affect the participation constraint of the financial
intermediary, does not affect the ex ante welfare of the entrepreneur, but does ensure that
the incentive compatibility constraint is slack.
Proposition 2.2 When audits are perfect (η(θ) = η(θ¯) = 0), sufficiently inexpensive
(κ < (E(θ) − ρ)/pi) and projects enjoy constant returns to scale, efficient leverage and
entrepreneurial consumption are infinite.
Proof. Set the probability of audit equal to one, q = 1. Substituting the budget constraints
(2.1) into the participation constraint (2.4) shows that when κ < (E(θ)− ρ)/pi, expected
consumption will be rising in b. Lemma 2.1 states that the incentive compatibility con-
straint need not bind for any allocation satisfying the participation constraint, given any
level of borrowing b.
Under perfect audits, auditing with a high probability allows us to equate the en-
trepreneur’s ex post marginal utility across all states, regardless of leverage. When audits
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are sufficiently inexpensive, higher leverage permits higher entrepreneurial consumption
in all states. Leverage in equilibrium is only bound by decreasing technological returns
to scale, as in Gale and Hellwig (1985), or through general equilibrium effects.
If the probability of audit is sufficiently high, large penalties charged against misre-
porting high type entrepreneurs ensure that the incentive compatibility constraint is slack
for any schedule of positive consumption allocations earned with positive probability.
Any further audits would be wasteful, as the resource costs of additional audits would
tighten the participation constraint of the fiinancial intermediary, and as the incentive
compatibility constraint was already slack, no further risk sharing gains would be avail-
able from the additional audits.
Efficient allocations require that any agent who earns a low type return, declares their
return truthfully, yet receives a high type audit signal (m, σ¯, θ) should face a repayment
greater than their revenue z(m, σ¯) > (α + b)θ. However, this outcome occurs with zero
probability when audits are perfect.
2.5 IMPERFECT AUDITS
When type-I errors occur with positive probability (η(θ) > 0), Lemma 2.1 and subse-
quently Theorem 2.1 cease to hold; the outcome (m, σ¯, θ) occurs with positive probability
in any contract with auditing (q∗(m) > 0). Even if the audit probability is high, a further
increase in the audit probability does increase the set of feasible consumption allocations
available to the entrepreneur. Increasing the probability of audit under imperfect audits
allows the incentive costs of contract enforcement to be defrayed more widely, increasing
risk sharing across states. If audit costs are low, then increasing the probability of audit is
worthwhile even when the probability of audit is already high.
Theorem 2.2 Let borrowing be taken as given b = bˆ. When type-I audit errors occur
with positive probability (η(θ) > 0), there exists some strictly positive audit cost κˆ such
that for all κ < κˆ, standard debt contracts (q(m) = 1) are efficient.
Proof. We consider an arbitrary efficient contract with interior audit probability q(m) ∈
(0, 1), and show from the first order condition for the probability of audit Lq(m) that if
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audit costs were sufficiently low, the initial contract could be strictly improved by an
increase in audit probability q(m).
To simplify notation, in this section we will define B(b) := (α + b)(θ¯ − θ). Also, as
we are only considering allocations consistent with truth-telling, we will drop the report
variable from the consumption allocation x(σ, θ) := x(m,σ, θ).
Consider the first order necessary condition for q(m) (2.6f), which can be re-written
as follows:
Lq(m) : 0 = pi(1− η(θ)) [U(x(σ, θ))− λx(σ, θ)]− µη(θ¯)U [x(σ, θ) +B(b)]
+ piη(θ) [U(x(σ¯, θ))− λx(σ¯, θ)]− µ(1− η(θ¯))U [x(σ¯, θ) +B(b)]
− pi [U(x(∅, θ)) + λx(∅, θ)] + µ U [x(∅, θ) +B(b)]
− λ(α+ b)piκ+ ν0 − ν1. (2.7)
Up to division by q(m), the consumption variables x(σ, θ), x(σ¯, θ) enter Lq(m) in the
same way that they enter the entrepreneur’s problem L (equation 2.6). This means that the
first order necessary conditions for x(σ, θ), x(σ¯, θ) (equations 2.6c and 2.6d respectively),
also identify a stationary point of Lq(m), with respect to the consumption allocations of
audited agents (x(σ, θ), x(σ¯, θ)) and holding other variables constant.
This property has a straightforward economic interpretation: efficiently allocating
consumption to audited agents, is the same problem as maximising the gain from ad-
ditional audits, which is expressed by the first order condition Lq(m).
We can think of the first three lines of (2.7) as the gains attained from the information
provided by a marginal increase in the probability of audit. The fourth line contains the
marginal resource cost, plus Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated with the upper and lower
bounds on the audit probability.
Here it is important that audits are imperfect, which by Corollary 2.1 ensures that the
incentive compatibility constraint is binding, and µ > 0, regardless of q(m). Were audits
perfect, sufficiently high audit probabilities would result in slackness in the incentive
compatibility constraint (µ = 0), leaving the first order conditions for x(σ, θ), x(∅, θ)
equated.
Consider the allocation xˆ(σ, θ) = xˆ(σ¯, θ) = x(∅, θ). This allocation would leave the
sum of the first three lines of (2.7) equal to zero. But this allocation is not a stationary
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point of Lq(m), and does not satisfy the first order necessary conditions for x(σ, θ), x(σ¯, θ)
(equations 2.6c and 2.6d respectively).
We can do better by decreasing x(σ¯, θ), which has a low weight in expected welfare
and a high weight in the incentive compatibility constraint, and increasing x(σ, θ), which
has a relatively high weight in expected welfare and a low weight in the incentive com-
patibility constraint. This perturbation would leave the sum of the first three lines of (2.7)
strictly greater than zero, such that for sufficiently low audit costs κ, additional audits
would always be welfare enhancing.
Theorem 2.2 shows that standard debt can be efficient under imperfect audits. The
remainder of this section explores the global efficiency of standard debt, and the quanti-
tative relevance. As we will see, an important determinant of the efficiency of standard
debt will be whether the entrepreneur has access to a leverage margin—enabling them to
scale up and down the size of the project ex ante.
Under perfect audits, Proposition 2.2 showed that when audit costs are low, constant
technological returns to scale would result in unbounded leverage and entrepreneurial
consumption. When type-I audit errors occur with positive probability, that result no
longer holds. To see this, note that the incentive compatibility constraint (2.3) ensures
that for some σ ∈ {∅, σ, σ¯}, x(m¯, ∅, θ¯) − x(m,σ, θ) ≥ (α + b)(θ¯ − θ). Combining this
with assumption 2 ensures that as b increases, consumption risk must be increasing and
consumption in some state x(m,σ, θ) must tend toward zero.
Entrepreneurs will not choose contracts with consumption bundles too close to zero,
where their marginal utility of consumption tends to infinity. Entrepreneurs’ aversion to
low consumption bundles in bad states encourages them to choose contracts with limited
leverage, even when their project enjoys constant technological returns to scale. This
argument is formalised in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2.3 When type-I errors occur with positive probability (η(θ) > 0), positive
entrepreneurial consumption in all states requires that high type consumption, leverage
and the probability of audit satisfy the following inequalities
a. high type consumption, x(m¯, ∅, θ¯) > (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ),
b. leverage, α+ b
α
<
ρ
ρ− θ + piqκ , and
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c. the probability of audit, q < min
(
1,
1
piκ
αρ
α+ b
[
1− α+ b
α
· ρ− θ
ρ
])
.
Proof. The first part of Proposition 2.3 is a direct weakening of equation 2.3, which
is presented in a form such that all consumption bundles contained in the constraint are
earned with positive unconditional probability in contracts with auditing, and are therefore
positive by the assumption specified in the Proposition.
x(m¯, ∅, θ¯) > (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ) (2.8)
Substituting equation 2.8 and the budget constraints (2.1) into the participation con-
straint (2.4) with the assumption that entrepreneurial consumption is positive in every
state yields the following inequality:
(α+ b)(p¯iθ¯ + piθ − ρ− piqκ) + αρ > p¯i(α+ b)(θ¯ − θ) (2.9)
which can be rearranged to confirm parts (b) and (c) of the Proposition.
We proceed allowing borrowing b to be chosen freely, under the assumption of con-
stant technological returns to scale. This does not mean that firms enjoy constant returns
to scale. Firm size is endogenously bounded above according to Proposition 2.3. It does
mean that the only source of decreasing returns to scale is the information asymmetry
between the entrepreneur and external finance providers.
Figure 2.1 presents evidence of the quantitative relevance of standard debt in our
framework for a sample parameterisation. Along the horizontal axis, the risk of the en-
trepreneur’s project (θ¯ − θ) is increasing, holding expected returns (E(θ)) constant. The
vertical axis plots audit costs as a share of total assets under management. Two features
of the simulation are striking: First, standard debt (q∗ = 1) is very prevalent. Very low
project risk or high audit costs are required for standard debt to be inefficient. Second,
stochastic audit regimes (0 < q∗ < 1) are rare. Indeed, when risk is low, efficient con-
tracts ‘jump’ from standard debt (q∗ = 1) to non-contingent debt contracts (q∗ = 0). In
the model, there is no cost associated with writing a ‘complex’ contract with stochastic
audit regimes, as are optimal under the perfect audits framework. Yet, entrepreneurs tend
to prefer ‘simple’, non-contingent or standard debt contracts.
When contracts are constrained by the upper and lower bound on audits (q∗ = 0 or 1),
local analysis of the entrepreneur’s problem is relatively straightforward, yielding closed
form solutions under constant relative risk aversion when the likelihood of type-II audit
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error is zero (η(θ¯) = 0):11
Proposition 2.4 When the likelihood of type-I and type-II errors are positive and zero
respectively (η(θ) > 0, η(θ¯) = 0) and preferences exhibit constant relative risk aversion
U(x) = x1−γ/(1 − γ), leverage, consumption allocations and shadow prices of stan-
dard debt contracts and non-contingent debt contracts can be represented by closed-form
expressions in terms of exogenous parameters.
The proof of Proposition 2.4 is given in appendix 2.B. Displayed below are solutions
to standard debt contracts under logarithmic utility (U(x) = log x).
x(m¯, ∅, θ¯) = αρ 1
1− ζ , x(m,σ, θ) = αρ, x(m, σ¯, θ) = αρ
piη(θ)
p¯iζ + piη(θ)
,
b =
αρ
θ¯ − θ
ζ
1− ζ
(
p¯i + piη(θ)
p¯iζ + piη(θ)
)
− α, where ζ = E(θ)− ρ− piκ
p¯i(θ¯ − θ) . (2.10)
From the solutions presented in (2.10), we can derive measures of leverage and loan
coupon rates, which are more easily observed than entrepreneurs’ consumption alloca-
tions in practise. Leverage, l, as measured by the total assets managed by the entrepreneur
over their initial net worth can be described as follows:
l =
α+ b
α
=
ρ
θ¯ − θ
ζ
1− ζ
(
p¯i + piη(θ)
p¯iζ + piη(θ)
)
. (2.11)
We can determine the net interest (coupon) rate on loans, r, by subtracting one from the
ratio of the repayment following high reports z(m¯, ∅) and the initial amount borrowed b.
Combining the budget constraints with (2.10) yields
r =
z(m¯, ∅)
b
− 1 = (ρ− 1) + ρζ (θ¯ − ρ)(p¯i + piη(θ))− (θ¯ − θ)(p¯iζ + piη(θ))
ρζ(p¯i + piη(θ))− (1− ζ)(θ¯ − θ)(p¯iζ + piη(θ)) . (2.12)
The first term on the right hand side, (ρ−1), is the opportunity cost of funds for the finan-
cial intermediary, expressed as a net interest rate. The second term captures the interest
rate credit spread, as measured by the difference between the loan interest (coupon) rate
and the financial intermediary’s opportunity cost of funds. Section 2.6 presents example
comparative statics for leverage ratios and the loan interest rate.
The solutions obtained by Proposition 2.4 are local, though the entrepreneur’s problem
exhibits ‘jumps’ between locally efficient contracts. Fact 2.1 states that for a standard debt
11Type-II errors, while perhaps more familiar than type-I errors, have little effect on the nature of efficient
contracts if they occur with a low probability. The implications of type-II errors are investigated in appendix
2.D.
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contract to be globally efficient, it must be both locally efficient, and superior to any non-
contingent contract. While these two necessary conditions do not rule out an alternative
globally efficient contract, we have not been able to find a numerical example where the
two necessary conditions expressed in fact 2.1 are satisfied, and standard debt contracts
are not globally efficient.
Fact 2.1 Let Γ be a globally efficient contract, and q(Γ) = 1. (a) The Kuhn-Tucker
multiplier on the constraint q ≤ 1 must be positive (ν1 > 0), and (b) expected utility
under Γ must exceed the maximum utility attainable conditional upon private information
(E(U |Γ) ≥ E(U |(Γ∗|q = 0))).
When utility is CRRA and type-II errors do not occur (η(θ¯) = 0), then by Proposition
2.4 we can check fact 2.1 part (b) directly from the closed-form solutions to standard and
non-contingent debt contracts provided in appendix 2.B. When utility is logarithmic, we
can also directly check fact 2.1 part (a) by the following result:
Proposition 2.5 When utility is logarithmic, and type-II errors do not occur (η(θ¯) = 0),
the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers on the upper and lower bounds for the audit probability,
0 ≤ q ≤ 1, can be described by closed-form expressions.
A derivation of Proposition 2.5 is provided in Appendix 2.B.3.
We now return to reconsider the bang-bang feature of efficient contracts observed in
figure 2.1, which we formalise by Proposition 2.6.
Proposition 2.6 When audits are imperfect, there exist parameter specifications which
permit both non-contingent (q = 0) and standard (q = 1) debt contracts as locally
efficient contracts.
When project risk and audit costs are low, efficient contracts appear to jump from non-
contingent debt to standard debt. Figure 2.2 plots an example of this bang-bang behaviour.
In figure 2.2, the determination of efficient contracts is deconstructed by leverage and
audit strategy for one example parameter specification. The horizontal axis plots levels
of borrowing. The lower panel plots the efficient probability of audit, conditional upon
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borrowing, and the upper panel plots the attainable expected welfare conditional upon
borrowing. The solid line plots expected welfare attainable with a non-contingent contract
(q = 0), the dashed line allows the audit strategy to be chosen optimally.
The efficiency of standard debt is sensitive to the assumption that the entrepreneur
can determine the scale of the project. When leverage is low, total risk is low, and the
gains from insurance provided by auditing are low. On the other hand, when leverage is
high, Proposition 2.3 showed that auditing will push the minimum consumption allocation
closer to zero. Audits are only useful to the extent that the entrepreneur can absorb type-I
errors in low states.
Appendix 2.C solves an example where non-contingent and standard debt contracts
are locally efficient. Under the non-contingent debt contract, the marginal resource cost
of additional audits exceeds the gains obtained from the audit signal. Under the standard
debt contract, the marginal resource gain from reducing the audit probability is smaller
than the cost of foregoing the information and incentive gains obtained via the marginal
audit.
Leverage is higher under the non-contingent contract than under the efficient standard
debt contract, and therefore the marginal resource cost of audits is higher than under the
standard debt contract. The marginal benefit from information obtained in additional au-
dits is actually identical under the two locally efficient contracts considered. Under the
non-contingent contract, the difference in expected marginal utility across project out-
comes is high, suggesting that the gains from insurance should be higher than under the
efficient standard debt contract. However, low consumption of low type entrepreneurs
also makes type-I errors particularly costly, preventing significant penalties in auditing
contracts, and reducing the benefits obtained by auditing.
2.6 COMPARATIVE STATICS
The preceding paragraphs explained how small parameter changes—for example a small
increase in project risk—can cause the efficient contract to jump from a high leverage, low
risk premium, non-contingent contract, to a low leverage, high risk premium and highly
contingent standard debt contract.
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Within parameter neighbourhoods where defautable debt contracts are efficient, we
can use the solutions obtained in appendix 2.B to analyse local perturbations to expected
returns, risk, audit costs and audit quality. Consider the following parameterisation: The
probability of default is pi = 1/10; conditional upon realisation of the low state, the audit
signal returns a high state with vanishing probability η(θ) → 0+; the gross opportunity
cost of funds ρ = 21/20, equivalent to a 5% interest rate; the expected gross return on
projects E(θ) = 6/5; the coefficient of relative risk aversion γ = 1; audit costs as a share
of the initial assets devoted to the project are κ = 9/80, and in low states, the project
returns θ = 33/40. Subsequently, the high type return is θ¯ = 1
p¯i
[E(θ) − piθ] = 149/120;
project risk is (θ¯ − θ) = 5/12; and ζ = [E(θ)− ρ− piκ]/[p¯i(θ¯ − θ)] = 37/100.
By equation 2.11, leverage (l) is equal to
l =
ρ
θ¯ − θ
ζ
1− ζ
(
p¯i + piη(θ)
p¯iζ + piη(θ)
)
= 4.
By equation 2.12, the loan interest (coupon) rate is
r = (ρ− 1) + ρζ (E(θ) + pi(θ¯ − θ)− ρ)(p¯i + piη(θ))− (θ¯ − θ)(p¯iζ + piη(θ))
ρζ(p¯i + piη(θ))− (1− ζ)(θ¯ − θ)(p¯iζ + piη(θ)) = 10%,
We can take derivatives of the log of the leverage ratio to find the semi-elasticities of
leverage with respect to expected returns, the intermediary’s opportunity cost, risk, audit
costs and type-I errors:
d log l
d(E(θ))
= 4.23,
d log l
dρ
= −3.28, d log l
d(θ¯ − θ) = −3.81,
d log l
dκ
= −0.423 and d log l
dη(θ)
= −0.189
respectively, reported to 3 significant figures.12
We can also determine the sensitivity of efficient loan interest rates to underlying
parameters:
dr
d(E(θ))
= −0.219, dr
dρ
= 1.20,
dr
d(θ¯ − θ) = 0.197,
dr
dκ
= 0.155 and
dr
dη(θ)
= −0.0357.
Whilst these calculations are specific to our example, they do provide insights into the
12For example, an increase in expected returns by 0.01 causes an increase in the optimal leverage ratio
by 4.23 percent. Note that rather than reporting semi-elasticities for returns in each state (θ¯, θ), we have
reported responses to expected returns E(θ) and risk (θ¯− θ), which we find to be more useful for intuition.
84
CHAPTER 2
tradeoffs more generally faced by entrepreneurs.
An increase in expected project returns E(θ) increases leverage and, perhaps sur-
prisingly, decreases loan interest rates. The prospect of higher returns encourages en-
trepreneurs to increase leverage, but they are limited in doing so due to the presence of
type-I errors. A decrease in interest payments in high states r leaves the entrepreneur
enough funds in low states to repay loans in full following type-I errors. In order to sat-
isfy the financial intermediary’s participation constraint, providing an expected return of ρ
on loans b net of auditing costs, the entrepreneur must absorb more project risk. Low state
repayments following verified reports (z(m,σ)/b) are increased. Decreases in project risk
(θ¯− θ) and audit costs (κ) have a similar effect on leverage and interest rates as increases
in expected returns E(θ).
Following a decrease in the financial intermediary’s opportunity cost of funds, loan
interest rates fall by an even greater amount. In other words, the spread between loan
interest rates and the opportunity cost of funds is increasing in the opportunity cost of
funds. First, a decrease in ρ allows the entrepreneur to make lower repayments in all
states, while meeting the intermediary’s participation constraint. Second, when ρ is low,
the entrepreneur enjoys more of the gains from increased leverage. As in the case of
an increase in expected returns E(θ), increases in leverage require the entrepreneur to
further lower interest repayments such that full repayments are possible even following
type-I errors. To compensate, repayments following verified low reports (z(m,σ)/b) must
increase.
The only variable which moves leverage and loan interest rates in the same direction
is audit quality, as measured by the conditional probability of type-I error (η(θ)). An in-
crease in the probability of error encourages entrepreneurs to increase consumption in the
unlikely event of a type-I error. This adjustment is achieved first by decreasing leverage,
which at any given interest rate increases the amount of resources remaining following
type-I errors, and secondly by decreasing the loan interest rate r, which further reduces
repayments following type-I errors. This adjustment requires an increase in repayments
in low states (z(m,σ)/b) to compensate the financial intermediary.
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2.7 A FOUR-STATE EXAMPLE
In this section we extend the model by increasing the number of states from two to four.
Unfortunately, that makes the model analytically intractable.13 The purpose of this ex-
tension is twofold. First, it is clearly of interest to investigate how general our analytical
results are likely to be, concerning the desirability of standard debt. Second, and related,
it is of interest to compare the imperfect audits case to that of the perfect audits case of
Mookherjee and Png (1989).
Typically, standard debt is defined as a contract where reports below some cutoff are
audited with certainty. See, for example Townsend (1979). Audits above the cutoff are
not audited. Thus, we state:
Definition 2.8 In a model with n > 2 possible states (θ ∈ (θ1, θ2, ..., θn) and θi < θi+1),
a contract is a standard debt contract if and only if
∃K ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} s.t. q(mj) = 1 ∀j < K, q(mj) = 0 otherwise. (2.13)
Note that incentive compatibility requires that all repayments following reports above
the cutoff must be identical
z(mi, ∅) = z(mj , ∅) ∀i, j ≥ K. (2.14)
Definition 2.8 generalises definition 2.3(b) used to analyse the two-state model in earlier
sections. An important feature of standard debt is that when income is sufficiently high,
repayments are not sensitive to income—the borrower need not ever pay more than the
coupon plus the principal. This is formalised in equation 2.14, and is not observable in
the two-state model, where there is only one ‘high’ state. In this section with a multiple
states model it turns out that imperfect audits do indeed motivate that feature of standard
debt.
Figure 2.3 presents a numerically-solved example of locally efficient contracts under
perfect and imperfect audits. In order to compare the incentive regimes under the two
environments, borrowing b is set exogenously. The upper panel presents the probability
13Even with just four states, the problem contains 24 choice variables. We have been unable to find
superior contracts to the examples presented below, but we do not prove that the contracts presented are
globally efficient.
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distribution from which states are drawn. The second panel presents the expected repay-
ment conditional upon the true state being equal to θ. The contract with signal errors
(marked by ×) features constant repayments across the three higher states, and a reduced
expected repayment in the lowest state. The perfect audits contract (marked by +) exhibits
sharply increasing repayments across states—similar to an equity contract with variable
dividends. The third panel presents the expected utility of the borrower, conditional upon
the realised state. The contract with signal errors exhibits significant sensitivity between
expected utility and project outcomes, across all states. The contract with perfect audits
exhibits increasing expected utility across states, although the sensitivity of utility across
states is very low. The fourth panel presents the auditing regime under each contract. The
contract with signal errors resembles a standard debt contract: reports of the lowest state
are followed by certain audits (q(m1) = 1). Reports of any higher states are not audited
(q(m2) = q(m3) = q(m4) = 0). Under perfect audits, audits are conducted with low
probability across all of the three lower states.
2.8 DISCUSSION
Standard debt contracts can be the optimal form of external finance contracts when con-
tract enforcement is uncertain due to noisy audit signals. Supporting truth-telling under
a stochastic audit strategies requires large penalties. When there is no guarantee that
these penalties are fairly applied, these contracts will not be acceptable to risk averse en-
trepreneurs. The resulting efficient contracts will audit consequent only on low reports,
but will likely audit low reports with certainty. As a result, only small penalties are re-
quired to ensure truth-telling in equilibrium. In fact, the penalty following a disputed
report in an optimal debt contract is typically very close to fully repaying the debt.
Imperfect verification also implies other interesting properties of optimal contracts.
For instance, it means that borrowers can only pass a limited amount of risk on to lenders,
regardless of contracted audit strategies. And even when projects enjoy constant returns to
scale and audits are relatively inexpensive, firm size and leverage is endogenously limited
by the entrepreneur’s risk preference.
We end with a final observation. The standard debt contracts derived under imperfect
monitoring enjoy an additional benefit—one that we did not formalise. When enforce-
ment is certain, or near certain, incentive compatibility is not sensitive to the risk tolerance
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of the entrepreneur. That reduces the potential for adverse selection in two forms: First,
the preferences of the entrepreneur may be unobservable; and second, the entrepreneur
may have access to hidden wealth. The presence of either of these sources of asymmetric
information would make it more difficult to employ a stochastic incentive scheme.
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2.A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.1
Proof.
2. It is established that if it were the case that low type agents were indifferent to
reporting high or low type messages, then the contract in place must be weakly
inferior than a simple non-contingent debt contract. This argument is made via three
perturbations which leave the expected utility of the entrepreneur either unchanged
or increased, and relax the intermediary’s participation constraint.
Let the probability of audit following high type reports be positive, and the incentive
compatibility constraint be binding for low type entrepreneurs: q(m¯) > 0 and
∑
σ∈Θ∪∅
∆(σ(θ, q(m)))U [(α+ b)θ − z(m,σ(θ, q(m)))]
=
∑
σ∈Θ∪∅
∆(σ(θ, q(m¯)))U [(α+ b)θ − z(m¯, σ(θ, q(m¯)))]. (2.15)
Perturbation 1: First replace all z(m¯;σ) with z′(m¯), such that
∑
σ∈Θ∪∅
∆(σ(θ¯, q(m¯)))U [(α+ b)θ¯ − z(m¯, σ(θ¯, q(m¯)))] = U [(α+ b)θ¯ − z′(m¯)].
The perturbation leaves truth-telling high type entrepreneurs indifferent. By Jensen’s
inequality, that perturbation will relax the intermediary’s participation constraint,
but could possibly violate the incentive compatibility constraint (2.15). If (2.15) is
now not violated, then the proof is complete, and q(m¯) can be set to zero, as the
information yielded by auditing high type messages is ignored.
If (2.15) is violated after the perturbation, then
U [(α+ b)θ − z′(m¯)] >
∑
σ∈Θ∪∅
∆(σ(θ, q(m)))U [(α+ b)θ − z(m,σ(θ, q(m)))].
Perturbation 2: Now replace z(m,σ) with z′(m), such that
U [(α+ b)θ − z′(m)] =
∑
σ∈Θ∪∅
∆(σ(θ, q(m)))U [(α+ b)θ − z(m,σ(θ, q(m))).
By Jensen’s inequality, that perturbation would also relax the participation con-
straint. Given that (2.15) is violated, z′(m) > z′(m¯): Low type entrepreneurs have
an incentive to report high type shocks.
Perturbation 3: Replace z′(m), z′(m¯) with z′′ = piz′(m) + p¯iz′(m¯)
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Perturbation 3 restores incentive compatibility, by equating repayments across re-
ports and states. The participation constraint is respected, as expected repayments
are unchanged. The new contract offers expected utility which is strictly greater
than under the original contract, by Jensen’s inequality:
p¯iU [(α+ b)θ¯ − z′′] + piU [(α+ b)θ − z′′] > p¯iU [(α+ b)θ¯ − z′(m¯)] + piU [(α+ b)θ − z′(m)].
Audits are not required, as repayments are non-contingent.
3(a). For the incentive compatibility constraint ( 4.10 ; θ = θ¯) to be satisfied, there must
be some consumption bundle x(m,σ, θ) < x(m¯, ∅, θ¯), where σ ∈ {∅, σ¯, σ}, and
x(m,σ, θ) is a bundle consumed with non-zero unconditional probability (∆(σ|m, q(m)) >
0). Let equation ( 4.10 ; θ = θ¯) be slack. There must be some ε ∈ (0,∞)
such that a perturbation increasing z(m¯, ∅) by ε
∆(∅|m¯, 0) , and decreasing z(m,σ)
by
ε
∆(σ|m, q(m)) , which would violate neither the participation nor the incen-
tive compatibility constraints. This perturbation would increase expected utility
by Jensen’s inequality.
3(b). When audits are perfect, we cannot directly follow the proof of part 3(a)—the in-
centive compatibility constraint does not directly ensure that consumption x varies
across states. First, if x does vary across states and audit signals, then we can follow
the same argument as in part 3(a), and perturb toward a contract with less consump-
tion variability. If x is constant across all states, then we could reduce the audit
probability q, relaxing the participation constraint without violating the incentive
compatibility constraint.
2.B EFFICIENT ALLOCATIONS UNDER NON-CONTINGENT AND
STANDARD DEBT CONTRACTS
Here we solve for efficient allocations and borrowing when efficient audit strategies are
deterministic, ie. when q = 0 or 1. Here, we assume CRRA utility, U(x) = x1−γ/(1−γ).
In the text, we refer to the more tractable case of logarithmic utility, which can be found
by setting γ = 1 in any of the solutions contained in this section.
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The general problem outlined by equation 2.6 is non-convex, due to the presence of
the lottery in the right hand side of the incentive compatibility constraint. When the
probability of audit q(m) is constrained by either its upper or lower bound, ν0 or ν1 > 0,
and the probability of type-II audit errors is zero η(θ¯) = 0, then locally the problem is
convex, and we can use the first order approach to find local maxima.
2.B.1 PRIVATE INFORMATION CONTRACTS (q = 0)
When audits are not used (q = 0), efficient contracts are non-contingent. Repayments
are independent of entrepreneurs’ reports, and no audit signals are obtained to condition
repayments. This certainty of repayment makes the incentive compatibility constraint
linear in the choice variables, enabling us to solve the entrepreneur’s problem with a
Lagrangian:
L0 = p¯i U(x(m¯, ∅, θ¯)) + pi U(x(m, ∅, θ))
+ λ[(α+ b)(E(θ)− ρ) + αρ− p¯ix(m¯, ∅, θ¯)− pix(m, ∅, θ)]
+ µ
[
U(x(m¯, ∅, θ¯))− U [x(m, ∅, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ)]] . (2.16)
The first order conditions are
x(m¯, ∅, θ¯) : 0 = p¯iU ′(x(m¯, ∅, θ¯))− p¯iλ+ µ U ′(x(m¯, ∅, θ¯))
x(m, ∅, θ) : 0 = piU ′(x(m, ∅, θ))− piλ− µ U ′[x(m, ∅, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ)]
b : 0 = λ(E(θ)− ρ)− µ(θ¯ − θ)U ′[x(m, ∅, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ)].
Substituting the incentive compatibility constraint and utility function into the first order
conditions yields
U ′(x(m, ∅, θ))
U ′(x(m¯, ∅, θ¯)) =
p¯i
pi
(
θ¯ − ρ
ρ− θ
)
. (2.17)
The right hand side of equation 2.17 shows that the ratio of weighted returns in high and
low states can be interpreted as the cost of consumption in low states relative to consump-
tion in high states. Equation 2.17 along with the incentive compatibility constraint can be
substituted into the participation constraint to solve first for x(m¯, ∅, θ¯) and the remaining
choice variables:
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x(m¯, ∅, θ¯) = αρ (θ¯ − θ)(
pi(ρ− θ)
p¯i(θ¯ − ρ)
)1/γ
(θ¯ − ρ) + (ρ− θ)
x(m, ∅, θ) = αρ (θ¯ − θ)
(θ¯ − ρ) + (ρ− θ)
(
p¯i(θ¯ − ρ)
pi(ρ− θ)
)1/γ
b = αρ

1−
(
pi(ρ− θ)
p¯i(θ¯ − ρ)
)1/γ
(
pi(ρ− θ)
p¯i(θ¯ − ρ)
)1/γ
(θ¯ − ρ) + (ρ− θ)
− α
λ =
[
pi1/γ(θ¯ − ρ) γ−1γ + p¯i1/γ(ρ− θ) γ−1γ
αρ (θ¯ − θ) γ−1γ
]γ
µ =
p¯i(E(θ)− ρ)
ρ− θ . (2.18)
2.B.2 ALWAYS AUDIT CONTRACTS (q = 1) WITH NO TYPE-II ERRORS (η(θ¯) = 0)
When audits occur with certainty following low type reports, and the audit signal correctly
identifies high type entrepreneurs with certainty, then as in the private information case
the incentive compatibility constraint becomes linear. Our problem can be expressed by
the following Lagrangian
L1 = p¯i U(x(m¯, ∅, θ¯)) + pi(1− η(θ)) U(x(m,σ, θ)) + piη(θ) U(x(m, σ¯, θ))
+ λ[(α+ b)(E(θ)− ρ− piκ) + αρ− p¯ix(m¯, ∅, θ¯)− pi(1− η(θ))x(m,σ, θ)− piη(θ)x(m, σ¯, θ)]
+ µ
[
U(x(m¯, ∅, θ¯))− U [x(m, σ¯, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ)]] (2.19)
The first order conditions are
x(m¯, ∅, θ¯) : 0 = p¯iU ′(x(m¯, ∅, θ¯))− p¯iλ+ µ U ′(x(m¯, ∅, θ¯))
x(m,σ, θ) : 0 = pi(1− η(θ))U ′(x(m,σ, θ))− pi(1− η(θ))λ
x(m, σ¯, θ) : 0 = piη(θ)U ′(x(m, σ¯, θ))− piη(θ)λ− µ U ′[x(m, σ¯, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ)]
b : 0 = λ(E(θ)− ρ− piκ)− µ(θ¯ − θ)U ′[x(m, σ¯, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ)].
Substituting the incentive compatibility constraint into the first order conditions yields
U ′(x(m¯, ∅, θ¯)) = λ
(
p¯i(θ¯ − θ)− (E(θ)− ρ− piκ)
p¯i(θ¯ − θ)
)
U ′(x(m,σ, θ)) = λ
U ′(x(m, σ¯, θ)) = λ
(
piη(θ)(θ¯ − θ) + E(θ)− ρ− piκ
piη(θ)(θ¯ − θ)
)
,
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which we can combine with the intermediary’s participation constraint and the utility
function and solve for consumption allocations:
x(m¯, ∅, θ¯) = αρχ
(
1
1− ζ
)1/γ
x(m,σ, θ) = αρχ
x(m, σ¯, θ) = αρχ
(
piη(θ)
p¯iζ + piη(θ)
)1/γ
b =
αρχ
θ¯ − θ
(
ζ
1− ζ
)1/γ (
p¯i + piη(θ)
p¯iζ + piη(θ)
)1/γ
− α
λ = (αρχ)−γ
µ =
p¯iζ
1− ζ . (2.20)
where
χ =
1
p¯i (1− ζ) γ−1γ + piη(θ)
(
p¯iζ + piη(θ)
piη(θ)
) γ−1
γ
+ pi(1− η(θ))
, and
ζ =
E(θ)− ρ− piκ
p¯i(θ¯ − θ) .
2.B.3 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.5
Proof. We can write the first order condition for q as follows:
Lq = (1− η(θ))U(x(m,σ, θ)) + η(θ)U(x(m, σ¯, θ))− U(x(m, ∅, θ))
− λ[(α+ b)piκ+ (1− η(θ))x(m,σ, θ) + η(θ)x(m, σ¯, θ)− x(m, ∅, θ)]
+ µ[U(x(m, ∅, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ))− U(x(m, σ¯, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ))] + ν0 − ν1. (2.21)
In order to solve for Kuhn-Tucker multiplier ν1, we need to solve for shadow allocations
which are consumed with probability zero: x(m, ∅, θ) in the case of standard debt.
In the limit as q → 1−, the first order condition for x(m, ∅, θ) must hold, even though
this allocation is consumed with vanishing probability. The first order condition for
x(m, ∅, θ) is:
x(m, ∅, θ) : 0 = piU ′(x(m, ∅, θ))− piλ− µ U ′[x(m, ∅, θ) + (α+ b)(θ¯ − θ)].
Under logarithmic utility, U ′(x) = 1/x. We can solve for x(m, ∅, θ) using the solutions
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obtained in (2.20):
x(m, ∅, θ) = −αρ
2
[
1
pi
ζ
1− ζ −
piη(θ)
p¯iζ + piη(θ)
]
+
αρ
2
√[
1
pi
ζ
1− ζ −
piη(θ)
p¯iζ + piη(θ)
]2
+ 4
ζ
1− ζ
(
p¯i + piη(θ)
p¯iζ + piη(θ)
)
. (2.22)
Noting that ν0 = 0 by complimentary slackness, substitute (2.22) and (2.20) into (2.21) to
express the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier ν1 as a closed-form expression in terms of parameters.
2.C PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.6
Proof. Consider the case where the entrepreneur enjoys consumption with log utility,
type–II errors occur with zero probability (η(θ¯) = 0) and type-I errors occur with pos-
itive but very low probability, η(θ) → 0+. By Proposition 2.4, consumption following
overturned low type reports also tends toward zero (limη(θ)→0+ x(m, σ¯, θ) = 0), and by
l’Hoˆpital’s rule, the contribution to ex ante expected utility of the entrepreneur from con-
sumption following overturned reports also tends toward zero, (limη(θ)→0+ piη(θ)U(x(m, σ¯, θ)) =
0). When type-I errors are extremely rare, errors have little effect on the ex ante welfare
of entrepreneurs but still limit repayments drawn from high type entrepreneurs.
For tractability, we consider contracts under the following assumptions: First, type-I
errors will occur with very low (positive) probability. Second, utility will be logarithmic
over consumption. Third, the two income states will occur with equal probability.
Let y1 (y0) be the efficient value of choice variable y in the always audit (private
information) contract. Substituting U(x) = log x and pi = p¯i = 1/2 into the solutions
from Appendix 2.B, and taking the limit as η(θ)→ 0+, we obtain the following solutions:
α+ b1
α
=
1
2
ρ
ρ− θ + piκ, x1(m¯, ∅, θ¯) = αρ
1
2
θ¯ − θ
ρ− θ + piκ, x1(m,σ, θ) = αρ
x1(m, ∅, θ) = αρ
−(E(θ)− ρ− piκ) +
√
(E(θ)− ρ− piκ)2 + 1
2
(θ¯ − θ)(ρ− θ + piκ)
ρ− θ + piκ
x1(m, σ¯, θ) = 0, λ1 =
1
αρ
, µ1 =
1
2
E(θ)− ρ− piκ
ρ− θ + piκ . (2.23)
α+ b0
α
=
ρ(E(θ)− ρ)
(θ¯ − ρ)(ρ− θ) , x0(m¯; ∅; θ¯) = αρ
1
2
θ¯ − θ
ρ− θ , x0(m,σ, θ) = αρ
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x0(m, ∅, θ) = αρ 1
2
θ¯ − θ
θ¯ − ρ , x0(m, σ¯, θ) = 0, λ0 =
1
αρ
, µ0 =
1
2
E(θ)− ρ
ρ− θ . (2.24)
The bang-bang result occurs when efficient contracts ‘jump’ between private information
and standard debt contracts, where both are local maxima. To focus on these bang-bang
results, we first set κ such that the always audit and private information contracts provide
equal expected utility (EU(x1) = EU(x0)). Solving for κ yields
piκ = 2
(ρ− θ)(E(θ)− ρ)
θ¯ − θ (2.25)
It is useful to define two new parameters, one representing the excess return in good
states and the other the shortfall in bad states. Thus, let φ¯, φ ∈ R+, where φ¯ = θ¯ − ρ, and
φ = ρ− θ. All else equal, the entrepreneur would prefer a project with large φ¯, and small
φ. Note that assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 require that φ ∈ (0, φ¯). Substituting equation 2.25
into the solutions for the always standard debt contract (2.23), we can re-write allocations
as follows:
b1 =
αρ
4
:
φ¯+ φ
φ¯φ
− α, x1(m¯, ∅, θ¯) = αρ
4
(φ¯+ φ)2
φ¯φ
,
x1(m, ∅, θ) = αρ
4
−(φ¯− φ)2 +
√
(φ¯− φ)4 + 4φ¯φ(φ¯+ φ)2
φ¯φ
 , µ1 = 1
8
(φ¯− φ)2
φ¯φ
(2.26)
Now, consider the trade-off characterised by the first order condition for auditing q at
the always audit contract. After substituting equations 2.25 and 2.26 into the first order
condition for q (equation 2.21), we obtain
Lq = 1
2
log
 4φ¯φ
−(φ¯− φ)2 +
√
(φ¯− φ)4 + 4φ¯φ(φ¯+ φ)2

− 1
2
1− −(φ¯− φ)2 +
√
(φ¯− φ)4 + 4φ¯φ(φ¯+ φ)2
4φ¯φ
− 1
4
(φ¯− φ)
φ¯
+
1
8
(φ¯− φ)2
φ¯φ
log
1 + −(φ¯− φ)2 +
√
(φ¯− φ)4 + 4φ¯φ(φ¯+ φ)2
(φ¯+ φ)2
− ν1. (2.27)
The first term on the right hand side of equation 2.27 is the welfare gain attained through
auditing by verifying low type agents’ reports. In this example, agents clearly prefer to be
audited, x(m,σ, θ) > x(m, ∅, θ) for all values of φ¯, φ. The second term captures the re-
source cost of this increase in consumption for low type agents whose reports are verified,
and the third term represents the extra resource costs expended by the intermediary in
conducting more audits. The fourth term captures welfare gains attained by relaxing the
incentive compatibility constraint: auditing with a higher probability directly increases
the likelihood that misreporting high type entrepreneurs will be punished. The final term
on the right hand side is the Lagrange multiplier capturing the shadow cost of the natural
95
Financial Contracts and Business Cycles
upper bound of one attached to the audit probability.
Let φ→ 0+. By l’Hoˆpital’s rule,
lim
φ→0+
−(φ¯− φ)2 +
√
(φ¯− φ)4 + 4φ¯φ(φ¯+ φ)2
4φ¯φ
=
1
2
, and
lim
φ→0+
1
φ
log
1 + −(φ¯− φ)2 +
√
(φ¯− φ)4 + 4φ¯φ(φ¯+ φ)2
(φ¯+ φ)2
 = 2
φ¯
.
Substituting these results into 2.27 while retaining the same ordering of terms yields
lim
φ→0+
Lq(q = 1) = 1
2
log 2− 1
4
− 1
4
+
1
4
− ν1. (2.28)
The Kuhn-Tucker multiplier ν1 is positive. At the margin, the benefits of additional audits
outweigh the costs. The first two terms show that the utility benefits accruing to low type
entrepreneurs from verification of their reports exceeds the resource cost associated with
awarding more low type entrepreneurs with the post-verification consumption bundle.
The resource cost of audits is the product of the Lagrange multiplier on the resource
constraint, total assets devoted to the project and audit costs. Here, as the downside
shortfall φ approaches zero, borrowing and assets devoted to the project are unbounded
above. When downside risk is low, the benefits of auditing are small, and indeed the audit
cost which equates the expected welfare of always audit and private information contracts
is vanishing piκ→ 0+. The resource cost of the marginal audit is 1/4, which in this case is
equal and opposite to the benefit attained from the marginal audit by relaxing the incentive
compatibility constraint.
For the same case, letting φ → 0+, now consider the corresponding private informa-
tion contract. The first order condition for q can be written as follows:
Lq = 1
2
log
2φ¯
φ¯+ φ
− 1
2
[
1− 1
2
φ¯+ φ
φ¯
]
− 1
2
(φ¯− φ)2
φ¯(φ¯+ φ)
+
1
4
φ¯− φ
φ
log
(
φ
φ¯− φ + 1
)
+ ν0.
Taking the limit as φ→ 0+ yields
lim
φ→0+
Lq(q = 0) = 1
2
log 2− 1
4
− 1
2
+
1
4
+ ν0, (2.29)
The first term captures the direct welfare benefit from verifying entrepreneur reports, and
providing them with the consumption bundle x0(m,σ, θ) > x0(m, ∅, θ). This benefit,
and the resource cost associated with it and captured in the second term, are identical to
those in the always audit contract (2.28). This is due to the fact that these consumption
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bundles are identical in both contracts for this limiting case: low type agents whose reports
are verified (x(m,σ, θ)) consume αρ and low type agents whose reports are unverified
(x(m, ∅, θ)) consume αρ/2 in both contracts. As in the always audit contract (2.28), the
fourth term capturing the relaxation in the incentive compatibility constraint is equal to
1/4.
The third term, capturing the cost of the marginal audit, is greater in magnitude than
under the always audit contract. Audit costs as a fraction of assets employed in the project
are constant across contracts by assumption, yet leverage in the private information con-
tract is greater than in the always audit contract. We can see this by taking the limit of the
ratio of assets devoted to the project in the two contracts: limφ→0
α + b0
α + b1
= 2.
2.D STANDARD DEBT CONTRACTS WITH TYPE-II ERRORS
Assume that the probability of Type-II errors η(θ¯) following the audit of a high type
entrepreneur is low, and that the optimal contract is standard debt (q∗ = 1). We can
find approximate closed form solutions to optimal contracts using a first order Taylor
expansion of the Incentive Compatibility Constraint around η(θ¯) = 0. Denote the efficient
contract at η(θ¯) = 0 with all other parameters constant by Γ0, with associated public
actions and allocations labelled b0, q0 = 1, x0, z0.
U(x0(m¯, ∅, θ¯)) ≥ U(x0(m, σ¯, θ¯)) + U ′(x0(m, σ¯, θ¯))[x(m, σ¯, θ¯)− x0(m, σ¯, θ¯)]
− U ′(x0(m¯, ∅, θ¯))[x(m¯, ∅, θ¯)− x0(m¯, ∅, θ¯)]
+ η(θ¯)[U(x0(m,σ, θ¯))− U(x0(m, σ¯, θ¯))]
Note that x0(m¯, ∅, θ¯) = x0(m, σ¯, θ¯), which combined with the budget constraints allows
us to simplify the above expression as follows:
z(m, σ¯)− z(m¯, ∅) ≥ η(θ¯)
U ′(x0(m, σ¯, θ¯))
[U(x0(m,σ, θ¯))− U(x0(m, σ¯, θ¯))]. (2.30)
When utility is log, we can solve directly using Proposition 2.4. After rearranging and
simplifying, our first order approximation of the ICC can be written as a linear expression
in terms of contracted repayments:
z(m, σ¯)− z(m¯, ∅) ≥ η(θ¯) αρ
1− ζ log
[
1 +
p¯iζ(1− p¯iζ)
p¯iζ + piη(θ)
]
(2.31)
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Figure 2.1: Efficient contracts, project risk and audit costs. (U(x) = √x, ρ = 1,E(θ) = 1.2, p¯i =
0.9, η(θ) = 0.01).
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
q∗ = 0
0 < q∗ < 1
(θ¯, θ)
q∗ = 1
κ
(
E(θ)− piρ
p¯i
,ρ
) (
E(θ)
p¯i
,0
)
This linear approximation to the ICC permits closed form approximations to allocations
and leverage for efficient contracts, which are not presented here.
One interpretation of equation 2.31 is that it specifies a a small non-refundable fee
paid by all entrepreneurs who declare a low type return. Entrepreneurs whose reports are
overturned by the audit signal would be required to repay the full contracted repayment
z(m¯, ∅) in addition to the small fee. When η(θ¯) is small, this fee is negligible.
2.E FIGURES
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Figure 2.2: The determination of optimal contracts when there are multiple local maxima. (U(x) =
log x, ρ = 1,E(θ) = 1.2, p¯i = 0.9, (θ¯ − θ) = 0.3, η(θ) = 10−4, α = 1, κ ≈ 0.18)
0.9
1.0
V
(q
,
b
)
0 4 8 12
0
1
q
∗ (
b
)
b
b 1b 2
x2 x1
q = 0
V 1, V 2
q = q ∗(b )
αθ
ρ − θ
−α
99
Financial Contracts and Business Cycles
Figure 2.3: A Four-state example. (Θ = (0.9, 1.0, 1.1, 1.2), pi(Θ) = (1/8, 3/8, 3/8, 1/8), ρ = 1, α =
1, b = 5, κ = 0.08, U(x) = x1−γ/(1 − γ), γ = 9/10). Imperfect audits case marked by ×, with P (σ =
θi|θ = θj) = 10−|i−j| if and only if i 6= j. Perfect audits case marked by +, with P (σ = θi|θ = θj) =
0 if and only if i 6= j.
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FINANCIAL FRICTIONS AND UNEMPLOYMENT
This chapter is co-authored with Charles Nolan.1
This paper presents a DSGE model with risk averse entrepreneurs who must
be compensated for bearing productive risk. Increases in leverage or in finan-
cial stress increase the risk burden placed on entrepreneurs, and reduce wages
and interest rates below their factors’ respective marginal products. This in-
creases the volatility of employment, and distorts the link between labour cost
growth and inflation pressure. Inequalities between worker households and
entrepreneurs amplify and propagate business cycle shocks. Furthermore, the
model describes a link between observed macroeconomic trends in the labour
share of income and the capital-output ratio and the observed decline in en-
trepreneurship over recent decades. The model suggest that this decline in
entrepreneurship is consistent with trend increases in leverage as well as an
increase in the sensitivity of employment and output to financial shocks.
1Professor of Economics, University of Glasgow. Charles.Nolan@glasgow.ac.uk. The authors
would like to thank Christoph Thoenissen and conference and seminar participants at the University of
Glasgow Macrotheory Seminar Series and the 2015 Sheffield Workshop in Macroeconomics for helpful
comments and discussions. All errors are our own.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper introduces a new microfoundation for debt contracts as project finance within
a DSGE framework. The key modelling departure from the financial accelerator model
of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) is the introduction of debt disputes and risk
averse entrepreneurs, which combined result in the optimality of standard debt contracts.
The main consequence of the introduction of entrepreneur risk aversion is to elicit a pre-
cautionary motive which limits the demand for capital and labour factor inputs below
their respective marginal revenue products. During periods of financial stress, this pre-
cautionary motive increases, reducing the demand for labour further below what would
be predicted by shifts in marginal labour productivity. This exacerbates volatility in em-
ployment, and amplifies shifts in unemployment resulting from imperfect labour market
institutions.
RELATION TO THE LITERATURE
The well studied models described by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and Carl-
strom and Fuerst (1997) motivate the use of debt contracts to finance firms’ investment
projects by appealing to the costly state verification framework. In the costly state verifi-
cation model, project outcomes are initially privately observed by the borrower alone, but
can be detected by the lender using a costly auditing technology. Townsend (1979) and
Gale and Hellwig (1985) showed that when stochastic audit regimes are not available, a
standard debt contract is an optimal external finance contract in costly state verification
settings. Risk sharing and auditing only occurs following bad outcomes, which are inter-
preted as bankruptcy. Border and Sobel (1987) and Mookherjee and Png (1989) showed
with risk neutral and risk averse borrowers respectively that limiting agents to pure audit
strategies in this setting was extremely restrictive. Much if not all of the deadweight loss
associated with the information asymmetry could be eliminated if the lender can employ
stochastic monitoring strategies. With risk averse borrowers, resulting optimal contracts
resemble equity, with a high degree of risk sharing and stochastic auditing. Duncan and
Nolan (2014) show that the standard debt can be restored as an optimal contract in costly
state verification problems if the audit technology provides an imperfect signal and the
borrower is risk averse, and this is the model we employ here.
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The model we present is Knightian in the sense that entrepreneurs are risk averse
and must be compensated for bearing risk even under perfect competition in factor and
product markets (see Knight, 1921, part 3, chapter 9). This risk cannot be passed on in
full to outside lenders and investors who cannot freely observe the luck enjoyed by firms
engaging in risky projects. This luck is private information observed initially only by the
entrepreneur. As a result, fixed wages paid to employees and interest paid to creditors will
fall short of their respective expected marginal products, the difference compensating the
entrepreneur for providing guaranteed fixed wages and partially flexible interest income
when revenues are subject to risk.2
In terms of the dynamics of the model, it is the wedge between wages and the marginal
productivity of labour which differentiates us from Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999)
and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). In Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), expected
bankruptcy costs are increasing in amount of capital employed by the firm, driving a
wedge between risk free interest rates and capital’s marginal product. In Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997), loans funding capital must be backed by sufficient collateral to ensure re-
payment. This pulls the interest rate below the marginal product of capital, such that total
loan repayments are within the stock of pledgeable collateral assets under control. In our
model, audit costs increase in the amount of capital employed by the firm as in Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), but in contrast with that model, our entrepreneurs are risk
averse, which limits the extent to which they are willing to provide guaranteed wage and
interest income. The wedge between interest rates earned on the representative house-
hold’s savings and the marginal product of capital is a combination of monitoring costs
as in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and a risk premium. The wedge between
the marginal product of labour and the wage rate is a risk premium, and the risk premium
components of the two factor market wedges move together.
This has important implications for the dynamics of employment. As leverage in-
creases, or following an adverse shock to the efficiency of loan intermediation, the risk
borne by entrepreneurs increases, their required compensation for risk increases and both
wages and interest rates fall further from their respective marginal products of labour and
capital. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007), Jermann and Quadrini (2012) and Zanetti
2While Knight (1921) also emphasised the role of uncertainty (unquantifiable risks) in limiting risk
sharing between entrepreneurs and outside investors/insurers, his theory of entrepreneur compensation and
factor price determination relies on the presence of either uninsurable risks or uncertainty. In this paper
risks are uninsurable as a result of information asymmetries alone.
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Figure 3.1: Equity risk premium over following 8 quarters (annualised, area, LHS) and the labour share
of income (deviation from HP-filtered trend, bars, RHS). Shaded areas indicate NBER recessions.
(2015) show empirically that large recessions following financial crises tend to exhibit a
large wedge between wages and the marginal product of labour, and our model predicts
that financial stress and the labour wedge are tightly linked.
Figure 3.1 presents the forward looking 2-year excess return to equity of a portfolio
of 90 day treasury bills, and the deviation of the labour share of national income from
Hodrick-Prescott filtered trend. Using the realised return to equity and bond portfolios as
a very imperfect proxy for the expected return, the chart shows a clear negative correlation
between the equity risk premium and the labour wedge. When wages are relatively low,
the premium returned to equityholders over bondholders tends to be high, and vice-versa.
This is a key prediction of our model. Firms’ willingness to offer partially-guaranteed
income to capital through fixed coupon bonds is tightly linked to their willingness to offer
guaranteed wage income.3
This chapter proceeds to derive the important relationships in our model, starting from
the entrepreneurs’ problem. Features of the model which are not unique to this paper, for
example the representative household, wage and retail price setting and capital goods
production are described in Appendix 3.B. The dynamics and key results of this chapter
are contained in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, we consider two extensions of the benchmark
model.
First, we show that when the model is subject to New Keynesian retail price setting
frictions, the marginal cost of production is equal to the sum of marginal labour costs and
3Abo-Zaid (2013) describes a similar correlation between credit spreads and the labour wedge.
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the risk premium accruing to entrepreneurs. During periods of financial stress, the risk
premium is large, and cost pressure on retail prices exceeds what would be predicted by
labour cost growth alone.
Second, we outline the three main candidate financial shocks, which consist of inno-
vations in project risk, entrepreneur risk aversion and the quality of loan monitoring. We
show analytically that when the probability of default is low, the effect of project risk
shocks relative to risk aversion or loan monitoring shocks is greater.
3.1 THE MODEL
The structure of the economy is similar to the model described by Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist (1999). The economy consists of a representative household and a unit measure
of entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs hire labour and borrow capital from the representative
household to combine with their own capital in productive projects.
3.1.1 ENTREPRENEURS
There exists a unit measure of entrepreneurs, indexed by i, who enjoy consumption with
logarithmic utility over the composite consumption good,
U eti = Et
∞∑
j=0
βejue(Cet+ji), (3.1)
where ue(C) = logC, and βe < βh, entrepreneurs are less patient than the representative
household. 4 Entrepreneurs undertake projects with binary risky outcomes. The individ-
ual output of entrepreneur i exhibits constant returns to scale, and can be expressed as
follows:5
Yti = θtiAtK
α
t−1iN
1−α
ti , (3.2)
4Entrepreneurs enjoy a greater return on savings than households in the model. Their reduced discount
factor is required to ensure that the ratio of entrepreneurial and household wealth is constant in the steady
state.
5It is important for aggregation that the entrepreneurs’ preferences are intertemporally homothetic
(ueti(c
e
ti) = c
e(1−γe)
ti /(1 − γe)) and that their production technology exhibits constant returns to scale
(Yti = θtiAt[αK
φ
ti + (1 − α)Nφti]1/φ). This means that each entrepreneurs’ demand for factors and con-
sumption is proportional to their wealth. Restricting preferences to log utility and technology to Cobb-
Douglas is not essential, and Appendix 3.4.2 explores the generalisation of preferences to CRRA utility.
For both the steady state and the dynamics, variations in entrepreneur risk aversion resemble variations in
project risk.
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where θit is an idiosyncratic shock drawn from θti ∈ {θ1t, θ2t} where θ1t < θ2t. These
two states occur with probabilities pi1 and pi2 respectively, and their expectation is equal to
one, pi1θ1t + pi2θ2t = 1. Throughout this paper, it will be useful to consider the difference
between high and low project outcomes ξt = θ2t − θ1t which we will allow to be time
varying. Denote the expectation of output for entrepreneur i in period t conditional upon
At by Y¯ti = AtKαt−1iN
1−α
ti . The variable At is an aggregate total factor productivity
shock. Aggregate shocks are observable at the beginning of the period, the idiosyncratic
shock is revealed to the entrepreneur at the end of the period. Capital employed by the
entrepreneur is denoted in period t is Kt−1i, and Nti is labour hired by the entrepreneur
from the household sector.
At the beginning of each period, entrepreneurs borrow capital Kbti from financial in-
termediaries. Loan contracts specify the interest rate paid in good states, as well as the
recovery rate returned to financial intermediaries in bad states. Capital inputs into en-
trepreneur i’s project include the entrepreneur’s initial capital holdings and further capital
borrowed.
Kti = K
e
ti +K
b
ti, (3.3)
where Ket is the capital held by the entrepreneur at the beginning of the period. En-
trepreneurs fund consumption and future capital holdings out of the sum of project rev-
enues and current capital holdings, after repaying loans and paying workers’ wages,
QtK
e
ti + C
e
ti =
Yti(θti)
Xt
+Qt(1− δ)Ket−1i −Kbt−1irti(θti, σti)−WtNti. (3.4)
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital, Qt is the real price of capital, Xt is the markup
of retail prices over the wholesale price of entrepreneurs’ project output, meaning that
1/Xt is the real price of the entrepreneurs’ project output good. The state contingent real
rental rate of capital is rti(θti, σti), and Wt is the real wage rate. We attach the Lagrange
multipliers λeti(θti, σti) to each of the state contingent accumulation constraints. Note
that capital rental payments rti(θti, σti) are contingent on the idiosyncratic shock θti as
well as any audit signal obtained by the financial intermediary, σti ∈ {σ1, σ2}. Audit
signals are distributed as follows: P(σ2|θ2) = 1,P(σ2|θ1) = η,P(σ1|θ1) = 1 − η. The
unconditional probabilities of the three possible outcomes are as follows: P(θ1, σ1) =
pi1(1− η),P(θ1, σ2) = pi1η, and P(θ2, ∅) = pi2.
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3.1.2 FINANCIAL CONTRACTS
Chapter 2 show that when audit costs are sufficiently low and auditing is imperfect, stan-
dard debt contracts with deterministic audit strategies are constrained efficient. Within
the class of debt contracts, an important determinant of the nature of optimal repayment
schedules is the extent to which lenders can use current information to penalise the en-
trepreneur for past misreporting. For example, consider an extreme case with a high
frequency repeated loans between a borrower and lender. In this situation a high degree
of risk sharing can be accomplished even when the borrower has private information to
project returns. After some time, any reporting strategy which is systematically dishonest
will become apparent to the lender, who can observe that the distribution of reported re-
turns is not converging to the true distribution of project returns. The lender might not be
able to detect individual lies, but with time they can easily detect liars.
In practise, there are limits to the extent to which lending relationships are repeated,
and how new information can be used to punish historical claims. In this paper, we pro-
ceed under the assumption that contract repayments can only be made contingent on infor-
mation revealed in the current period. Relaxing this assumption would affect repayment
schedules, but would not change the qualitative relationships between leverage, marginal
rates of substitution across project outcomes and project risk that drive the results of this
paper.
Assumption 3.1 External finance contracts are only contingent on information revealed
in the current period.
This restriction is referred to as the anonymity constraint. Once repayments on current
period loans are made, entrepreneurs are considered to become anonymous, and their
future actions in other markets cannot be used as evidence of past false reports.
We apply Theorem 2.2 from Chapter 2 to motivate standard debt contracts as optimal.
Theorem 2.2 Let borrowing be taken as given b = bˆ. When type-I audit errors occur
with positive probability (η(θ) > 0), there exists some strictly positive audit cost κˆ such
that for all κ < κˆ, standard debt contracts (q(m) = 1) are efficient.
As we discuss in Appendix 3.A, it is difficult to pin down audit costs in a way that
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produces the high credit spreads observed in the data, given the low historical probabilities
of corporate default. Microeconomic estimates of direct bankruptcy costs as a share of
firms’ assets (what would be interpreted as κ in our framework) typically fall between
0.01 and 0.06, which is sufficiently low to be consistent with standard debt contracts
being optimal in accordance with Theorem 2.2.6
Assumption 3.2 Audit costs are sufficiently low, such that standard debt contracts are
optimal in equilibrium.
Following Theorem 2.2, contracts are subject to two constraints. First, repayments
following overturned low reports must exceed those following high reports,
r(θ1, σ2) ≥ r(θ2, ∅). (3.5)
Equation 3.5 is the incentive compatibility constraint, and we attach to it the Lagrange
multiplier µ. Second, expected loan repayments must exceed the sum of the financial
intermediaries’ deposit interest rate and expected audit costs,
∑
(θti,σti)
P(θti, σti)rˆt(θti, σti)K
b
t−1i ≥ rbtKbt−1i + pi1κKt−1i. (3.6)
where rbt is the financial intermediary’s opportunity cost of funds. Equation 3.6 describes
the financial intermediaries’ participation constraint, to which we’ll attach the Lagrange
multiplier ν. Both the incentive compatibility and participation constraints will be binding
under efficient contracts.
6These estimates are drawn from Warner (1977), Weiss (1990) and Altman (1984).
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3.1.3 FIRST ORDER NECESSARY CONDITIONS
Now that we have defined the entrepreneurs’ problem, we can take first order necessary
conditions:
Nti : 0 = Etλeti(θti, σti)
[
YNti(θti)
Xt
−Wt
]
, (3.7)
Kbti : 0 = Etλeti(θti, σti)
[
YKti(θti)
Xt
− rti(θti, σti)
]
+ νti
[
Etrˆt(θti, σti)− rbt − pi1κ
]
(3.8)
Ceti(θti, σti) : 0 = u
e′(Ceti(θti, σti))− λeti(θti, σti), (3.9)
Keti(θti, σti) : 0 = −Qtλeti(θti, σti)
+ βeEt
[
λet+1i(θt+1i, σt+1i)
(
YKt+1i
Xt+1
+Qt+1(1− δ)
)
− νt+1ipilκ
]
(3.10)
rˆt(θ1, σ1) : 0 = −P(θ1, σ1)λeti(θ1, σ1)Kbt−1i + νtiP(θ1, σ1)Kbt−1i (3.11)
rˆt(θ1, σ2) : 0 = −P(θ1, σ2)λeti(θ1, σ2)Kbt−1i + νtiP(θ1, σ2)Kbt−1i + µti (3.12)
rˆt(θ2, ∅) : 0 = −P(θ2, ∅)λeti(θ2, ∅)Kbt−1i + νtiP(θ2, ∅)Kbt−1i − µti (3.13)
Without loss of generality, Yjti(θti) denotes the derivative of output with respect to factor
j for entrepreneur i in period t given idiosyncratic shock realisation θti. Also, let Y¯jti
denote the expectation of the derivative of output with respect to factor j for entrepreneur
i in period t over idiosyncratic shock realisations θti
3.1.4 RISK ACROSS STATES
Equations 3.11, 3.12 and 3.13 describe how the entrepreneurs’ marginal utility (captured
by λeti(θ, σ)) varies across states. Entrepreneurs can vary loan repayment rates across
states r(θ, σ) in order to attempt to reduce variations in λeti across states. Entrepreneurs’
ability to reduce variations in λeti across states is limited by the entrepreneurs’ incentive
compatibility constraint (3.5). The incentive compatibility constraint is binding under
an efficient contract (µti > 0) resulting in varying marginal utilities across idiosyncratic
states λeti(θ1, σ2) > λ
e
ti(θ1, σ1) > λ
e
ti(θ2, ∅). Combining equations 3.11, 3.12 and 3.13
yields
νti = λ
e
ti(θ1, σ1), (3.14)
µti = P(θ1, σ2)K
b
ti(λ
e
ti(θ1, σ2)− λeti(θ1, σ1)) and (3.15)
λeti(θ1, σ1) = P(θ1, θ1)λ
e
ti(θ1, θ1) + P(θ1, θ2)λ
e
ti(θ1, θ2) + P(θ2, ∅)λeti(θ2, ∅). (3.16)
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In addition to the option of reduced repayments following successful audits, entrepreneurs
can mitigate project risk by reducing the size of projects, relative to the size which max-
imises expected profits. This precautionary reduction in the size of projects translates
into reductions in the quantities of capital and labour demanded compared with first best
efficient allocations.
3.1.5 DEMAND FOR LABOUR AND CAPITAL
Equation 3.7 describes the entrepreneurs’ first order necessary condition for labour de-
manded. Wage contracts are determined at the beginning of the period, prior to the
revelation of idiosyncratic shocks. Idiosyncratic project outcomes affect the marginal
product of labour, which means that wages are not equal to the marginal product of
labour ex post. When hiring labour, entrepreneurs weight deviations between wages and
labour’s marginal product according to the likelihood of states and the entrepreneurs’
state-contingent marginal utility. With a high marginal utility weight on bad outcomes
where the wage rate exceeds the marginal product of labour, entrepreneurs exercise pre-
caution in the labour market. The resulting market labour demand leaves a wedge between
the average marginal product across firms and the competitive market wage rate.
Entrepreneurs’ risk aversion also affects the capital market. Equation 3.8 presents
the first order necessary condition for the quantity of capital rented from the household
sector. The first term captures deviations between the marginal product of capital and
the capital rental rate. As in the labour market, these deviations are weighted by the en-
trepreneurs’ state-contingent marginal utility. The second term accounts for real resource
costs associated with auditing.
The capital market distortion resulting from the costs of auditing represents a real
resource cost. On the other hand, the distortions arising from entrepreneurs weighting
outcomes by their state contingent marginal utilities affects the distribution of income.
Entrepreneur risk aversion reduces the income of the representative household, but in-
creases the expected income of entrepreneurs.
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3.2 FACTOR PRICES AND LEVERAGE UNDER FLEXIBLE PRICES
It is useful to first consider factor prices and leverage with perfect competition in product
markets. This allows us to consider the distortions arising from the financial friction
in isolation from distortions arising from nominal rigidities. Under flexible prices and
perfect competition in product markets, the gross retail markup of consumption goods
over wholesale prices will be equal to one, Xt = 1.
Let the labour and capital market wedges be defined as follows,
τNti =
Y¯Nti −Wt
Y¯Nti
and (3.17)
τKti =
Y¯Kti − rbt
Y¯Kti
. (3.18)
Combining equations 3.7, 3.8 and 3.16 yields the following optimality conditions:
λeti(θ1, θ2)
λeti(θ1, θ1)
= 1 +
τNti
P(θ1, θ2)ξt
, (3.19)
λeti(θ2, ∅)
λeti(θ1, θ1)
= 1− τNti
P(θ2, ∅)ξt and (3.20)
τNti = τKti − pi1κ
Y¯Kti
. (3.21)
Derivations of equations 3.19, 3.20 and 3.21 can be found in Appendix 3.E.1. Equations
3.19 and 3.20 relate the entrepreneurs’ marginal rates of substitution for consumption
across project outcomes to the labour market wedge. Equation 3.21 relates the labour
market wedge to the capital market wedge. For entrepreneurs, it is efficient to reduce both
labour and capital demanded in order to mitigate project risk. Equation 3.21 confirms that
the labour market wedge (the left hand side, τNti) is less than the capital market wedge
(τKti). The difference between the two wedges results follows as a result of auditing costs,
which are increasing in the capital factor but not in the labour factor.
3.2.1 FACTOR INCOME
The previous subsection showed how the entrepreneurs’ inability to share idiosyncratic
productive risk with households results in positive labour and capital market wedges.
113
Financial Contracts and Business Cycles
Returns to the representative household’s productive factor inputs are lower than their
expected marginal products. Aggregating over entrepreneurs, we can combine the defini-
tions of the factor market wedges (3.17, 3.18) with the optimality condition relating the
two wedges (3.21) to derive the composition of output in terms of factor income:
Yt = WtNt + r
b
t [K
b
t−1 +K
e
t−1] + YtτNt + pilκKt−1. (3.22)
The first two terms on the right hand side of (3.22) typically form the decomposition
of factor income in a frictionless model. When entrepreneurs are compensated for risk,
there are two additional terms: the compensation for risk bearing earned by entrepreneurs
is captured by YtτNt. The fourth term, pilκKt−1, captures the resource costs of audits.
3.2.2 ENTREPRENEURS’ SAVINGS BEHAVIOUR
Entrepreneurs’ preferences are intertemporally homothetic, and their technology is scal-
able. Consequently, entrepreneurs’ actions in terms of consumption, labour and capital
hired are equal as a share of capital brought into the current period. Additionally, efficient
loan coupon rates r are identical across entrepreneurs. Taken together, we can describe the
aggregate behaviour of the population of entrepreneurs as a function of the mean wealth
of entrepreneurs. Mean preserving fluctuations in the ex ante distribution of wealth across
entrepreneurs do not affect market prices or aggregate quantities traded.
Also note that under logarithmic utility, where the income and substitution effects
of interest rates on savings cancel, the efficient savings decision of entrepreneurs which
uniquely satisfies equation 3.10 is
Ceti =
1− βe
βe
QtK
e
ti. (3.23)
A derivation of equation 3.23 is found in Appendix 3.E.2.
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3.2.3 GREAT RATIOS
We can re-write equation 3.21 in two alternative ways, in order to find the efficient labour-
capital and output-capital ratios in terms of factor prices and parameters:
Nti
Kt−1i
=
1− α
α
rbt + pilκ
Wt
and (3.24)
Y¯ti
Kt−1i
= Zt
[
1− α
α
rbt + pilκ
Wt
]1−α
. (3.25)
3.2.4 SOLVING FOR LEVERAGE
Given that Ceti is equal to a fixed proportion of K
e
t+1i regardless of idiosyncratic state
(equation 3.23), and that Ceti = 1/λ
e
ti by equation 3.9, we can write down the ratios
λeti(θ1, θ2)/λ
e
ti(θ1, θ1) and λ
e
ti(θ2, ∅)/λeti(θ1, θ1) in terms of the accumulation constraints
3.4:
λeti(θ1, θ2)
λeti(θ1, θ1)
=
Yti(θ1) +Qt(1− δ)Ket−1i −Kbt−1irti(θ1, σ1)−WtNti
Yti(θ1) +Qt(1− δ)Ket−1i −Kbt−1irti(θ1, σ2)−WtNti
and (3.26)
λeti(θ2, ∅)
λeti(θ1, θ1)
=
Yti(θ1) +Qt(1− δ)Ket−1i −Kbt−1irti(θ1, σ1)−WtNti
Yti(θ2) +Qt(1− δ)Ket−1i −Kbt−1irti(θ2, ∅)−WtNti
. (3.27)
Combining (3.26,3.27,3.19,3.20), we can first solve for the efficient amount of risk shar-
ing obtained by entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs can set capital rental repayment rates on a
contingent basis, enabling partial risk sharing.
Kbt−1i[rti(θ2, ∅)− rti(θ1, σ1)] = Y¯ti
[
pi2ξt − τNti
pi2 + pi1η
]
(3.28)
Equation 3.28 shows that risk sharing through differentiated repayment rates across states
is limited as a share of project risk EYtiξt. This means that for each entrepreneur, an
increase in output through hiring more labour and renting more capital will increase the
risk borne by that entrepreneur.
It will be helpful to derive a measure of leverage, and to show how leverage relates to
the labour wedge, τN . From the entrepreneur’s perspective, an increase in labour or capital
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hired from the household sector both increase the risk of projects, and the expected factor
payments due at the end of projects. It makes sense therefore to include labour payments
in our measure of leverage. One useful measure of leverage is the following:
Lti =
Y¯ti
RtQt−1Ket−1i
(3.29)
Project output Y¯ti is the expectation of the total income generated by the project, and
RtQt−1Ket−1i is the net worth of entrepreneur i, expressed in terms of their opportunity
cost, which was to redeem their capital holdings for deposits at the end of the period t−1.
After some rearranging, substituting equation 3.28 into equation 3.26 yields
Lti =
(pi2 + pi1η)τNti
[pi2ξt − τNti][pi1ηξt + τNti] , (3.30)
which can be rearranged to yield an approximate solution for τNti,7
τNti ≈ pi2
[
ξt − 1
Lti
]
+ pi1η
[
L2t ξ
2
t + 1
Lti [Ltiξt − 1]
]
+O([pi1η]2).
Derivations of equations 3.28 and 3.30 are contained in Appendix 3.E.2. Consider
equation 3.30. The left hand side is our production or income based measure of leverage.
The right hand side is increasing in τNti, indicating that all else equal, an increase in lever-
age means an increase in the labour market wedge (by equation 3.21, this also translates
into an increase in the capital market wedge). This is because an increase in leverage
requires the entrepreneur to accept a greater share of productive risk. Entrepreneurs hire
factors until their expected marginal product, weighted by their marginal rates of substi-
tution across states, is equal to their prices, in this case wages and interest rates. When
leverage is high, the entrepreneur bears more risk. The marginal rates of substitution
between worse and better project outcomes increase, increasing the wedge between the
risk adjusted expected marginal product of factors, which determines demand for factors
in our model, and the risk neutral expectation of factor marginal products, which would
equal factor prices in a perfect information environment.
7While serving as a useful approximation for some applications, it is important to note that the behaviour
of this function diverges significantly from the true solution when τN approaches zero. In particular, unlike
equation 3.30, the approximation does not restrict τN to positive values.
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In terms of business cycle dynamics, the positive relationship between leverage and
factor market wedges expressed in equation 3.30 marks the main departure of our model
from the related literature.
Equation 3.30 makes two clear predictions about business cycle dynamics. First, real
wages and real interest rates will respond sluggishly to total factor productivity shocks.
Consider a shock to total factor productivity. This will increase output, and the leverage
ratio. According to equation 3.30, this increase in the leverage ratio will also increase the
factor market wedge, captured by τN . In other words, real wages and real interest rates
will respond sluggishly to movements in marginal products driven by fluctuations in total
factor productivity.
Second, real wages and interest rates will diverge from their marginal products in
response to risk shocks (movements in ξt). For any given leverage ratio, an increase in
risk will mean a greater factor market wedge τN , and consequently a decrease in real
wages and real interest rates. When labour supply is elastic, or the wage setting process
exhibits additional rigidities, then employment and output will decrease in response to
positive shocks to project risk.
An alternative measure of leverage is the ratio of capital holdings between the two
populations, Kh/Ke. This measure is closer to that considered in related literature, but in
the context of our model is less useful. Importantly, it does not capture wage bill obliga-
tions which are determined at the beginning of the period and cannot be renegotiated in
the case of a bad project outcome. Combining equations 3.6, 3.28 and 3.30 yields
Kbt−1i
Ket−1i
([rti(θ2, ∅)− rbt ]− pi1κ) = RtQt−1
[
pi1(1− η)τNti
pi1ηξt + τNti
]
+ pi1κ (3.31)
Note that [rti(θ2, ∅) − rbt ] can be interpreted as the interest rate risk premium on loans,
the difference between the loan coupon rate and the deposit rate.
3.2.5 EQUILIBRIUM IN THE CAPITAL MARKET
Figure 3.2 presents the determination of equilibrium leverage and factor market wedges.
The blue, upward sloping schedules depict equation 3.30, the increasing relationship be-
tween leverage and risk, which draws the entrepreneurs’ idiosyncratic marginal rates of
substitution away from unity, resulting in the factor market wedge τ . This schedule
is determined by parameters taken as exogenous in our analysis including project risk,
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Figure 3.2: Equilibrium in the capital market.a
aUnless otherwise stated, all parameter values are taken from our benchmark parameterisation.
the probability of bad idiosyncratic outcomes, the probability of audit error and the en-
trepreneurs’ tolerance for risk (an increase in any of which would result in a leftward shift
of the blue schedule.
The downward sloping red schedules plot the relationship between the factor market
wedge, leverage and the equity risk premium. While endogenous in the short run, the long
run equity risk premium is tied down by the discount rates of the worker households and
entrepreneurs. Without loss of generality, when βhRf > 1, the wealth of worker house-
holds will tend to be increasing. When βeRe > 1, the (mean) wealth of entrepreneurs will
tend to be increasing.
3.3 MODEL DYNAMICS
Figure 3.3, reproduced from the Introduction for convenience, describes two measures of
the behaviour of wages to the marginal product of labour for the United States recessions
beginning in 1974Q1, 1981Q4, 2001Q2 and 2008Q1. For both the measure derived from
national income accounts (left hand panel) and the measure derived from firm surveys
118
CHAPTER 3
Figure 3.3: Labour income and productivity in US NBER recessions (Recession starting 1974Q1 dashed
o, 1981Q4 solid , 2001Q2 dashed, 2008Q1 solid). Left hand panel: Labour share of National Income
(BEA NIPA Table 2.1). Right hand panel: Nonfarm real wages relative to labour productivity (BLS
PRS85006102, PRS85006092. Nominal wages deflated by the consumer price index, St. Louis Fed-
eral Reserve FRED Database CPIAUCSL). Both series normalised to one at the onset of the respective
recessions.
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(right hand measure), wages tend to increase relative to marginal labour productivity at the
onset of the 1974 and 1981 recessions before falling below marginal labour productivity
over the medium run. For the more recent recessions starting in 2001 and 2008, real
wages tend to lag marginal labour productivity growth from the onset of the recession and
for the whole sample period.
Qualitatively, these trends can be reproduced within the flexible price version of our
model. Figures 3.4 and 3.4 display the dynamics of selected variables related to the labour
wedge, following total factor productivity (TFP) and risk shocks respectively. Full im-
pulse responses are presented in Appendix 3.F. Following the negative total factor pro-
ductivity shock, output and leverage falls, resulting in a short run decrease in the labour
wedge. At the onset of the shock, real wages actually rise initially, and over the short run
real wage falls lag the fall in labour productivity. Over the medium run, wages fall below
the path of marginal labour productivity. The lower right hand panel presents the dynam-
ics of real wages relative to labour productivity, and it is this panel that within our model
can be interpreted as equivalent to the panels presented in 3.3. The relative paths of real
wages and labour productivity resemble those observed in the 1974 and 1981 recessions,
initially rising before falling over the medium run.
Following the risk shock, the project risk absorbed by the entrepreneurs increases
sharply, and this manifests itself through a sharp increase in the labour wedge. Factor
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Figure 3.4: Dynamics of important labour market variables. Negative total factor produc-
tivity (TFP) shock (-1%). Log-linearised model. Periods measured in quarters.
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prices including wages fall, although marginal labour productivity actually increases as
employment falls in the short run while the capital stock is inelastic. Taken together, the
diverging paths of real wages and labour productivity mean that the fall in wages relative
to the path of labour productivity is large, approximately three times the magnitude of the
fall in output under our parameterisation.
Figures 3.6 and 3.7 present impulse selection for a broader set of model variables un-
der flexible prices and sticky retail prices respectively, where the sticky price model is
closed by a Taylor rule responding solely to contemporaneous inflation. The full param-
eterisations are available in Appendix 3.A. The broad qualitative dynamics of the model
are similar under flexible and sticky price settings, with the main distinction being the
now humped-shaped and persistent response to the risk shock under sticky prices.
Under the Taylor-type monetary policy rule with which we close the model, the real
interest rate response to shocks is sluggish compared with the rapid responses exhibited
under flexible prices. In the case of the positive TFP shock, the sluggish increase in the
real interest rate means that entrepreneurs’ (for whom the real interest rate is an expense)
accumulate capital quickly in response to the shock, but their initial leverage is high (the
real interest rate is also a determinant of their net worth—it reflects their opportunity cost
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Figure 3.5: Dynamics of important labour market variables. Risk shock (1%). Log-
linearised model. Periods measured in quarters.
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of projects). Taken together, the path of the factor wedge is more volatile than in the flex-
ible price counterfactual: it rises sharply at the onset of the shock, then falls sharply soon
after. Consequently, the paths of wages, hours worked, output and household consump-
tion are also more volatile than under the flexible price counterfactual.
Turning to the (recessionary) risk shock, again it is the dampened initial response of
the real interest rate to the shock that propagates the effects of the shock. At the onset
of the shock, the relatively high real interest rate keeps leverage lower than under the
flexible price counterfactual, dampening the initial response of the factor wedge. But the
relatively high real interest rate reduces the equity premium, slowing the accumulation of
entrepreneurial capital, fundamental to the adjustment process.
Following the risk shock, output returns to near its steady state level within 20 quar-
ters. But this relatively quick return of output to trend masks the adjustment processes
that are still occurring. After 40 quarters, there remain large differences in the inequality
of consumption and capital holdings across the household and entrepreneur groups. Per-
haps it is these persistent and sluggish trends in consumption and wealth inequality that
are part of the reason why financial crises tend to provoke concerns about the fairness of
the sharing of business cycle risks.
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3.4 EXTENSIONS
The main message of this paper is that during periods of financial stress, the demand for
labour will fall sharply. This reduces the risk absorbed by firm insiders, mitigating the
effects of the financial stress. How this reduction in the demand for labour is reflected by
increases in unemployment and decreases in wages will be determined in part by workers’
preferences and wage and price setting frictions.
Within this section, we outline some of the implications of the model for business
cycle dynamics. First, we show that within a New Keynesian setting, the marginal cost of
production will include a risk premium, which increases during times of financial stress.
This means that following a negative financial shock, cost pressure on inflation will be
greater than that predicted by trends in wages and labour productivity. Second, we outline
three candidate financial shocks (risk, risk tolerance and loan monitoring) and show how
they result in similar business cycle dynamics.
3.4.1 WAGE GROWTH AND RETAIL PRICE INFLATION
Within a New Keynesian setting, retailers purchase the entrepreneurs’ wholesale output
good at relative price 1/Xt, and sell differentiated retail goods to entrepreneurs and house-
holds. From the retailers’ perspective, the marginal cost of production is 1/Xt. When re-
tailers are restricted in their ability to adjust prices in response to fluctuations in marginal
costs, retail price inflation in the current period will be a function of current and expected
future fluctuations in marginal costs. In this Chapter, we motivate New Keynesian price
setting rigidities through Rotemberg adjustment costs, and the resulting New Keynesian
Phillips’ curve takes the following form
(1− ) + 
Xt
− φΠΠt(Πt − 1) + φΠβEt
[(
λht+1
λht
)
Yt+1
Yt
Πt+1(Πt+1 − 1)
]
= 0, (3.32)
where  > 0 is the demand elasticity of substitution between differentiated varieties,
φΠ > 0 is the adjustment cost parameter and Π is the gross inflation rate. A full derivation
is included in Appendix 3.C. Current inflation will be high if current marginal costs or
expected inflation are high.
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We can derive marginal costs as a function of labour costs and leverage from the
entrepreneurs’ problem. When product market nominal rigidities are present, leverage
across entrepreneurs becomes
Lt =
Yt
XtRtQt−1Ket−1
, (3.33)
where φx > 0, xˆt is the log difference in retail markup over wholesale prices from the
steady state.
Leverage and labour costs are related according to8
1
Xt
=
pi2
1− α
WtNt
Yt
(
ξt − L−1t + 1/pi2
)
+O(pi1η). (3.34)
Taking a log-linear approximation around the steady state we obtain9
−xˆt = wˆt + nˆt − yˆt + φl lˆt + φξ ξˆt +O(pi1η), (3.35)
where all variables are expressed in terms of log deviations from their steady state values.
The left hand side of equation 3.35 captures marginal costs. Within the benchmark New
Keynesian model, or in standard financial frictions models including Bernanke, Gertler,
and Gilchrist (1999), marginal costs consist solely of marginal labour costs, and are equal
to the first three terms on the right hand side wˆt + nˆt − yˆt, which capture the real wage
and the marginal productivity of labour. The terms φl lˆt + φξ ξˆt capture the risk premium
earned by entrepreneurs who absorb some of the additional productive risk associated
with an increase in firm size. Increases in leverage lˆt and project risk ξˆt increase project
risk and the risk premium added to marginal labour costs to obtain the marginal cost of
production.
This means that the relationship between labour marginal costs and total marginal
costs will be time varying, and importantly will respond to financial stress. During periods
of high financial stress, cost pressure on inflation will be high relative to prevailing wage
and productivity growth.
8A derivation is contained in Appendix 3.C.
9where
φl =
pi2
1− α
XssWssNss
YssLss
, φξ =
pi2
1− α
XssWssNssξss
Yss
.
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Note that here we’ve continued to restrict financial shocks to risk shocks, as in Chris-
tiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2014). Note however that other financial shocks including
fluctuations in entrepreneurs’ risk tolerance or in audit quality would have similar first
order effects as fluctuations in project risk ξˆt. Section 3.4.2 considers the relative effects
of these three potential financial shocks.
3.4.2 FINANCIAL SHOCKS
Several recent studies have pointed toward financial shocks affecting the intermediation of
capital loans as an important determinant of business cycle dynamics (see Benk, Gillman,
and Kejak, 2005, Nolan and Thoenissen, 2009, Fornari and Stracca, 2012, Jermann and
Quadrini, 2012 and Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno, 2014). While financial shocks in
our model differ from the standard financial accelerator model, the primary difference is
the inclusion of a direct effect on the labour market wedge, which is an important feature
of the model described by Jermann and Quadrini (2012).10
There remains some debate about the interpretation of these financial shocks. Chris-
tiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2014) find in an estimated model based on Bernanke, Gertler,
and Gilchrist (1999) that shocks to the dispersion of firms’ project outcomes (risk shocks)
are a suitable financial shock and can explain a large share of business cycle volatility
in US data. Pinter, Theodoridis, and Yates (2013) cast some doubt on this finding, argu-
ing that risk shocks as identified by market expectations of stock price volatility cannot
account for a large share of business cycle volatility.
For the bulk of the analysis within this paper, we’ve assumed that the ‘financial shock’
takes the form of an increase in idiosyncratic project risk across firms. Within our model,
the effects of a risk shock on the dynamics of macroeconomic aggregates are isomorphic
to the effects of a shock to loan monitoring quality, and are similar to the effects of a shock
to entrepreneurs’ risk tolerance.11 All three potential shocks enter the model through the
relationship between leverage and the labour market wedge outlined by equation 3.30.12
10It is important to note that within the model described by Jermann and Quadrini (2012), the financial
friction is motivated by inefficient tax design, rather than by appeal to informational frictions.
11A shock to entrepreneurs’ risk tolerance would also affect the entrepreneurs’ savings responses to
shocks, but for the purposes of this comparison we will focus on the relationship between our selected
financial shocks, leverage and the labour market wedge outlined by equation 3.30. Numerical simulations
suggest that the effects on entrepreneurs’ savings of fluctuations in risk tolerance are small.
12The three shocks have differential effects on interest rate spreads, but within the model their effects on
macroeconomic aggregates can be isolated from their effects on interest rate spreads.
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We’ll compare our three financial shocks within the flexible price model (Xt = 1)
by taking first order approximations of equation 3.30 in terms of log deviations from
steady state of leverage lˆt, project risk ξt and the entrepreneurs’ coefficient of relative risk
aversion ˆ[log γe]t, and absolute deviations in terms of the labour wedge τˆNt and type-I
audit error ηˆt. We will take this approximation around the initial values η → 0+ and
γe = 1.
First we need to work through the entrepreneurs’ problem again, this time allowing γe
to take any positive value. Equation 3.30 is replaced by
L−1ti =
[pi2ξt − τNt]
[
(pi2 + pi1η)τNt
pi1η[pi2ξt − τNt] + 1
] 1
γe
+ pi1(1− η)ξt
[
τNt
pi1ηξt
+ 1
] 1
γe
+ pi1ηξt + τNt[
(pi2 + pi1η)τNt
pi1η[pi2ξt − τNt] + 1
] 1
γe
− 1
.
(3.36)
Now, assuming ηt and γet to be time-varying around steady state values of ηss → 0+ and
γess = 1, we can derive the following expression in log linear and linear differences from
the steady state,
ϕτ τˆt = lˆt + ϕξ ξˆt + ϕγ ˆ[log γe]t + ϕηηˆt︸ ︷︷ ︸
financial shocks
(3.37)
where
ϕτ = ξssLss − 1, ϕξ = ξssLss, ϕγ = pi1 log(ξssLss), ϕη = pi1
pi2(ξssLss − 1) .
For any value of leverage, the factor market wedge τt is increasing in project risk ξt,
relative risk aversion γet and audit errors ηt. When the probability of a bad project outcome
pi1 is low, small fluctuations in project risk ξ have a large impact on financial stress relative
to fluctuations in relative risk aversion γe or audit quality η. When the probability of the
bad project outcome pi1 is high, this means that the likelihood of bankruptcy is greater, and
the costs of poor monitoring quality will be larger along with the effects of fluctuations in
risk tolerance.
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3.A PARAMETERISATION
The worker households’ preferences over consumption and labour are described by u(C,N) =
C1−σ/(1 − σ) − N1+ψ/(1 + ψ), with σ = 2 and ψ = 1.5. The difference between the
worker households’ and entrepreneurs’ intertemporal elasticities of substitution (1/σ) are
important for our results. Recall that the entrepreneurs’ intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution is equal to one. Typically, when worker households’ intertemporal elasticities of
substitution are low, the equilibrium insurance flows toward worker households will be
greater in recessions. Consequently, the amplification of shocks will be larger.
The worker households’ quarterly discount factor is βh = 0.995, and constant steady
state wealth shares require that the entrepreneurs’ quarterly discount factor is βe = 0.975.
In the steady state, the risk free interest rate (R = 1/βh), and the average return to
entrepreneurs’ equity is (Re = 1/βe).13 The probability of a bad project outcome is pi1 =
0.00415, which corresponds to an annual probability of default of 1.66%, the average
historical annual default probability of credit rated US firms (Schuermann and Hanson,
2004). and the probability of a type-I error resulting from an audit is η = 0.1. Small
changes in this value have no effect on our main results, so long as η remains strictly
positive. The resource cost of auditing (bankruptcy costs), expressed as a share of capital
invested in the project is κ = 0.3, which is high in comparison with microeconomic
studies that have found direct bankruptcy costs of between 1% and 6% of firms’ assets
(see for example Warner, 1977, Weiss, 1990 and Altman, 1984). This is quite a common
weakness of costly state verification models. It is difficult to obtain the high interest rate
spreads observed in the data with both realistically low default rates and bankruptcy costs.
Across parameterisations matching any two of these three variables with available data has
little effect on the dynamics of the model. Given that credit spreads resemble an insurance
premium in our model, it is possibly the case that greater entrepreneur risk aversion would
help in obtaining the high and volatile credit spreads seen in the data while still retaining
realistically low default probabilities and bankruptcy costs. That being said, we would
expect entrepreneurs to self select as being relatively risk tolerant, so it is unlikely that
greater risk aversion is the best way to bring the model closer to the financial data.
13It would be possible to write up the model with a common discount factor across worker households
and entrepreneurs, but, given entrepreneurs’ relatively high expected return to capital, there would need to
be some process governing the exit or death of entrepreneurs in the steady state in order to ensure a stable
steady state distribution of capital wealth between worker households and entrepreneurs.
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Table 3.1: Properties of the deterministic steady state
STEADY STATE VALUE
Data Model
GREAT RATIOS
Capital-output†, K/Y 2.74 2.99
Consumption-output, C/Y 0.65 0.75
Hh. consumption share, Ch/C NA 0.83
Investment-output, I/Y 0.16 0.24
Ent. capital share, Ke/K 0.42 0.42
Labour share, NW/Y 0.56 0.58
FINANCIAL VARIABLES
Real interest rate†, Rf − 1 1.35% 2.01%
Return on equity†, Re − 1 9.43% 10.61%
Credit spread†, r(θ2, ∅)− rb 2.04% 1.91%
† These figures have been converted to annualised values.
The idiosyncratic risk coefficient is 5, which is sufficiently large that in low states
θ1, individual output is negative in the sense that more capital is destroyed than output
produced. The steady state factor wedge is quite sensitive to the entrepreneurs’ discount
factor (the lower the discount factor, the less savings the entrepreneurs will accrue) and
idiosyncratic risk. Under our parameterisation, the steady state factor wedge is τN is equal
to 10.25%.
The Cobb-Douglas weight on capital is α = 0.35. The depreciation rate of capital is
δ = 0.02 per quarter. The investment adjustment cost parameter is φ = 4. The persistence
of both risk and total factor productivity shocks are set at ρA = 0.93, ρξ = 0.99, the
standard deviation and magnitude of impulse response for both shocks are set at σA =
0.01, σξ = 0.01.
3.A.1 DATA
All macroeconomic variables are taken from the St Louis Federal Reserve FRED database,
except where otherwise stated. FRED unique identifies are provided in brackets.
The risk free real interest rate is calculated from the Effective Federal Funds rate
(FEDFUNDS).14 The average return on equity is the annualised percentage change in
14Using the Effective Federal Funds rate (FEDFUNDS) results in an average real interest rate of 1.35%,
which compares with 1.00% derived from the 90 day treasury bill rate (TB3MS).
127
Financial Contracts and Business Cycles
the Russell 3000 Total Market Return Index (RU3000TR PC1).15 Both interest rates are
converted to real returns by subtracting CPI inflation (CPIAUCSL PC1). The average an-
nualised credit spread is taken from Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012). The average capital
leverage ratio is taken from Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2012) and is set to the upper end of the
range of financial leverage (Assets / Equity) values they find for US listed non-financial
firms of 2.4.16
For the sticky price model, the elasticity of substitution between differentiated va-
rieties of the retail good is  = 11 and the Rotemberg adjustment cost parameter is
φΠ = 116, standard values in the literature. The Taylor rule coefficient on inflation is
1.5.
Note that in our model, the consumption and investment shares of output add to one.
This is not true in the data, which includes Government Spending.
3.B THE REST OF THE MODEL
3.B.1 HOUSEHOLDS
There exists a representative household enjoying consumption c and supplying labour n
in each period. Households maximise
Uht = Et
∞∑
j=0
βjUh(Ct+j, Nt+j), (3.38)
where Uh1 ,−Uh11, Uh2 , Uh22 > 0.
At the start of the period, the representative household holds deposits Dt−1 which are
claims issued by the financial intermediaries. At the end of the period, the financial inter-
mediaries repay the household with interest on their deposits RtDt−1, and wage income
WtNt. The representative household uses these deposit holdings to purchase consumption
15For comparison, the average real return on equity for United States Banks (USROE) over the time
period is equal to 8.65%, which compares with the average of 9.43% calculated from the Russell 3000
Index.
16Estimates on this measure vary dramatically, with McGrattan and Prescott (2005) finding an average
Assets / Equity ratio of 1.2. This makes quite a big difference to the dynamics of the model, but the main
points made within this paper still hold under a wide range of steady state leverage ratios.
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goods Ct, and the remaining deposits are carried over to the following period Dt,
Dt + Ct = RtDt−1 +WtNt. (3.39)
The first order conditions of the representative household can be described as follows:
−U
h
2 (Ct, Nt)
Wt
= Uh1 (Ct, Nt) (3.40)
Uh1 (Ct, Nt) = βEtRt+1Uh1 (Ct+1, Nt+1). (3.41)
3.B.2 FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
Financial intermediaries are perfectly competitive and risk neutral, earning zero profits
in equilibrium. Financial intermediaries provide a deposit asset to households, and inter-
mediate payments from entrepreneurs to households. Between periods, financial interme-
diaries hold the durable capital good. Within periods, these capital holdings are lent to
entrepreneurs.
Loan contracts specify interest rates following successful projects, and recovery rates
following unsuccessful projects (bankruptcies). As the probability of project success is
variable, intermediaries’ diversified portfolios are subject to aggregate risks. This risk is
passed on to the household sector depositors.
At the end of each period, all deposits are backed by capital holdings
Dt = QtK
b
t (3.42)
where Kft is the amount of capital held by financial intermediaries at the end of period
t, and Qt is the cost of capital in period t. All loan earnings are passed on directly to the
representative household through interest on deposits.
Dt−1Rt = Qt(1− δ)Kbt−1 + rbtKbt−1 (3.43)
129
Financial Contracts and Business Cycles
The first term on the right hand side of equation 3.43 is the value of bank capital holdings
in the current period after depreciation δ. The second term is the capital rental income
earned through loans to entrepreneurs, net of monitoring costs.
3.B.3 CAPITAL PRODUCERS
Competitive capital producers (indexed by j) combine the combine the consumption good
with existing capital to produce new capital goods. Firm j can produce Ijt units of the
investment good for total cost
Itj + Φ
(
Itj
Kt−1j
)
Kt−1j, (3.44)
where
Φ
(
I
K
)
=
φ
2
(
I
K
− δ
)2
.
In competitive equilibrium, the cost of capital can be described as follows,
Qt = 1 + Φ
′
(
It
Kt−1
)
= 1 + φ
(
It
Kt−1
− δ
)
. (3.45)
The final condition we require ensures market clearing in the goods market:
Yt = Ct + C
e
t +QtIt + pi1κKt−1 (3.46)
3.C THE NEW KEYNESIAN MODEL
In this appendix we outline the key features of the New Keynesian extension to the model.
Monopolistically competitive retailers indexed by j purchase wholesale output of en-
trepreneurs and produce differentiated products without cost. Households’ consumption
bundle includes individual consumption goods indexed by j:
Ct =
[∫ 1
0
Ct(j)
1− 1
 di
] 
1−
. (3.47)
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The representative household also receives any profits χ accruing to the retailers, in which
they own a diversified portfolio of shares:
Dt + Ct = RtDt−1 +WtNt + χt. (3.48)
Entrepreneurs’s consumption bundles and the investment good bundle are also adapted
in a similar way:
Cet =
[∫ 1
0
Cet (j)
1− 1
 di
] 
1−
(3.49)
It =
[∫ 1
0
It(j)
1− 1
 di
] 
1−
(3.50)
Let Xt be the gross markup of retail prices over the price of wholesale goods produced
by entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurs’ capital accumulation constraint becomes
QtK
e
ti + C
e
ti =
1
Xt
Yti(θti) +Qt(1− δ)Ket−1i −Kbt−1irti(θti, σti)−WtNti, (3.51)
where Q,W, r, 1/X, κ remain prices expressed in real terms, relative to the price level of
consumption goods P . Note that the labour and capital market wedges must be re-defined
in terms of marginal revenue products as follows:
τNti =
Y¯Nti −XtWt
Y¯Nti
. (3.52)
In addition, the leverage ratio becomes
Lti =
Y¯ti/Xt
RtQt−1Ket−1i
(3.53)
Working again through the entrepreneurs’ problem, we can re-write equation 3.30 in
terms of the retail markup over wholesale prices Xt:
Xt =
1− α
pi2
Y¯ti
WtNti
/(
ξt − L−1ti + 1/pi2
)
+O(pi1η) (3.54)
Note that (1 − α) Y¯ti
WtNti
is the traditional markup in the benchmark New Keynesian
model with Cobb-Douglas production. What equation 3.54 shows is that for any marginal
labour cost of production, higher leverage L means a smaller markup. This is because
higher leverage increases the risk borne by the entrepreneur. The total marginal cost of
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production includes compensation to the entrepreneur for production risk.
The aggregate accumulation constraint of entrepreneurs becomes
QtK
e
t + C
e
t =
1
Xt
Yti(θt) +Qt(1− δ)Ket−1 − rbK lt−1 − pilκKt−1 −WtNt, (3.55)
Individual retailers may reset their price with probability 1−ρ in each period. Retailers
are completely owned by the worker households, who hold diversified portfolios of shares
in retailers. It follows that retailers discount expected future cashflows according to the
worker households’ common stochastic discount factor.
Retailers’ nominal price setting decisions are subject to a quadratic adjustment cost
following Rotemberg (1982). The adjustment costs incurred by firm j in period t are
given by
φΠ
2
(
Pt(j)
Pt−1(j)
− 1
)2
Yt. (3.56)
Retailer j determines a state contingent path for prices {Pt(j)}∞t=0 that maximises the
discounted value of nominal profits χ:
max
{Pt(j)}∞t=0
Et
∞∑
s=0
[sdf]ht,t+sχt+s, (3.57)
where
χt = Pt(j)Yt(j)− [mc]tYt(j)Pt − φ
Π
2
(
Pt(j)
Pt−1(j)
− 1
)2
YtPt, (3.58)
And [sdf]ht,t+s is the stochastic discount factor applied by households in period t for income
received in period t+ s.
The resulting New Keynesian Phillips Curve in symmetric equilibrium is described as
follows:
(1− ) + [mc]t− φΠΠt(Πt− 1) + φΠβEt
[(
λht+1
λht
)
Yt+1
Yt
Πt+1(Πt+1 − 1)
]
= 0. (3.59)
We close the model with a Taylor rule that responds solely to current inflation. Let Rnt
denote the gross nominal interest rate on household deposits D. The Fisher relation is
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described as follows,
Rt = R
n
t /Πt. (3.60)
The monetary rule can be written the following way,
Rnt β = ψΠΠt. (3.61)
3.D EQUILIBRIUM CONDITIONS
3.D.1 THE FLEXIBLE PRICE MODEL
Definition 3.1 A decentralised competitive equilibrium specifies the set of state-contingent
paths for {Yt, Kt, Ket , Kbt , Dt, Nt, Ct, Cet , It, Rt, Qt, rbt , rt(θ2, ∅),Wt, τNt}∞t=0 which satis-
fies the following system of equations:
WORKER HOUSEHOLDS
Dt + Ct = RtDt−1 +WtNt (3.39)
−U2(Ct, Nt)
Wt
= U1(Ct, Nt) (3.40)
U1(Ct, Nt) = βEtRt+1U1(Ct+1, Nt+1) (3.41)
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
Dt = QtK
b
t (3.42)
Dt−1Rt = Qt(1− δ)Kbt−1 + rbtKbt−1 (3.43)
ENTREPRENEURS
Yt = ZtK
α
t−1N
1−α
t (3.2)
Kt = K
b
t +K
e
t (3.3)
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QtK
e
t + C
e
t = Yt +Qt(1− δ)Ket−1 − rbtKbt−1 − pi1κKt−1 −WtNt (3.4)
τNt =
(1− α)Yt −WtNt
(1− α)Yt (3.17)
Cet =
1− βe
βe
QtK
e
t (3.23)
Nt
Kt−1
=
1− α
α
rbt + pilκ
Wt
(3.24)
Lt =
Yt
RtQt−1Ket−1
(3.29)
Lt =
(pi2 + pi1η)τNt
[pi2ξt − τNt][pi1ηξt + τNt] (3.30)
Kbt−1
Ket−1
=
RtQt−1
[
pi1(1− η)τNti
pi1ηξt + τNti
]
+ pi1κ
[rti(θ2, ∅)− rbt ]− pi1κ
(3.31)
CAPITAL PRODUCERS AND AGGREGATE DEMAND
Qt = 1 + φ
(
It
Kt
− δ
)
(3.45)
Yt = Ct + C
e
t +QtIt + pi1κKt−1 (3.46)
3.D.2 THE STICKY PRICE MODEL
Definition 3.2 A decentralised competitive equilibrium specifies the set of state-contingent
paths for {Yt, Kt, Ket , Kbt , Dt, Nt, Ct, Cet , It, Rt, Qt, rbt , rt(θ2, ∅),Wt, τNt, Xt,Πt, Rnt }∞t=0
which satisfies the following system of equations:
WORKER HOUSEHOLDS
Dt + Ct = RtDt−1 +WtNt + χt (3.48)
−U2(Ct, Nt)
Wt
= U1(Ct, Nt) (3.40)
U1(Ct, Nt) = βEtRt+1U1(Ct+1, Nt+1) (3.41)
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FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
Dt = QtK
b
t (3.42)
Dt−1Rt = Qt(1− δ)Kbt−1 + rbtKbt−1 (3.43)
ENTREPRENEURS
Yt = ZtK
α
t−1N
1−α
t (3.2)
Kt = K
b
t +K
e
t (3.3)
QtK
e
t + C
e
t =
Yt
Xt
+Qt(1− δ)Ket−1 − rbtKbt−1 − pi1κKt−1 −WtNt (3.55)
τNt =
(1− α)Yt −XtWtNt
(1− α)Yt (3.53)
Cet =
1− βe
βe
QtK
e
t (3.23)
Nt
Kt−1
=
1− α
α
rbt + pilκ
Wt
(3.24)
Lt =
Yt/Xt
RtQt−1Ket−1
(3.33)
Lt =
(pi2 + pi1η)τNt
[pi2ξt − τNt][pi1ηξt + τNt] (3.30)
Kbt−1
Ket−1
=
RtQt−1
[
pi1(1− η)τNti
pi1ηξt + τNti
]
+ pi1κ
[rti(θ2, ∅)− rbt ]− pi1κ
(3.31)
CAPITAL PRODUCERS AND AGGREGATE DEMAND
Qt = 1 + φ
(
It
Kt
− δ
)
(3.45)
Yt = Ct + C
e
t +QtIt + pi1κKt−1 (3.46)
(1− ) + [mc]t− φΠΠt(Πt− 1) + φΠβEt
[(
λht+1
λht
)
Yt+1
Yt
Πt+1(Πt+1 − 1)
]
= 0. (3.59)
Rt = R
n
t /Πt (3.60)
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Rnt β = ψΠΠt, (3.61)
3.E USEFUL DERIVATIONS
3.E.1 DERIVATION OF EQUATIONS (3.19 , 3.20, 3.21)
Expanding the entrepreneurs’ first order conditions for labour demand (3.7) yields
0 = P(θ1, σ1)λ
e
ti(θ1, σ1)YNti(θ1) + P(θ1, σ1)λ
e
ti(θ1, σ2)YNti(θ1) + P(θ2, ∅)λeti(θ2, ∅)YNti(θ2)
− Etλeti(θti, σti)Wt
= P(θ1, σ1)λ
e
ti(θ1, σ1)YNti(θ1) + P(θ1, σ1)λ
e
ti(θ1, σ2)YNti(θ1) + P(θ2, ∅)λeti(θ2, ∅)YNti(θ2)
+ P(θ2, ∅)λeti(θ2, ∅)YNti(θ1)− P(θ2, ∅)λeti(θ2, ∅)YNti(θ1)− Etλeti(θti, σti)Wt
= Etλeti(θti, σti)θ1YNti + P(θ2, ∅)λeti(θ2, ∅)YNti(θ2 − θ1)− Etλeti(θti, σti)Wt
= λeti(θ1, σ1)(θ1YNti −Wt) + P(θ2, ∅)λeti(θ2, ∅)YNtiξt
= −(Wt − θ1YNti) + P(θ2, ∅) λ
e
ti(θ2, ∅)
λeti(θ1, σ1)
YNtiξt
λeti(θ2, ∅)
λeti(θ1, σ1)
=
1
P(θ2, ∅)ξt
Wt − θ1YNti
YNti
=
1
P(θ2, ∅)ξt
Wt − [θ1 + P(θ2, ∅)ξt − P(θ2, ∅)ξt]YNti
YNti
=
1
P(θ2, ∅)ξt
Wt − [1− P(θ2, ∅)ξt]YNti
YNti
λeti(θ2, ∅)
λeti(θ1, σ1)
= 1− 1
P(θ2, ∅)ξt
YNti −Wt
YNti
= (3.20 RHS).
Now, re-write (3.16) as follows:
P(θ2, ∅)λeti(θ2, ∅) = [P(θ2, ∅) + P(θ1, θ2)]λeti(θ1, σ1)− P(θ1, θ2)λeti(θ1, θ2),
and divide through by λeti(θ1, σ1):
P(θ2, ∅) λ
e
ti(θ2, ∅)
λeti(θ1, σ1)
= [P(θ2, ∅) + P(θ1, θ2)]− P(θ1, θ2)λ
e
ti(θ1, θ2)
λeti(θ1, σ1)
,
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Rearranging and substituting in (3.20) yields
λeti(θ1, θ2)
λeti(θ1, σ1)
=
P(θ2, ∅) + P(θ1, θ2)
P(θ1, θ2)
− P(θ2, ∅)
P(θ1, θ2)
λeti(θ2, ∅)
λeti(θ1, σ1)
=
P(θ2, ∅) + P(θ1, θ2)
P(θ1, θ2)
− P(θ2, ∅)
P(θ1, θ2)
[
1− τNti
P(θ2, ∅)ξt
]
=
P(θ2, ∅) + P(θ1, θ2)
P(θ1, θ2)
− P(θ2, ∅)
P(θ1, θ2)
+
P(θ2, ∅)
P(θ1, θ2)
τNti
P(θ2, ∅)ξt
λeti(θ1, θ2)
λeti(θ1, σ1)
= 1 +
τNti
P(θ1, θ2)ξt
= (3.19 RHS).
Now we consider equation (3.21). Substituting (3.14) into (3.8) yields
0 = Etλeti(θti, σti)[YKti(θti)− rti(θti, σti)] + λeti(θ1, σ1)
[
Etrˆt(θti, σti)− rdt − pi1κ
]
= Etλeti(θti, σti)YKti(θti)− λeti(θ1, σ1)
[
rdt + pi1κ
]
+ λeti(θ1, σ1) [Etrˆt(θti, σti)]
− Etλeti(θti, σti)rti(θti, σti)
= Etλeti(θti, σti)YKti(θti)− λeti(θ1, σ1)
[
rdt + pi1κ
]
+ λeti(θ1, σ1)[P(θ1, θ2)rti(θ1, θ2) + P(θ2, ∅)rti(θ2, ∅)]
− [P(θ1, θ2)λeti(θ1, θ2)rti(θ1, θ2) + P(θ2, ∅)λeti(θ2, ∅)rti(θ2, ∅)]
= Etλeti(θti, σti)YKti(θti)− λeti(θ1, σ1)
[
rdt + pi1κ
]
+ λeti(θ1, σ1)[P(θ1, θ2) + P(θ2, ∅)]rti(θ2, ∅)
− [P(θ1, θ2)λeti(θ1, θ2) + P(θ2, ∅)λeti(θ2, ∅)]rti(θ1, θ2)
= Etλeti(θti, σti)YKti(θti)− λeti(θ1, σ1)
[
rdt + pi1κ
]
+ {[P(θ1, θ2) + P(θ2, ∅)]λeti(θ1, σ1)− P(θ1, θ2)λeti(θ1, θ2)− P(θ2, ∅)λeti(θ2, ∅)}rti(θ1, θ2)
= λeti(θ1, σ1)θ1YKti + P(θ2, ∅)λeti(θ2, ∅)YKtiξt − λeti(θ1, σ1)
[
rdt + pi1κ
]
(by (3.16))
= θ1YKti + P(θ2, ∅) λ
e
ti(θ2, ∅)
λeti(θ1, σ1)
YKtiξt −
[
rdt + pi1κ
]
= θ1YKti +
[
1− τNti
P(θ2, ∅)ξt
]
P(θ2, ∅)YKtiξt −
[
rdt + pi1κ
]
(by (3.20))
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τNti =
YKti [θ1 + P(θ2, ∅)ξt]− rdt − pi1κ
YKti
τNti =
YKti − rdt − pi1κ
YKti
= (3.21 RHS)
3.E.2 DERIVATION OF EQUATION 3.23
First, note that the entrepreneurs’ preferences exhibit intertemporal homotheticity, and
that projects are constant-returns-to-scale. The combination of these facts results in the
consequence that both the choices of each entrepreneur and their returns and risks are
scalable in Keti. For simplicity, we’ll re-write the accumulation constraint as
QtK
e
t+1i = R
e
tiK
e
ti − Ceti,
where
Reti =
Yti(θti) +Qt(1− δ)Keti −K ltirti(θti, σti)−WtNti
Keti
in order to capture the scalability of the entrepreneur’s problem. Reti is an idiosyncratic
shock realised before the consumption decision is taken. In order to describe the en-
trepreneur’s consumption decision, we’ll re-write their problem as a Bellman equation
formulated after the realisation of Reti. We’ll denote Wti = R
e
tiK
e
ti, which is the resources
the entrepreneur has available when they make their consumption decision in period t.
V (Wti) = max
Ceti
logCeti + β
eEtV (Wt+1i),
subject to
Wt+1i =
Ret+1i
Qt
(Wti − Ceti).
Which we can re-write as
V (Wti) = max
Ceti
logCeti + β
eEtV
(
Ret+1i
Qt
(Wti − Ceti)
)
.
Dropping the subscript i, the first order condition for Ce is
1
Cet
= βeE
Ret+1
Qt
V ′
(
Ret+1i
Qt
(Wti − Ceti)
)
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We proceed by guessing a particular functional form for V , and verifying that this func-
tional form satisfies the conditions above.
Let
Vˆ (W ) =
1
1− βe logW + k,
where k is some constant.
Assuming, that Vˆ is the correct value function, we substitute it into the first order
condition to solve for consumption:
1
Cet
=
βe
1− βe
1
(Wt − Cet )
which rearranges to yield
Cet = (1− βe)Wti
We now verify our guess value function by substituting it into the entrepreneur’s Bellman
equation,
V (Wti) = max
Ceti
logCeti + β
eEt
1
1− βe log
(
Ret+1i
Qt
(Wti − Ceti)
)
+ βek.
And substitute in our optimal consumption decision,
V (Wti) = log[(1− βe)Wti] + βeEt 1
1− βe log
(
Ret+1i
Qt
(Wti − (1− βe)Wti)
)
+ βek
= logWti + log(1− βe) + β
e
1− βeEt log
(
Ret+1i
Qt
(βeWti)
)
+ βek
= logWti + log(1− βe) + β
e
1− βe logWti +
βe
1− βeEt log
(
Ret+1i
Qt
βe
)
+ βek
=
1
1− βe logWti + log(1− β
e) +
βe
1− βeEt log
(
Ret+1i
Qt
βe
)
+ βek
V (Wti) =
1
1− βe logWti + k,
where
k =
1
1− βe
[
log(1− βe) + β
e
1− βeEt log
(
Ret+1i
Qt
βe
)]
.
This confirms that our guess value function Vˆ satisfies the entrepreneur’s problem, and
that Cet = (1− βe)Wti is the optimal consumption decision for our entrepreneur.
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We can now substitute this back into the entrepreneurs’ accumulation constraint (3.4)
to obtain
Ceti = (1− βe)[Yti(θti) +Qt(1− δ)Keti −K ltirti(θti, σti)−WtNti].
It follows that
QtK
e
t+1i = β
e[Yti(θti) +Qt(1− δ)Keti −K ltirti(θti, σti)−WtNti],
and
Ceti =
1− βe
βe
QtK
e
t+1i. (3.23)
DERIVATION OF EQUATIONS 3.28, 3.30 AND 3.31
First, substitute the national income equation (3.22) into the marginal rates of substitution
conditions (3.26) and (3.26) to eliminate WtNt,
λeti(θ1, θ2)
λeti(θ1, θ1)
=
(θ1 − 1 + τNt)Y¯t + [Qt(1− δ) + rdt ]Keti −K ltirti(θ1, σ1) + rdK lt + pilκKt
(θ1 − 1 + τNt)Y¯t + [Qt(1− δ) + rdt ]Keti −K ltirti(θ2, ∅) + rdK lt + pilκKt
(3.62)
λeti(θ2, ∅)
λeti(θ1, θ1)
=
(θ1 − 1 + τNt)Y¯t + [Qt(1− δ) + rdt ]Keti −K ltirti(θ1, σ1) + rdK lt + pilκKt
(θ2 − 1 + τNt)Y¯t + [Qt(1− δ) + rdt ]Keti −K ltirti(θ2, ∅) + rdK lt + pilκKt
(3.63)
Note that pi1θ1 + pi2θ2 = 1, which implies θ1 = 1− pi2ξt, and θ2 = 1 + pi1ξt.
Rather than working with specific interest rates r(·) and project returns θ, it will be
helpful to re-write these conditions in terms of project risk ξt = θ2 − θ1, and risk sharing
[rti(θ2, ∅) − rti(θ1, σ1)]. From the financial intermediaries’ participation constraint we
have
K lti[(pi2 + pi1η)rti(θ2, ∅) + pi1(1− η)rti(θ1, σ1)] = rdK lt + pilκKt
which allows us to re-write rti(θ2, ∅), rti(θ1, σ1) in terms of required returns and risk:
rti(θ2, ∅) = rd + pilκ Kt
K lti
+ pi1(1− η)(rti(θ2, ∅)− rti(θ1, σ1))
rti(θ1, σ1) = r
d + pilκ
Kt
K lti
− (pi2 + pi1η)(rti(θ2, ∅)− rti(θ1, σ1))
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which we can substitute back into (3.62,3.63) and rearrange to obtain
RtQt−1
Keti
K lti
= (pi2ξt−τNt) Y¯t
K lti
−
[
1
1− λeti(θ1, θ2)/λeti(θ1, θ1)
− pi1(1− η)
]
(rti(θ2, ∅)−rti(θ1, σ1))
RtQt−1
Keti
K lti
= (pi2ξt − τNt) Y¯t
K lti
+
λeti(θ2, ∅)/λeti(θ1, θ1)
1− λeti(θ2, ∅)/λeti(θ1, θ1)
Y¯t
K lti
ξt
−
[
1
1− λeti(θ2, ∅)/λeti(θ1, θ1)
− pi1(1− η)
]
(rti(θ2, ∅)− rti(θ1, σ1))
And we equate the right hand sides to solve
Y¯tξt
K lti(rti(θ2, ∅)− rti(θ1, σ1))
=

λeti(θ1, θ2)
λeti(θ1, θ1)
/
λeti(θ2, ∅)
λeti(θ1, θ1)
− 1
λeti(θ1, θ2)
λeti(θ1, θ1)
− 1

Note that
λeti(θ1, θ2)
λeti(θ1, θ1)
> 1, and
λeti(θ2, ∅)
λeti(θ1, θ1)
< 1, making the right hand side strictly greater
than 1. The left hand side is the ratio of productive risk to the possible amount of risk
sharing following loan restructuring. The equation shows how an increase in the ratio of
productive risk to risk sharing increases the entrepreneurs’ marginal rates of substitution
for consumption across idiosyncratic states. These marginal rates of substitution in turn
determine entrepreneurs’ precautionary reductions in wage and capital hiring compared
with the first best efficient levels, through the wedges specified in equations (3.19) and
(3.20). Substituting these factor wedges in place of the marginal rates of substitution
yields
Kbt−1i[rti(θ2, ∅)− rti(θ1, σ1)] = Y¯ti
[
pi2ξt − τNti
pi2 + pi1η
]
(3.28)
Now we can use this solution to solve for the the leverage ratio
Y¯ti
RtQt−1Ket−1i
=
(pi2 + pi1η)τNti
[pi2ξt − τNti][pi1ηξt + τNti] , (= (3.30 RHS))
and also the ratio of household’s to entrepreneurs’ capital in terms of the loan coupon
interest rate spread [rti(θ2, ∅)− rbt ].
Kbt−1i
Ket−1i
([rti(θ2, ∅)− rbt ]− pi1κ) = RtQt−1
[
pi1(1− η)τNti
pi1ηξt + τNti
]
+ pi1κ (3.31)
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3.F MODEL DYNAMICS
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Figure 3.6: Log-linearised model dynamics: Total factor productivity shock. Flexible
prices (black,– –), sticky prices (red,—).
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Figure 3.7: Log-linearised model dynamics: Risk shock. Flexible prices (black,– –),
sticky prices (red,—).
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CHAPTER 4
SYSTEMIC RISK MARKETS AND THE FINANCIAL
ACCELERATOR
This chapter is co-authored with Charles Nolan.1
This paper considers the importance of insurance markets for commonly ob-
served systemic risks in a setting where entrepreneur borrowers’ individual
specific risks are private information. Within a new framework allowing risk
averse entrepreneur borrowers in a costly state verification setting, the key
finding of this paper is that when systemic risk markets are open, the de-
centralised competitive equilibrium is typically constrained inefficient, with
excessive volatility in leverage. This contrasts with earlier studies with risk
neutral entrepreneurs which have suggested that trade in systemic risk mar-
kets would tend to dampen the financial accelerator and collateral amplifica-
tion mechanisms.
1Professor of Economics, University of Glasgow. Charles.Nolan@glasgow.ac.uk. The authors
would like to thank Costas Azariades, Martin Eichenbaum, Campbell Leith and Bruce Mizrach in addition
to conference and seminar participants at the 2015 Society for Nonlinear Dynamics Annual Conference,
the 2015 Centre for Economic Growth and Policy Conference and the 2015 Sheffield Workshop in Macroe-
conomics for helpful comments and discussions. All errors are our own.
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INTRODUCTION
Equity earns high returns in bad times—after its price has fallen. Firms should buy in-
surance against downturns and financial stress. This would transfer wealth to them pre-
cisely when it is likely to earn a high return. This is a well-known prediction of the
two workhorse models of financial macroeconomics described by Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist (1999) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian (2014),
Krishnamurthy (2003) and Nikolov (2014) show in these models respectively that this pri-
vately optimal insurance trade should eliminate the financial accelerator and credit cycle
mechanisms which amplify and propagate business cycle shocks within these models.
But we don’t appear to see this trade in practise. Confronting the macroeconomic
data, business cycle models that include financial sector amplification seem to perform
better empirically.2 From the microeconomic perspective, the more typical story we hear
from the period preceding the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-08 is that financial and
non-financial firms (with the notable example of AIG) had overly exposed themselves
to the state of the US economy, housing market and financial system, effectively selling
insurance against systemic risk.
In this paper, we show that this observation is consistent with a broad class of financial
macroeconomic models, of which the financial accelerator and collateral amplification
models described by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) are special cases. The combination of both risk averse firm insiders and monotonic
insider compensation schemes limits the extent to which competitive trade in systemic risk
insurance results in the sacrifice of consumption insurance in return for the stabilisation
of factor price wedges that amplify business cycle volatility in the model.
We then present a costly state verification model with risk averse entrepreneurs and
optimal debt contracts.3 In our model, competitive insurance allocations result in full
consumption insurance, at the cost of high volatility in factor market distortions. We
show that the resulting competitive equilibrium allocations are constrained inefficient,
2See for example Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2014), Nolan and Thoenissen (2009), Jermann and
Quadrini (2012) and Del Negro, Giannoni, and Schorfheide (2014).
3More specifically, we allow for stochastic auditing schemes as in Border and Sobel (1987) and
Mookherjee and Png (1989), while still recovering standard debt contracts with deterministic audit schemes
as optimal.
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and further that closing the market for systemic risk insurance could result in a Pareto
welfare gain.
THE EXTERNALITY ASSOCIATED WITH SYSTEMIC RISK INSURANCE
At the heart of all popular models in financial macroeconomics is an equilibrium condition
relating wedges between factor marginal products and factor prices τt to the financial
leverage of entrepreneurs lt and some measure of financial stress ξt,
τt = T (lt, ξt), T1, T2 > 0.4
At business cycle frequencies, leverage dynamics can be volatile, and are heavily influ-
enced by the extent of trade in systemic risk (or alternatively by government enforced
transfers) between worker households and entrepreneurs.
Consider a systemic risk insurance contract between worker household A and an in-
dividual entrepreneur. Who insures whom against the various sources of systemic risk is
ambiguous at this stage. On the one hand, risk averse worker j will likely suffer a greater
increase in consumption marginal utility during a downturn, suggesting that systemic risk
insurance should result in transfers from the entrepreneur to worker household j during
a downturn. On the other hand, in the downturn the return to entrepreneurs wealth will
be relatively high. This is equivalent to saying that the price of the entrepreneurs’ con-
sumption relative to worker household consumption is low, and suggests suggesting that
in equilibrium it may be privately optimal to write a contract that transfers wealth from
the worker household j to the entrepreneur during downturns.
Any transfer from the individual entrepreneur to worker household j will increase the
leverage of the entrepreneur. This increase in leverage will increase the factor market
wedges, reducing the return to the capital holdings and the wage offered for the labour
endowment of other worker households. In the absence of Coasean bargains between
worker households, or Kilenthong and Townsend (2014) mechanisms,5 the privately opti-
4In the models described by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), the
wedge τkt is the difference between the marginal product of capital and interest rates earned on household
savings. In our model (and also in the model described by Jermann and Quadrini, 2012) financial stress
also affects labour markets through τnt , a wedge between real wages and the marginal product of labour. In
all of these models, the factor market wedge(s) will be larger when leverage is high or during periods of
financial stress.
5Kilenthong and Townsend (2014) show that in generalised incomplete market settings, constrained
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mal systemic risk insurance trade between worker household j and the entrepreneur may
impose a net social cost.
The models described by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997) predict that systemic risk insurance trade typically resulted in transfers from
worker households to entrepreneurs during downturns. This has the effect of dampening
volatility in the factor market wedges. We show that this result does not generalise. In our
model, systemic risk insurance will often result in transfers from entrepreneurs to workers
during downturns, exacerbating volatility in the factor market wedges.
IMPLICATIONS FOR STABILISATION POLICY
The emerging empirical consensus is that financial frictions play an important rule in am-
plifying and propagating business cycles. In light of the stark results of Carlstrom, Fuerst,
and Paustian (2014), Krishnamurthy (2003) and Nikolov (2014), suggesting that trade in
systemic risk markets should eliminate financial amplification, one plausible interpreta-
tion of the empirical evidence is that systemic risk markets are closed.
If systemic risk markets are indeed closed, then there may be a role for policy in repli-
cating the flows of funds between worker households and entrepreneurs that would have
occurred if systemic risk markets were open. The policy interventions studied by Chris-
tiano and Ikeda (2011) resemble the insurance payments implicit in Carlstrom, Fuerst,
and Paustian (2014), Krishnamurthy (2003) and Nikolov (2014). The studies of Koenig
(2011) and Sheedy (2014) essentially attempt to restore these same real transfers through
nominal output targeting monetary rules that allow high inflation during downturns.
But this transfer policy would be ineffective if systemic risk markets were actually
open. We have no microeconomic evidence or theoretical justification underlying the pre-
sumption that systemic risk markets are closed. We cannot appeal to information asym-
metries. Further, we know that in some cases, systemic risk markets are clearly open.
Commodity futures markets are essentially systemic risk markets, and these markets are
widely used by firms exposed to commodity price risk.
efficient allocations are obtainable through decentralised market trade if markets can be organised in such
a way that the rights to participate in an individual market can be traded ex ante. Given this and the ability
to write long term contracts and use stochastic mechanisms, constrained efficiency can be restored without
government intervention.
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In our model, the introduction of systemic risk markets does not eliminate the financial
amplification mechanism. Consequently, the predictions of our model do not necessarily
favour the presumption that systemic risk markets are closed. There is a potential role for
policy to play in dampening the volatility of distortions arising from the financial friction.
ROADMAP
Section 1 describes how systemic risk markets address the twin goals of consumption
insurance and stabilisation of factor market wedges.Section 2 introduces the model, fo-
cusing on the entrepreneurs’ problem which is new to the literature. Section 3 presents
a comparison between equilibrium allocations under the assumptions of open and closed
systemic risk insurance markets.
4.1 INSURANCE AND STABILISATION
With unrestricted trade in securities contingent on commonly observed states revealed at
the beginning of period t, the competitive equilibrium evolution of the marginal values of
wealth of worker household j and entrepreneur i are characterised as follows:
βhV h
′
(W hjt )
Uh′(Chjt−1)
=
βeV e′(W eit )
U e′(Ceit−1)
With unrestricted trade in insurance, payments following the revelation of the com-
monly observed state will flow toward agents who would otherwise have a relatively high
marginal value of wealth.
For each agent, the marginal value of wealth is the expectation of returns to wealth
within the current period and the marginal utility of consumption at the termination of
the period. Entrepreneurs’ return to wealth Re is subject to risk within the period while
wealth held by the worker households earns the risk free rate Rh. We can re-write the
marginal values of worker household j and entrepreneur i as follows
V h
′
(W hjt ) = R
f
t U
h′(Chjt )
V e′(W eit ) = Et[Reit U e
′(Ceit )]
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In equilibrium, insurance payments will flow toward agents who otherwise would have
relatively high marginal values, from agents who would otherwise have relatively low
marginal values. What we’re interested in is seeing how marginal values and consequently
insurance flows are linked to the equity risk premium Et[Reit ]/R
f
t , which will tend to be
large during periods of financial stress. If equilibrium insurance payments tend to flow
toward entrepreneurs when the equity risk premium is high, then this insurance trade
will tend to dampen volatility in the distortions associated with the financial friction, and
consequently dampen business cycle volatility.
When risk averse entrepreneurs cannot costlessly pass through productive risk, the
story changes. The entrepreneurs’ marginal value remains
V e′(W eit ) = Et[Reit U e
′(Ceit )]
Equilibrium in the insurance market implies
βhUh
′
(Chjt )
Uh′(Chjt−1)
=
βeEt[Reit U e′(Ceit )]
Rft U
e′(Ceit−1)
·
If entrepreneurs cannot costlessly pass through idiosyncratic production risk, then en-
trepreneurs’ individual marginal utility of consumption will be low following high returns,
and high following low returns. This negative covariance between marginal utility and re-
turns implies that Et[Reit Ue′(Ceit )] < Et[Reit ] · Et[Ue′(Ceit )]. We can re-write the insurance
market equilibrium condition as follows
βhUh
′
(Chjt )
Uh′(Chjt−1)
/
βeEt[U e′(Ceit )]
U e′(Ceit−1)
<
Et[Reit ]
Rft
. (4.1)
The inequality described by equation 4.1 can be interpreted as a statement about the
trade-off faced by the invisible hand as it seeks to achieve two sometimes conflicting
goals. The left hand side is the gross deviation from full consumption insurance. The right
hand side is the gross distortion in the capital market, and is a reflection of factor market
distortions—namely the difference between savers’ intertemporal marginal rates of sub-
stitution and the marginal product of capital, and in our model, the difference between the
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worker households’ consumption-leisure marginal rates of substitution and their respec-
tive marginal labour product. Holding all else constant, a one-off transfer of wealth from
worker households to entrepreneurs will raise the left hand side (increasing household
marginal utility relative to entrepreneurs’) and reduce the left hand side, as the increased
entrepreneur wealth reduces leverage and factor market distortions. Under the first best
efficient allocations, both left and right hand sides would be equal to one.
Considering specific examples in the following paragraphs will show how information
asymmetries and other frictions affecting idiosyncratic risk sharing also have an impact
on the sharing of systemic risks. Competitive trade in systemic risk insurance will not
allow large deviations from full consumption insurance to counter volatility in the equity
risk premium.
EXAMPLE 1: RISK NEUTRAL ENTREPRENEURS
We can think of the model of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) as the limit case
as entrepreneurs’ aversion to risk disappears. This helps us to reveal the intuition behind
the result of Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian (2014). With risk neutral entrepreneurs,
entrepreneurs’ marginal utilities are constant (= U e′) and their marginal value can be
described as follows
V e′(W eit ) = U
e′Et[Reit ].
The equilibrium condition resulting from unrestricted trade in common shock insurance
can be written as follows:
βhUh
′
(Chjt )
Uh′(Chjt−1)
/
βeU e′
U e′
=
Et[Reit ]
Rft
(4.2)
Equation 4.2 describes a tight link between deviations from full consumption insurance
and the equity risk premium. When the equity risk premium is large, worker households’
marginal utilities must also be high relative to the full consumption insurance benchmark,
indicating a transfer of resources from worker households to entrepreneurs. This flow
of wealth to entrepreneurs during periods of high equity risk premia helps to dampen
volatility in the equity risk premium, stabilising factor wedges and dampening business
cycle volatility.
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EXAMPLE 2: FULL PROJECT RISK SHARING
We can also consider the nature of optimal insurance flows when entrepreneurs are risk
averse but their private return to wealth is not subject to idiosyncratic risk.6 It could be
either projects are not subject to idiosyncratic risk, or that this risk can be shared cost-
lessly with financial intermediaries. There may still be financial constraints as a result
of a limited commitment friction limiting the amount of external finance in order to en-
sure the entrepreneur does not wish to walk away from their commitments. Here, the
entrepreneurs’ marginal value is
V e′(W eit ) = R
e
tU
e′(Ceit ).
and equilibrium in the insurance market implies,
βhUh
′
(Chjt )
Uh′(Chjt−1)
/
βeU e′(Ceit )
U e′(Ceit−1)
=
Ret
Rft
. (4.3)
As in the previous example, high equity risk premia during periods of financial stress
are consistent with relatively high worker household marginal utilities and relatively low
entrepreneur marginal utilities. This indicates that compared with the full consumption
insurance counterfactual, insurance payments tend to flow toward entrepreneurs during
periods of financial stress. The insurance trade is responding to the financial friction, and
consumption insurance is traded off against fluctuations in the equity risk premium.
EXAMPLE 3: OUR MODEL
Examples 1 and 2 describe very different models, yet result in the consistent prediction
that in competitive equilibrium, agents will suffer deviations from consumption risk in-
surance in order to stabilise costly factor market wedges. Both of these examples can
be thought of as limit cases of the general model, and crucially, neither example permits
idiosyncratic risk in entrepreneurs’ marginal utilities.
In the model we describe in the following sections, entrepreneurs’ marginal utility
will be subject to idiosyncratic production risk. Entrepreneurs’ demand for external fi-
6This could be the case if the financial friction was not based on private information but rather on limited
commitment or enforceability constraints.
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nance loans will be limited by imperfect risk sharing, which will result in a tradeoff be-
tween expected consumption and consumption risk. In equilibrium, the entrepreneurs’
consumption Euler condition will bind with respect to the risk free interest rate.
It follows that
Rft · Et[U e′(Ceit )] = Et[Reit U e′(Ceit )].
Equilibrium in the insurance market implies
βhUh
′
(Chjt )
Uh′(Chjt−1)
/
βeEt[U e′(Ceit )]
U e′(Ceit−1)
= 1. (4.4)
The competitive equilibrium is consistent with full consumption insurance. Unlike the
previous two examples, increases in the equity risk premium do not correspond to a com-
pensating departure from full consumption risk insurance. The insurance market does not
respond to factor market distortions.
High returns to entrepreneurs correspond to high entrepreneurial risk, breaking the
link between entrepreneurs’ marginal values of wealth and the equity risk premium. The
prospect of earning high equity returns during periods of financial stress does not neces-
sarily encourage entrepreneurs to purchase the insurance against downturns—insurance
which would recapitalise entrepreneurs during periods of financial stress and dampen the
financial accelerator mechanism.
4.2 THE MODEL
The model has a similar structure to Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). There exists
a large population of worker households, who enjoy consumption and supply labour. Indi-
vidual households’ consumption, wealth and employment outcomes are perfectly insured
in competitive markets within the worker household population. There is also a large
population of risk averse entrepreneurs, who hire labour and borrow capital to augment
their own capital wealth in productive risky projects. Individual project outcomes are
initially private information to entrepreneurs, and this individual specific productive risk
can be partially but not completely insured through state contingent capital loan contracts.
Specifically, lender financial intermediaries have a costly and imperfect state verification
technology, which allows them to investigate individual entrepreneurs’ project outcomes
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following low reported income—which we interpret as default.
THE OPTIMAL EXTERNAL FINANCE CONTRACT
State-contingent loan contracts follow a variant of the costly state verification problem
proposed by Townsend (1979), with the addition of possible disputes as described in
Chapter 2.7
If both principal and agent were risk neutral and the audit technology were perfect,
then the optimal external finance contract would inherit some of the properties highlighted
in Border and Sobel (1987). In particular, large penalties (for misinforming the principal)
or large rebates (for honest reporting) could be combined with a low probability of audit.
That way, audit costs are reduced whilst incentive compatibility is ensured. That combi-
nation of penalty/reward/audit probability could be applied to any reported income level
of the agent delivering, as result, a lot of risk-sharing. Such a contract does not resemble
simple debt.
If the agent were risk averse, as in Mookherjee and Png (1989), large penalties follow-
ing misinformation would remain desirable and high marginal utilities following penalties
further provide an even greater incentive for truth telling, even when these penalties ap-
plied with low probability. On the other hand, low marginal utility in good states would
dampen the positive incentive effects of large rebates following verified honest reports.
However, stochastic audits would remain optimal: So long as large penalties can be levied
for misinforming the principal, audits can be applied with low probability, reducing costs
while maintaining incentives for truth telling even when contracts allow for a high degree
of risk sharing. Indeed, optimal consumption profiles and audit probabilities may be non-
monotonic in income! Those properties, along with the optimality of stochastic audits,
would again mean that debt contracts are not optimal.
Like Mookherjee and Png (1989), we consider an environment where the principal is
risk neutral and the agent is risk averse. However, we assume that the audit technology
is imperfect; sometimes, the technology will incorrectly identify a low-income agent as
a high-income agent. We call this a Type I error. The possibility of such errors further
7Chapter 2 showed that borrower risk aversion combined with the introduction of the possibility of
disputed claims can result in the optimality of standard debt contracts which are not subject to the critiques
of Border and Sobel (1987) and Mookherjee and Png (1989).
156
CHAPTER 4
erodes the efficacy of penalties exacerbating the misreporting problem. Nevertheless,
when the cost of audit is not too high, Chapter 2 showed that low-income agents would
always wish to be audited. The possibility of error notwithstanding, being audited helps
maintain consumption just when it is especially valuable; were they not audited they
would be mistaken for high-income agents. At higher income levels, trying to risk-share
requires a high probability of audits and entails costly audits and the prospect of dispute.
At that point, it is preferable simply to pay interest plus principal. Such a contract bears
close similarity to standard debt.
Much of the derivations in this section follow Chapter 3 closely.
4.2.1 TIMING
Within this paper, we assume that common shocks are revealed at the beginning of each
period, and entrepreneurs’ projects are undertaken following the revelation of the com-
monly observed state. This means that there is no overlap between common shock in-
surance contracts and external finance contracts. Table 4.1 presents a timeline for en-
trepreneur i in period t, reproduced for convenience from Chapter 3.
Table 4.1: Timeline for entrepreneur i, period t
Nature Variables Determined Description
zt Common shocks revealed
Keit Insurance payments made
N it ,K
bi
t , r
i
t(θ
i
t, σ
i
t) Leverage, employment determined
θit Individual projects completed
σit Auditing, factor payments
Ceit , X
ei
t (zt+1),K
pei
t Consumption, insurance determined
zt+1 Common shocks revealed
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4.2.2 ENTREPRENEURS
There exists a unit measure of entrepreneurs, indexed by i, who enjoy consumption with
logarithmic utility,
U eti = Et
∞∑
j=0
βejU e(Cet+ji), (4.5)
where ue(C) = logC, and βe < β, entrepreneurs are less patient than households.8
Entrepreneurs undertake projects with binary risky outcomes. The individual output of
entrepreneur i is
Yti = θtiAtK
α
t−1iN
1−α
ti , (4.6)
where θit is an idiosyncratic shock drawn from θti ∈ {θ1t, θ2t} where θ1t < θ2t. These
two states occur with probabilities pi1 and pi2 respectively, and their expectation is equal to
one, pi1θ1t+pi2θ2t = 1. Throughout our analysis, it will be useful to consider the difference
between high and low project outcomes ξt = θ2t − θ1t which we will allow to be time
varying and following the law of motion log ξt = ρξ log ξt + ξt, where ξt is a white noise
process with standard deviation σξ. Denote the expectation of output for entrepreneur i
in period t conditional upon At by Y¯ti = AtKαt−1iN
1−α
ti . The variable At is an aggregate
total factor productivity shock following the law of motion logAt = ρA logAt + At,
where At is a white noise process with standard deviation σA. Aggregate shocks are
observable at the beginning of the period, whereas the unobservable shock is revealed to
the entrepreneur at the end of the period. Capital employed by the entrepreneur is denoted
in period t isKt−1i, andNti is labour hired by the entrepreneur from the household sector.
At the beginning of each period, entrepreneurs borrow capital Kbti from financial in-
termediaries. Loan contracts specify the interest rate paid in good states, as well as the
recovery rate returned to financial intermediaries in bad states. Capital inputs into en-
trepreneur i’s project include the entrepreneur’s initial capital holdings and further capital
borrowed.
Kti = K
e
ti +K
b
ti, (4.7)
where Ket−1 is the capital held by the entrepreneur at the beginning of period t. En-
trepreneurs fund consumption and future capital holdings out of the sum of project rev-
8Entrepreneurs enjoy a greater return on savings than households in the model. Their reduced discount
factor is required to ensure that the ratio of entrepreneurial and household wealth is constant in the steady
state.
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enues and current capital holdings, after repaying loans and paying workers’ wages,
QtK
e
ti + C
e
ti = Yti(θti) +Qt(1− δ)Ket−1i −Kbt−1irˆti(θti, σti)−WtNti. (4.8)
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital. We attach the Lagrange multipliers λeti(θti, σti)
to each of the state contingent accumulation constraints. Note that capital rental pay-
ments rˆti(θti, σti) are contingent on the idiosyncratic shock θti as well as any audit signal
obtained by the financial intermediary, σti ∈ {σ1, σ2}. Audit signals are distributed as fol-
lows: P (σ2|θ2) = 1, P (σ2|θ1) = η, P (σ1|θ1) = 1 − η. Consequently, the unconditional
probabilities of the three possible outcomes are as follows:
P (θ1, σ1) = pi1(1− η), P (θ1, σ2) = pi1η, and P (θ2, ∅) = pi2. (4.9)
FINANCIAL CONTRACTS
Chapter 2 show that when audit costs are sufficiently low and auditing is imperfect, de-
faultable debt contracts with deterministic audit strategies are constrained efficient.
Assumption 4.1 Contracts are only contingent on reports and audit signals within the
current period.
This restriction is referred to as the anonymity constraint. Once repayments on current
period loans are made, entrepreneurs are considered to become anonymous, and their
future actions in other markets cannot be used as evidence of past false reports.
We apply Theorem 2.2 from Chapter 2 to motivate standard debt contracts as optimal.
Theorem 2.2 Let borrowing be taken as given b = bˆ. When type-I audit errors occur
with positive probability (η(θ) > 0), there exists some strictly positive audit cost κˆ such
that for all κ < κˆ, standard debt contracts (q(m) = 1) are efficient.
As we discuss in Appendix 4.A, it is difficult to pin down audit costs in a way that
produces the high credit spreads observed in the data, given the low historical probabilities
of corporate default. Microeconomic estimates of direct bankruptcy costs as a share of
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firms’ assets (what would be interpreted as κ in our framework) typically fall between
0.01 and 0.06, which is sufficiently low to be consistent with standard debt contracts
being optimal in accordance with Theorem 2.2.9
Assumption 4.2 Audit costs are sufficiently low, such that standard debt contracts are
optimal in equilibrium.
Following Theorem 2.2, contracts are subject to two constraints. First, repayments
following overturned low reports must exceed those following high reports,
rˆ(θ1, σ2) ≥ rˆ(θ2, ∅). (4.10)
Equation 4.10 is the incentive compatibility constraint, and we attach to it the Lagrange
multiplier µ. Second, expected loan repayments must exceed the sum of the financial
intermediaries’ deposit interest rate and expected audit costs,
∑
(θti,σti)
P (θti, σti)rˆt(θti, σti)K
b
t−1i ≥ rbtKbt−1i + pi1κKt−1i. (4.11)
Equation 4.11 describes the financial intermediaries’ participation constraint, to which
we’ll attach the Lagrange multiplier ν. Both the incentive compatibility and participation
constraints will be binding under efficient contracts.
9These estimates are drawn from Warner (1977), Weiss (1990) and Altman (1984).
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FIRST ORDER NECESSARY CONDITIONS
Now that we have defined the entrepreneurs’ problem, we can take first order necessary
conditions:
Nti : 0 = Etλeti(θti, σti) [YNti(θti)−Wt] , (4.12)
K lti : 0 = Etλeti(θti, σti)[YKti(θti)− rˆti(θti, σti)]
+ νti
[
Etrˆt(θti, σti)− rbt − pi1κ
]
(4.13)
Ceti(θti, σti) : 0 = u
e′(Ceti(θti, σti))− λeti(θti, σti), (4.14)
Ket+1i(θti, σti) : 0 = −Qtλeti(θti, σti)
+ βeEt+
[
λet+1i(θt+1i, σt+1i) (YKt+1i +Qt+1(1− δ))− νt+1ipilκ
]
(4.15)
rˆt(θ1, σ1) : 0 = −P (θ1, σ1)λeti(θ1, σ1)Kbt−1i + νtiP (θ1, σ1)Kbt−1i (4.16)
rˆt(θ1, σ2) : 0 = −P (θ1, σ2)λeti(θ1, σ2)Kbt−1i + νtiP (θ1, σ2)Kbt−1i + µti (4.17)
rˆt(θ2, ∅) : 0 = −P (θ2, ∅)λeti(θ2, ∅)Kbt−1i + νtiP (θ2, ∅)Kbt−1i − µti (4.18)
Without loss of generality, Yjti(θti) denotes the derivative of output with respect to factor
j for entrepreneur i in period t given idiosyncratic shock realisation θti. Also, let Y¯jti
denote the expectation of the derivative of output with respect to factor j for entrepreneur
i in period t over idiosyncratic shock realisations θti
RISK ACROSS STATES
Equations 4.16, 4.17 and 4.18 describe how the entrepreneurs’ marginal utility (captured
by λeti(θ, σ)) varies across states. Entrepreneurs can vary loan repayment rates across
states rˆ(θ, σ) in order to attempt to reduce variations in λeti across states. Entrepreneurs’
ability to reduce variations in λeti across states is limited by the entrepreneurs’ incentive
compatibility constraint (4.10). The incentive compatibility constraint is binding under
an efficient contract (µti > 0) resulting in varying marginal utilities across idiosyncratic
states λeti(θ1, σ2) > λ
e
ti(θ1, σ1) > λ
e
ti(θ2, ∅). Combining equations 4.16, 4.17 and 4.18
yields
νti = λ
e
ti(θ1, σ1), (4.19)
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µti = P (θ1, σ2)K
b
ti(λ
e
ti(θ1, σ2)− λeti(θ1, σ1)) and (4.20)
λeti(θ1, σ1) = P (θ1, θ1)λ
e
ti(θ1, θ1) + P (θ1, θ2)λ
e
ti(θ1, θ2) + P (θ2, ∅)λeti(θ2, ∅). (4.21)
In addition to the option of reduced repayments following successful audits, entrepreneurs
can mitigate project risk by reducing the size of projects, relative to the size which max-
imises expected profits. This precautionary reduction in the size of projects translates
into reductions in the quantities of capital and labour demanded compared with first best
efficient allocations.
LABOUR AND CAPITAL MARKET WEDGES
Equation 4.12 describes the entrepreneurs’ first order necessary condition for labour de-
manded. The entrepreneurs weight deviations between the ex post marginal product of
labour and wages more highly in bad states, when their marginal utility is high. Averag-
ing over entrepreneurs, the expected marginal product of labour does not equal the wage
rate, even in the absence of aggregate risk. The labour market wedge is sensitive to both
the idiosyncratic distribution of project outcomes (Θ, pi(Θ)), as well as financial variables
including the accuracy of audit signals (η). The same holds for the capital market.
It is through these time varying factor market wedges that shocks are amplified in
our model, relative to the dynamics of the first best efficient allocations. The insurance
flows we study in this chapter have a direct bearing on the behaviour of these factor
market wedges: a flow of insurance transfers toward entrepreneurs will increase the en-
trepreneurs’ wealth and decrease their borrowing, reducing the variation of entrepreneurs’
marginal utilities across states and consequently reducing the factor market wedges of in-
efficiency.
Let the labour and capital market wedges be defined as follows,
τNti :=
Y¯Nti −Wt
Y¯Nti
and τKti :=
Y¯Kti − rbt
Y¯Kti
.
Combining equations 4.12, 4.13 and 4.21 yields the following optimality conditions:
λeti(θ1, θ2)
λeti(θ1, θ1)
= 1 +
τNti
P (θ1, θ2)ξt
, (4.22)
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λeti(θ2, ∅)
λeti(θ1, θ1)
= 1− τNti
P (θ2, ∅)ξt and (4.23)
τNti = τKti − pi1κ
Y¯Kti
. (4.24)
Derivations of equations 4.22, 4.23 and 4.24 can be found in Appendix 4.D.1. Equations
4.22 and 4.23 relate the entrepreneurs’ marginal rates of substitution for consumption
across project outcomes to the labour market wedge. Equation 4.24 relates the labour
market wedge to the capital market wedge. For entrepreneurs, it is efficient to reduce both
labour and capital demanded in order to mitigate project risk. Equation 4.24 confirms that
the labour market wedge (the left hand side, τNti) is less than the capital market wedge
(τKti). The difference between the two wedges results follows as a result of auditing costs,
which are increasing in the capital factor but not in the labour factor.
ENTREPRENEURS’ SAVINGS BEHAVIOUR
Entrepreneurs’ preferences are intertemporally homothetic, and their technology is scal-
able. This means that entrepreneurs’ actions in terms of consumption, labour and capital
hired are equal as a share of capital brought into the current period. Taken together, we
can describe the aggregate behaviour of the population of entrepreneurs as a function of
the mean wealth of entrepreneurs. Mean preserving fluctuations in the ex ante distribution
of wealth across entrepreneurs do not affect market prices or aggregate quantities traded.
Also note that under logarithmic utility, where the income and substitution effects
of interest rates on savings cancel, the efficient savings decision of entrepreneurs which
uniquely satisfies equation 4.15 is
Ceti =
1− βe
βe
QtK
e
ti. (4.25)
A derivation of equation 4.25 is found in Appendix 4.D.2.
SOLVING FOR LEVERAGE
Given that Ceti is equal to a fixed proportion of K
e
t+1i regardless of idiosyncratic state
(equation 4.25), and that Ceti = 1/λ
e
ti by equation 4.14, we can write down the ratios
λeti(θ1, θ2)/λ
e
ti(θ1, θ1) and λ
e
ti(θ2, ∅)/λeti(θ1, θ1) in terms of the accumulation constraints
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4.8:
λeti(θ1, θ2)
λeti(θ1, θ1)
=
Yti(θ1) +Qt(1− δ)Ket−1i −Kbt−1irˆti(θ1, σ1)−WtNti
Yti(θ1) +Qt(1− δ)Ket−1i −Kbt−1irˆti(θ1, σ2)−WtNti
and (4.26)
λeti(θ2, ∅)
λeti(θ1, θ1)
=
Yti(θ1) +Qt(1− δ)Ket−1i −Kbt−1irˆti(θ1, σ1)−WtNti
Yti(θ2) +Qt(1− δ)Ket−1i −Kbt−1irˆti(θ2, ∅)−WtNti
. (4.27)
Combining (4.26,4.27,4.22,4.23), we can first solve for the efficient amount of risk shar-
ing obtained by entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs can set capital rental repayment rates on a
contingent basis, enabling partial risk sharing.
Kbt−1i[rˆti(θ2, ∅)− rˆti(θ1, σ1)] = Y¯ti
[
pi2ξt − τNti
pi2 + pi1η
]
(4.28)
Equation 4.28 shows that risk sharing through differentiated repayment rates across states
is limited as a share of project risk EYtiξt. This means that for each entrepreneur, an
increase in output through hiring more labour and renting more capital will increase the
risk borne by that entrepreneur.
It will be helpful to derive a measure of leverage, and to show how leverage relates to
the labour wedge, τN . From the entrepreneur’s perspective, an increase in labour or capital
hired from the household sector both increase the risk of projects, and the expected factor
payments due at the end of projects. It makes sense therefore to include labour payments
in our measure of leverage. One useful measure of leverage is the following:
Lti =
Y¯ti
RtQt−1Ket−1i
(4.29)
Project output Y¯ti is the expectation of the total income generated by the project, and
RtQt−1Ket−1i is the net worth of entrepreneur i, expressed in terms of their opportunity
cost, which was to redeem their capital holdings for deposits at the end of the period t−1.
After some rearranging, substituting equation 4.28 into equation 4.26 yields
Lti =
(pi2 + pi1η)τNti
[pi2ξt − τNti][pi1ηξt + τNti] . (4.30)
Derivations of equations 4.28 and 4.30 are contained in Appendix 4.D.2. Consider equa-
tion 4.30. The left hand side is our production or income based measure of leverage. The
right hand side is increasing in τNti, indicating that all else equal, an increase in leverage
means an increase in the labour market wedge (by equation 4.24, this also translates into
an increase in the capital market wedge). This is because an increase in leverage requires
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the entrepreneur to accept a greater share of productive risk. Entrepreneurs hire factors
until their expected marginal product, weighted by their marginal rates of substitution
across states, is equal to their prices, in this case wages and interest rates. When lever-
age is high, the entrepreneur bears more risk. The marginal rates of substitution between
worse and better project outcomes increase, increasing the wedge between the risk ad-
justed expected marginal product of factors, which determines demand for factors in our
model, and the risk neutral expectation of factor marginal products, which would equal
factor prices in a perfect information environment.
An alternative measure of leverage is the ratio of capital holdings between the two
populations, Kh/Ke. This measure is closer to that considered in related literature, but in
the context of our model is less useful. Importantly, it does not capture wage bill obliga-
tions which are determined at the beginning of the period and cannot be renegotiated in
the case of a bad project outcome. Combining equations 4.11, 4.28 and 4.30 yields
Kbt−1i
Ket−1i
([rˆti(θ2, ∅)− rbt ]− pi1κ) = RtQt−1
[
pi1(1− η)τNti
pi1ηξt + τNti
]
+ pi1κ (4.31)
Note that [rˆti(θ2, ∅) − rbt ] can be interpreted as the interest rate risk premium on loans,
the difference between the loan coupon rate and the deposit rate.
4.3 SYSTEMIC RISK MARKETS
4.3.1 EQUILIBRIUM
Entrepreneurs’ consumption in equilibrium is strictly positive in all states (enforced by
restrictions on preferences to the CRRA class of utility functions). When determining
privately optimal leverage, each entrepreneur will always have access to additional loans
(or savings) paying (or yielding) the risk free interest rate. In equilibrium, the net marginal
benefit of additional loans or deposits will be zero, and the entrepreneurs’ consumption
Euler condition must bind with respect to the risk free interest rate.
It follows that
Rft · Et[U e′(Ceit )] = Et[Reit U e′(Ceit )].
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Equilibrium in the insurance market implies
βhUh
′
(Chjt )
Uh′(Chjt−1)
=
βeEt[U e′(Ceit )]
U e′(Ceit−1)
. (4.32)
Equilibrium insurance entails full consumption insurance, with the ratio of ex post in-
tertemporal marginal rates of substitution for worker households and entrepreneurs equal
to the steady state ratio βe/βh. The flows of insurance payments respond to consump-
tion across the two groups, but not explicitly to the equity risk premium. This is because
entrepreneurs discount the high returns associated with the high equity risk premium in
accordance with the risk of those returns. As such, high expected returns to equity to
not provide the same increase in entrepreneurs’ marginal value as in the aforementioned
models. In this way, the prospect of earning high equity returns during periods of finan-
cial stress does not necessarily encourage entrepreneurs to purchase the insurance against
downturns—insurance which would recapitalise entrepreneurs during periods of financial
stress and dampen the financial accelerator mechanism.
COMPARISON WITH CLOSED COMMON SHOCK INSURANCE MARKETS
When common shock insurance markets are closed, we can combine the Euler conditions
of the worker households and entrepreneurs to derive the evolution of marginal utilities
of consumption as a deviation from the full common shock insurance benchmark:
βhUh
′
(Chjt )
Uh
′
(Chjt−1)
=
βeEt[Ue′(Ceit )]
Ue′(Ceit−1)
·
[
Rft U
h′(Chjt )
Et−1[Rft Uh
′
(Chjt )]
Et−1[Rft Ue
′(Ceit )]
Rft EtUe
′(Ceit )
]
. (4.33)
The second term on the right hand side is the ratio of the relative deviations in marginal
value from the expectation formed in the previous period. Consider a recessionary shock.
If the innovation in worker household marginal utilities are greater than the innovation
in entrepreneur marginal utilities, then this ratio will exceed 1, and there will be a devia-
tion from the full consumption insurance outcome, with the entrepreneurs retaining more
wealth in the downturn than in the full common shock insurance counterfactual.
The innovation in worker household marginal utilities is likely to be larger in mag-
nitude than those of entrepreneurs in response to shocks in our model for two reasons.
The first is that by assumption, have a lower elasticity of intertemporal substitution than
entrepreneurs—and consequently a greater desire to smooth consumption.10 The second
10A lower elasticity of intertemporal substitution is a corrollary of a higher degree of consumption rel-
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is that in our model, wage income is particularly volatile as the financial friction affecting
firms’ project finance results in a time-varying distortion between wages and the marginal
product of labour.
When these conditions are present, welfare can be greater under closed common shock
insurance markets than when these markets are open. The introduced distortion in con-
sumption insurance can dampen volatility in the factor market distortions resulting from
the financial friction.
4.3.2 LABOUR SUPPLY
An important determinant of the welfare effects of the financial friction is the short run
interaction between the factor market wedge τN and labour supply Equation 4.34 presents
the short run relationship between labour suppy, the factor market wedge τN and the
unanticipated element of the current period marginal value of wealth Rtλht .
ΓN(Nt) = Γ
τ (ξt, τNt) + Γ
0
t−1 + log
[
Rtλ
h
t
Et−1(Rtλht )
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 0 when systemic risk markets open
(4.34)
where
ΓN(Nt) = logNt + logU
h
2 (Ct, Nt), Γ
N ′ > 0,
Γτ (ξt, τNt) = log(1− τNt) + logLt(ξt, τNt), Γτ2(ξt, τNt) is typically negative.
Γ0t−1 = log
(
1− α
1− βe ·
βeλht−1
βhλet−1
)
A derivation is contained in Appendix 4.D.3. When systemic risk markets are closed,
worker household marginal values will tend to rise during downturns. Interest rates and
marginal utilities (Rt and λht ) tend to move in opposite directions at busines cycle fre-
quencies, as decreases in productivity or increases in the factor market wedges pull down
both interest rates and household consumption.
ative risk aversion. The assumption that worker households are more risk averse than entrepreneurs is
internally consistent with our microfoundation. Within the model, entrepreneurs accept a great amount of
idiosyncratic consumption risk. All else equal, agents with a greater tolerance for consumption risk would
be more suited to entrepreneurship in our model.
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4.4 DYNAMICS
Impulse responses to total factor productivity (TFP) and risk shocks are presented for the
log-linearised version of the model in Appendix 4.E.
Following the positive TFP shock, the factor wedge initially rises as leverage in-
creases. This initial increase is dampened when systemic risk markets are open, as in-
surance payments flow toward entrepreneurs during booms. These insurance transfers
reduce leverage relative to the closed markets counterfactual, increasing factor payments
to labour and capital, increasing hours worked and amplifying the output response to the
positive shock. The consumption responses of both worker and entrepreneur groups of
agents are greater when systemic risk markets are open, and so is the investment response.
Immediately following the positive shock, worker households bring forward con-
sumption from future high productivity periods, drawing down their capital stocks before
increasing these stocks over the medium run. Entrepreneurs’ capital holdings increase
sharply immediately following the positive shock, as the return to entrepreneurs’ equity
increases sharply. In sum, the distribution of capital holdings between households and
entrepreneurs shifts sharply in favour to the entrepreneurs following the positive shock.
These dynamics in the inequality of wealth holdings are persistent and amplified by the
systemic risk markets.
Following the positive shock, credit spreads increase both when systemic risk markets
are open and closed. Further, this increase is greater when systemic risk markets are open.
However, the magnitudes of the increases in credit spreads are small.
Following the risk shock (an increase in project risk), the model dynamics are quite
similar under the two assumptions of closed or open systemic risk markets. There is a
transfer of wealth from entrepreneurs to worker households at the onset of the shock,
and this transfer slightly increases the factor wedge, reducing wages. The transfer to
households also dampens the wealth effect on labour supply, resulting in a slightly larger
employment response than under the closed markets counterfactual. These small transfers
have a larger effect on the accumulation of capital, which falls significantly further when
systemic risk insurance markets are open than in the counterfactual, and in household
consumption. It is perhaps surprising that a transfer of wealth from entrepreneurs to
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households at the onset of the recession reduces household consumption over the path
of the recession, but the reason is that while this transfer increases the amount of capital
held by worker households, it decreases the value of their labour endowment as wages
fall further from labour’s marginal product than in the counterfactual.
The next section considers the nature of systemic risk insurance flows in more detail.
4.5 WHAT DO EQUILIBRIUM INSURANCE PAYMENTS LOOK LIKE?
Worker households and entrepreneurs in our model hold a set of sophisticated financial
assets, which might initially appear wildly removed from the simple real-world portfolios
of households. First, the deposits held by our worker households fluctuate in value in
response to innovations in asset prices qt. Second, when systemic risk markets are open,
we introduce state-contingent payments xt that at first glance have no obvious real world
counterpart. When we observe real-world bank deposits, they do not tend to revalue in
response to the innovations in the values of capital assets, and nor do they respond to
macroeconomic shocks.
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 present impulse responses for output, physical asset prices, en-
trepreneurs’ net worth and household deposits. Full impulse responses for a broad range
of model variables are available in Appendix 4.A, which also includes the parameterisa-
tion used to produce these figures. When systemic risk markets are closed, shocks result
in immediate revaluations in household deposits and entrepreneurs’ net worth through in-
novations in the cost of installing new capital. When systemic risk markets are open, the
competitive equilibrium allocations result in much more stable paths for worker house-
hold’ deposits, which are now more ‘sticky’ in the short run. Entrepreneurs’ net worth
absorbs most of the fluctuation in physical asset prices, and jump immediately in response
to shocks.
In fact, when systemic risk markets are open, households’ asset portfolios look much
more like real world deposit accounts than when these markets are closed. Conversely,
entrepreneurs’ net worth looks much more like stock prices, responding dramatically in
the short run to macroeconomic shocks.
This prediction of the model suggests that real world deposit accounts, which provide
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Figure 4.1: Systemic risk markets and asset values. Log-linearised model. Total factor productivity shock
(+1%). Systemic risk markets open (orange, solid), closed (black, dashed).
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Figure 4.2: Systemic risk markets and asset values. Log-linearised model. Risk shock (+1%). Systemic
risk markets open (orange, solid), closed (black, dashed).
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a stability in terms of their real purchasing power, may be a good approximation of the
(privately) optimal set of state-contingent securities.One interpretation of this result is that
the reason why we don’t see worker households holding portfolios of assets contingent
on labour productivity and macroeconomic aggregates is not a result of the associated
complexity of these products, but rather a reflection of the demand for and supply of
such securities. These securities do not exist because trade in these assets does not offer
opportunities for mutual benefit. Deposits work just fine. This arrangement does not
however correspond to constrained efficiency.
4.5.1 COULD MARKETS IMPLEMENT CONSTRAINED EFFICIENT ALLOCATIONS?
The market equilibria we have considered in this paper restrict trade to one period con-
tracts. We’ve excluded markets in multiperiod contracts and market exclusion rights.
Kilenthong and Townsend (2014) show that permitting trade in such rights will restore
constrained efficiency in competitive equilibria in general incomplete markets settings.
The relevance of our policy analysis depends on the ability for these markets to open
and these contracts to be enforceable. If it is likely that these multiperiod contracts
and exclusion rights can be traded, then any policy intervention is redundant. Any op-
timal mechanism would need to implement the deviation between worker households’
consumption-leisure marginal rate of substitution and entrepreneurs’ risk-consumption
marginal rate of substitution. This means that the Kilenthong and Townsend (2014) con-
tracts must either commit workers to future employment at wages that differ from their
own consumption-leisure marginal rate of substitution, or must commit entrepreneurs to
offer future employment at wages that differ from their own risk-consumption marginal
rate of substitution.
In the model, the commitments implied by these contracts would need to be made
multilaterally between all workers and all firms. Pairwise agreements between individ-
ual worker-firm pairs might help but would not suffice for constrained efficiency, as the
labour demanded by individual firms is highly volatile, being sensitive to individual firms’
project outcomes. The Bureau of Labor Statistics Job Openings and Labor Turnover sur-
vey figures suggest that in a typical month, between 3% and 4% of employed workers are
separated from their current employer either through layoffs or quits. This high turnover
rate in the data suggests that the implementation of multiperiod labor commitments across
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households and firms would be costly to manage and enforce. In sum, it is our position
that it is unlikely that Kilenthong and Townsend (2014) contracts can restore constrained
efficiency in practise, and that there is likely to be a role for Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986)
interventions in promoting constrained efficient responses to business cycle shocks in this
setting.
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4.A PARAMETERISATION
The parameterisation employed in this chapter is identical to that employed in the flexi-
ble price model of Chapter 3. The details of this parameterisation are repeated here for
convenience.
The worker households’ preferences over consumption and labour are described by
u(C,N) = C1−σ/(1− σ)−N1+ψ/(1 + ψ), with σ = 2 and ψ = 1.5. The difference be-
tween the worker households’ and entrepreneurs’ intertemporal elasticities of substitution
(1/σ) are important for our results. Recall that the entrepreneurs’ intertemporal elasticity
of substitution is equal to one. Typically, when worker households’ intertemporal elas-
ticities of substitution are low, the equilibrium insurance flows toward worker households
will be greater in recessions. Consequently, the amplification of shocks will be larger.
The worker households’ quarterly discount factor is βh = 0.995, and constant steady
state wealth shares require that the entrepreneurs’ quarterly discount factor is βe = 0.975.
In the steady state, the risk free interest rate (R = 1/βh), and the average return to
entrepreneurs’ equity is (Re = 1/βe).11 The probability of a bad project outcome is pi1 =
0.00415, which corresponds to an annual probability of default of 1.66%, the average
historical annual default probability of credit rated US firms (Schuermann and Hanson,
2004). and the probability of a type-I error resulting from an audit is η = 0.1. Small
changes in this value have no effect on our main results, so long as η remains strictly
positive. The resource cost of auditing (bankruptcy costs), expressed as a share of capital
invested in the project is κ = 0.3, which is high in comparison with microeconomic
studies that have found direct bankruptcy costs of between 1% and 6% of firms’ assets
(see for example Warner, 1977, Weiss, 1990 and Altman, 1984). This is quite a common
weakness of costly state verification models. It is difficult to obtain the high interest rate
spreads observed in the data with both realistically low default rates and bankruptcy costs.
Across parameterisations matching any two of these three variables with available data has
little effect on the dynamics of the model. Given that credit spreads resemble an insurance
premium in our model, it is possibly the case that greater entrepreneur risk aversion would
11It would be possible to write up the model with a common discount factor across worker households
and entrepreneurs, but, given entrepreneurs’ relatively high expected return to capital, there would need to
be some process governing the exit or death of entrepreneurs in the steady state in order to ensure a stable
steady state distribution of capital wealth between worker households and entrepreneurs.
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help in obtaining the high and volatile credit spreads seen in the data while still retaining
realistically low default probabilities and bankruptcy costs. That being said, we would
expect entrepreneurs to self select as being relatively risk tolerant, so it is unlikely that
greater risk aversion is the best way to bring the model closer to the financial data.
The idiosyncratic risk coefficient is 5, which is sufficiently large that in low states
θ1, individual output is negative in the sense that more capital is destroyed than output
produced. The steady state factor wedge is quite sensitive to the entrepreneurs’ discount
factor (the lower the discount factor, the less savings the entrepreneurs will accrue) and
idiosyncratic risk. Under our parameterisation, the steady state factor wedge is τN is equal
to 10.25%.
The Cobb-Douglas weight on capital is α = 0.35. The depreciation rate of capital is
δ = 0.02 per quarter. The investment adjustment cost parameter is φ = 4. The persistence
of both risk and total factor productivity shocks are set at ρA = 0.93, ρξ = 0.99, the
standard deviation and magnitude of impulse response for both shocks are set at σA =
0.01, σξ = 0.01.
4.A.1 DATA
All macroeconomic variables are taken from the St Louis Federal Reserve FRED database,
except where otherwise stated. FRED unique identifies are provided in brackets.
The risk free real interest rate is calculated from the Effective Federal Funds rate
(FEDFUNDS).12 The average return on equity is the annualised percentage change in
the Russell 3000 Total Market Return Index (RU3000TR PC1).13 Both interest rates are
converted to real returns by subtracting CPI inflation (CPIAUCSL PC1). The average an-
nualised credit spread is taken from Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012). The average capital
leverage ratio is taken from Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2012) and is set to the upper end of the
range of financial leverage (Assets / Equity) values they find for US listed non-financial
firms of 2.4.14
12Using the Effective Federal Funds rate (FEDFUNDS) results in an average real interest rate of 1.35%,
which compares with 1.00% derived from the 90 day treasury bill rate (TB3MS).
13For comparison, the average real return on equity for United States Banks (USROE) over the time
period is equal to 8.65%, which compares with the average of 9.43% calculated from the Russell 3000
Index.
14Estimates on this measure vary dramatically, with McGrattan and Prescott (2005) finding an average
Assets / Equity ratio of 1.2. This makes quite a big difference to the dynamics of the model, but the main
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Table 4.2: Properties of the deterministic steady state
STEADY STATE VALUE
Data Model
GREAT RATIOS
Capital-output†, K/Y 2.74 2.99
Consumption-output, C/Y 0.65 0.75
Hh. consumption share, Ch/C NA 0.83
Investment-output, I/Y 0.16 0.24
Ent. capital share, Ke/K 0.42 0.42
Labour share, NW/Y 0.56 0.58
FINANCIAL VARIABLES
Real interest rate†, Rf − 1 1.35% 2.01%
Return on equity†, Re − 1 9.43% 10.61%
Credit spread†, r(θ2, ∅)− rb 2.04% 1.91%
† These figures have been converted to annualised values.
Note that in our model, the consumption and investment shares of output add to one.
This is not true in the data, which include Government Spending.
4.B REST OF THE MODEL
4.B.1 HOUSEHOLDS
There exists a representative household enjoying consumption C and supplying labour N
in each period. Households maximise
Ut = Et
∞∑
j=0
βjUh(Ct+j , Nt+j), (4.35)
where u1,−u11, u2, u22 > 0.
At the start of the period, the representative household holds deposits Dt−1 which are
claims issued by the financial intermediaries. At the end of the period, the financial inter-
mediaries repay the household with interest on their deposits RtDt−1, and wage income
WtNt. The representative household uses these deposit holdings to purchase consumption
goods Ct, and the remaining deposits are carried over to the following period Dt,
Dt + Ct = RtDt−1 +WtNt. (4.36)
points made within this paper still hold under a wide range of steady state leverage ratios.
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The first order conditions for the representative household can be described as follows:
−U
h
2 (Ct, Nt)
Wt
= Uh1 (Ct, Nt) (4.37)
Uh1 (Ct, Nt) = βEtRt+1Uh1 (Ct+1, Nt+1). (4.38)
4.B.2 FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
Financial intermediaries are perfectly competitive and risk neutral. Financial intermedi-
aries provide a deposit asset to households, and intermediate payments from entrepreneurs
to households. Between periods, financial intermediaries hold the durable capital good.
Within periods, these capital holdings are lent to entrepreneurs.
Loan contracts specify interest rates following successful projects, and recovery rates
following unsuccessful projects (bankruptcies). As the probability of project success is
variable, intermediaries’ diversified portfolios are subject to aggregate risks. This risk is
passed on to the household sector depositors.
At the end of each period, all deposits are backed by capital holdings
Dt = QtK
b
t (4.39)
where Kft is the amount of capital held by financial intermediaries at the end of period
t, and Qt is the cost of capital in period t. All loan earnings are passed on directly to the
representative household through interest on deposits.
Dt−1Rt = Qt(1− δ)Kbt−1 + rbtKbt−1 (4.40)
The first term on the right hand side of equation 4.40 is the value of bank capital holdings
in the current period after depreciation δ. The second term is the capital rental income
earned through loans to entrepreneurs, net of monitoring costs.
4.B.3 CAPITAL PRODUCERS
Competitive capital producers (indexed by j) combine the combine the consumption good
with existing capital to produce new capital goods. Firm j can produce Ijt units of the
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investment good for total cost
Itj + Φ
(
Itj
Kt−1j
)
Kt−1j , (4.41)
where
Φ
(
I
K
)
=
φ
2
(
I
K
− δ
)2
.
In competitive equilibrium, the cost of capital can be described as follows,
Qt = 1 + Φ
′
(
It
Kt−1
)
= 1 + φ
(
It
Kt−1
− δ
)
. (4.42)
The final condition we require ensures market clearing in the goods market:
Yt = Ct + C
e
t +QtIt + pi1κKt−1 (4.43)
4.C DERIVATION OF EQUATION 4.32
At the end of period t, we allow agents to trade in claims derivative on the following
period’s commonly observed exogenous state, zt+1 = (At+1, ξt+1). Let Pt(z) be the price
at the end of period t of a security returning one unit of capital at the beginning of period
t + 1, conditional upon the realisation of zt+1 = z. Let Xht (z) denote the amount of
securities of type z purchased by the household in period t, and Xet (z) the purchases of
the entrepreneurs. Market clearing requires that
Xht (z) +X
e
t (z) = 0 ∀t, z (4.44)
These transactions are settled at the beginning of each period, with units of the capital
stock. Consequently, the amount of capital held at the end of period t−1 is no longer equal
to the amount of capital which can be employed in projects in period t, which follows the
settlement of these insurance contracts. We’ll denote the capital brought forward by each
agent i of type j from period t − 1 to period t by Kpjt−1i. Following the settlement of
insurance contracts at the beginning of period t, the capital available to agent i of type
j to lend or allocate toward projects becomes Kjti. Note the distinction in time subscript
from earlier sections, which accounts for the fact that capital controlled by each agent in
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the current period t depends on the realisations of aggregate states in period t.
The financial intermediary acts as agent of the household sector in this market. At the
end of the period, deposit wealth is used to purchase capital goods and state contingent
securities,
Dt = QtK
pb
t +
∫
z
Pt(z)X
b
t (z)dzt+1. (4.45)
At the start of the period, bank capital holdings are augmented following insurance trans-
fers,
Kbt = K
pb
t−1 +X
b
t−1(zt). (4.46)
The updated capital stock is then lent to entrepreneurs, and the total proceeds are dis-
tributed to the representative household as interest on their deposits.
Dt−1Rt = Qt(1− δ)Kbt−1 + rbtKbt−1 (4.47)
The representative household’s capital accumulation constraint remains unchanged.
Entrepreneur i’s accumulation constraint can be re-written as follows
QtK
pe
ti = Yti(θti) +Qt(1− δ)Keti −Kbtirˆti(θti, σti)−WtNti − Ceti −
∫
z
Pt(z)X
e
ti(z)dzt+1 (4.48)
Keti = K
pe
t−1i +X
e
t−1i(zt). (4.49)
Note that the financial intermediaries maximise returns from insurance purchases sub-
ject to the household’s objective function and stochastic discount factor. The first order
necessary conditions for Xjti(zt+1) are
Pt(zt+1)λ
h
t = βEtRt+1λht+1(zt+1) ∀z, (4.50)
Pt(zt+1)λ
e
ti = β
eEtRet+1i(zt+1, θt+1i, σt+1i)λet+1i(zt+1, θt+1i, σt+1i) ∀z, θ, σ, i,
(4.51)
where
Reti(θti, σti) =
Yti(θti) +Qt(1− δ)Keti −Kbtirˆti(θti, σti)−WtNti
Qt−1Keti
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Combining (4.50,4.51) yields the following optimality condition, which current transfers
Xjti must satisfy in competitive equilibrium:
βRtλ
h
t
λht−1
=
βeEtReti(θti, σti)λeti(θti, σti)
λet−1i
= Pt−1(zt) ∀i. (4.52)
Note that even after the realisation of zt, it is still necessary to take expectations over
entrepreneurs’ marginal utility in the current period, which depends on their individual
project outcomes observed later within the period.
We can re-write our insurance optimality condition expressed by equation 4.52 in
terms of the deviation from perfect aggregate risk insurance:
βλht
λht−1
=
βeEtλeti(θti, σti)
λet−1i
· EtR
e
ti(θti, σti)λ
e
ti(θti, σti)
RtEtλeti(θti, σti)
. (4.53)
The second term on the right hand side is equal to one,15 which leaves us with full risk
sharing of common shocks:
βλht
λht−1
=
βeEtλeti(θti, σti)
λet−1i
. (4.32)
15This can be shown in two different ways. First, we could substitute in the entrepreneurs’ savings con-
dition 4.25. Alternatively, we could note that the entrepreneurs have access to risk free loans and deposits
at the gross interest rate Rt. It follows that we could re-write their Euler condition with risk free interest
rate Rt.
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4.D USEFUL DERIVATIONS
4.D.1 DERIVATION OF EQUATIONS (4.22 , 4.23, 4.24)
Expanding the entrepreneurs’ first order conditions for labour demand (4.12) yields
0 = P (θ1, σ1)λ
e
ti(θ1, σ1)YNti(θ1) + P (θ1, σ1)λ
e
ti(θ1, σ2)YNti(θ1)
+ P (θ2, ∅)λeti(θ2, ∅)YNti(θ2)− Etλeti(θti, σti)Wt
= P (θ1, σ1)λ
e
ti(θ1, σ1)YNti(θ1) + P (θ1, σ1)λ
e
ti(θ1, σ2)YNti(θ1)
+ P (θ2, ∅)λeti(θ2, ∅)YNti(θ2) + P (θ2, ∅)λeti(θ2, ∅)YNti(θ1)
− P (θ2, ∅)λeti(θ2, ∅)YNti(θ1)− Etλeti(θti, σti)Wt
= Etλeti(θti, σti)θ1YNti + P (θ2, ∅)λeti(θ2, ∅)YNti(θ2 − θ1)− Etλeti(θti, σti)Wt
= λeti(θ1, σ1)(θ1YNti −Wt) + P (θ2, ∅)λeti(θ2, ∅)YNtiξt
= −(Wt − θ1YNti) + P (θ2, ∅) λ
e
ti(θ2, ∅)
λeti(θ1, σ1)
YNtiξt
λeti(θ2, ∅)
λeti(θ1, σ1)
=
1
P (θ2, ∅)ξt
Wt − θ1YNti
YNti
=
1
P (θ2, ∅)ξt
Wt − [θ1 + P (θ2, ∅)ξt − P (θ2, ∅)ξt]YNti
YNti
=
1
P (θ2, ∅)ξt
Wt − [1− P (θ2, ∅)ξt]YNti
YNti
λeti(θ2, ∅)
λeti(θ1, σ1)
= 1− 1
P (θ2, ∅)ξt
YNti −Wt
YNti
= (4.23 RHS).
Now, re-write (4.21) as follows:
P (θ2, ∅)λeti(θ2, ∅) = [P (θ2, ∅) + P (θ1, θ2)]λeti(θ1, σ1)− P (θ1, θ2)λeti(θ1, θ2),
and divide through by λeti(θ1, σ1):
P (θ2, ∅) λ
e
ti(θ2, ∅)
λeti(θ1, σ1)
= [P (θ2, ∅) + P (θ1, θ2)]− P (θ1, θ2)λ
e
ti(θ1, θ2)
λeti(θ1, σ1)
,
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Rearranging and substituting in (4.23) yields
λeti(θ1, θ2)
λeti(θ1, σ1)
=
P (θ2, ∅) + P (θ1, θ2)
P (θ1, θ2)
− P (θ2, ∅)
P (θ1, θ2)
λeti(θ2, ∅)
λeti(θ1, σ1)
=
P (θ2, ∅) + P (θ1, θ2)
P (θ1, θ2)
− P (θ2, ∅)
P (θ1, θ2)
[
1− τNti
P (θ2, ∅)ξt
]
=
P (θ2, ∅) + P (θ1, θ2)
P (θ1, θ2)
− P (θ2, ∅)
P (θ1, θ2)
+
P (θ2, ∅)
P (θ1, θ2)
τNti
P (θ2, ∅)ξt
λeti(θ1, θ2)
λeti(θ1, σ1)
= 1 +
τNti
P (θ1, θ2)ξt
= (4.22 RHS).
Now we consider equation (4.24). Substituting (4.19) into (4.13) yields
0 = Etλeti(θti, σti)[YKti(θti)− rˆti(θti, σti)] + λeti(θ1, σ1)
[
Etrˆt(θti, σti)− rdt − pi1κ
]
= Etλeti(θti, σti)YKti(θti)− λeti(θ1, σ1)
[
rdt + pi1κ
]
+ λeti(θ1, σ1) [Etrˆt(θti, σti)]
− Etλeti(θti, σti)rˆti(θti, σti)
= Etλeti(θti, σti)YKti(θti)− λeti(θ1, σ1)
[
rdt + pi1κ
]
+ λeti(θ1, σ1)[P (θ1, θ2)rˆti(θ1, θ2) + P (θ2, ∅)rˆti(θ2, ∅)]
− [P (θ1, θ2)λeti(θ1, θ2)rˆti(θ1, θ2) + P (θ2, ∅)λeti(θ2, ∅)rˆti(θ2, ∅)]
= Etλeti(θti, σti)YKti(θti)− λeti(θ1, σ1)
[
rdt + pi1κ
]
+ λeti(θ1, σ1)[P (θ1, θ2) + P (θ2, ∅)]rˆti(θ2, ∅)
− [P (θ1, θ2)λeti(θ1, θ2) + P (θ2, ∅)λeti(θ2, ∅)]rˆti(θ1, θ2)
= Etλeti(θti, σti)YKti(θti)− λeti(θ1, σ1)
[
rdt + pi1κ
]
+ {[P (θ1, θ2) + P (θ2, ∅)]λeti(θ1, σ1)− P (θ1, θ2)λeti(θ1, θ2)− P (θ2, ∅)λeti(θ2, ∅)}rˆti(θ1, θ2)
= λeti(θ1, σ1)θ1YKti + P (θ2, ∅)λeti(θ2, ∅)YKtiξt − λeti(θ1, σ1)
[
rdt + pi1κ
]
(by (4.21))
= θ1YKti + P (θ2, ∅) λ
e
ti(θ2, ∅)
λeti(θ1, σ1)
YKtiξt −
[
rdt + pi1κ
]
= θ1YKti +
[
1− τNti
P (θ2, ∅)ξt
]
P (θ2, ∅)YKtiξt −
[
rdt + pi1κ
]
(by (4.23))
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τNti =
YKti [θ1 + P (θ2, ∅)ξt]− rdt − pi1κ
YKti
τNti =
YKti − rdt − pi1κ
YKti
= (4.24 RHS)
4.D.2 DERIVATION OF EQUATION 4.25
First, note that the entrepreneurs’ preferences exhibit intertemporal homotheticity, and
that projects are constant-returns-to-scale. The combination of these facts results in the
consequence that both the choices of each entrepreneur and their returns and risks are
scalable in Keti. For simplicity, we’ll re-write the accumulation constraint as
QtK
e
t+1i = R
e
tiK
e
ti − Ceti,
where
Reti =
Yti(θti) +Qt(1− δ)Keti −K ltirˆti(θti, σti)−WtNti
Keti
in order to capture the scalability of the entrepreneur’s problem. Reti is an idiosyncratic
shock realised before the consumption decision is taken. In order to describe the en-
trepreneur’s consumption decision, we’ll re-write their problem as a Bellman equation
formulated after the realisation of Reti. We’ll denote Wti = R
e
tiK
e
ti, which is the resources
the entrepreneur has available when they make their consumption decision in period t.
V (Wti) = max
Ceti
logCeti + β
eEtV (Wt+1i),
subject to
Wt+1i =
Ret+1i
Qt
(Wti − Ceti).
Which we can re-write as
V (Wti) = max
Ceti
logCeti + β
eEtV
(
Ret+1i
Qt
(Wti − Ceti)
)
.
Dropping the subscript i, the first order condition for Ce is
1
Cet
= βeE
Ret+1
Qt
V ′
(
Ret+1i
Qt
(Wti − Ceti)
)
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We proceed by guessing a particular functional form for V , and verifying that this func-
tional form satisfies the conditions above.
Let
Vˆ (W ) =
1
1− βe logW + k,
where k is some constant.
Assuming, that Vˆ is the correct value function, we substitute it into the first order
condition to solve for consumption:
1
Cet
=
βe
1− βe
1
(Wt − Cet )
which rearranges to yield
Cet = (1− βe)Wti
We now verify our guess value function by substituting it into the entrepreneur’s Bellman
equation,
V (Wti) = max
Ceti
logCeti + β
eEt
1
1− βe log
(
Ret+1i
Qt
(Wti − Ceti)
)
+ βek.
And substitute in our optimal consumption decision,
V (Wti) = log[(1− βe)Wti] + βeEt 1
1− βe log
(
Ret+1i
Qt
(Wti − (1− βe)Wti)
)
+ βek
= logWti + log(1− βe) + β
e
1− βeEt log
(
Ret+1i
Qt
(βeWti)
)
+ βek
= logWti + log(1− βe) + β
e
1− βe logWti +
βe
1− βeEt log
(
Ret+1i
Qt
βe
)
+ βek
=
1
1− βe logWti + log(1− β
e) +
βe
1− βeEt log
(
Ret+1i
Qt
βe
)
+ βek
V (Wti) =
1
1− βe logWti + k,
where
k =
1
1− βe
[
log(1− βe) + β
e
1− βeEt log
(
Ret+1i
Qt
βe
)]
.
This confirms that our guess value function Vˆ satisfies the entrepreneur’s problem, and
that Cet = (1− βe)Wti is the optimal consumption decision for our entrepreneur.
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We can now substitute this back into the entrepreneurs’ accumulation constraint (4.8)
to obtain
Ceti = (1− βe)[Yti(θti) +Qt(1− δ)Keti −K ltirˆti(θti, σti)−WtNti].
It follows that
QtK
e
t+1i = β
e[Yti(θti) +Qt(1− δ)Keti −K ltirˆti(θti, σti)−WtNti],
and
Ceti =
1− βe
βe
QtK
e
t+1i. (4.25)
DERIVATION OF EQUATIONS 4.28, 4.30 AND 4.31
First, substitute the national income equation (??) into the marginal rates of substitution
conditions (4.26) and (4.26) to eliminate WtNt,
λeti(θ1, θ2)
λeti(θ1, θ1)
=
(θ1 − 1 + τNt)Y¯t + [Qt(1− δ) + rdt ]Keti −Kltirˆti(θ1, σ1) + rdKlt + pilκKt
(θ1 − 1 + τNt)Y¯t + [Qt(1− δ) + rdt ]Keti −Kltirˆti(θ2, ∅) + rdKlt + pilκKt
(4.54)
λeti(θ2, ∅)
λeti(θ1, θ1)
=
(θ1 − 1 + τNt)Y¯t + [Qt(1− δ) + rdt ]Keti −Kltirˆti(θ1, σ1) + rdKlt + pilκKt
(θ2 − 1 + τNt)Y¯t + [Qt(1− δ) + rdt ]Keti −Kltirˆti(θ2, ∅) + rdKlt + pilκKt
(4.55)
Note that pi1θ1 + pi2θ2 = 1, which implies θ1 = 1− pi2ξt, and θ2 = 1 + pi1ξt.
Rather than working with specific interest rates rˆ(·) and project returns θ, it will be
helpful to re-write these conditions in terms of project risk ξt = θ2 − θ1, and risk sharing
[rˆti(θ2, ∅) − rˆti(θ1, σ1)]. From the financial intermediaries’ participation constraint we
have
K lti[(pi2 + pi1η)rˆti(θ2, ∅) + pi1(1− η)rˆti(θ1, σ1)] = rdK lt + pilκKt
which allows us to re-write rˆti(θ2, ∅), rˆti(θ1, σ1) in terms of required returns and risk:
rˆti(θ2, ∅) = rd + pilκ Kt
K lti
+ pi1(1− η)(rˆti(θ2, ∅)− rˆti(θ1, σ1))
rˆti(θ1, σ1) = r
d + pilκ
Kt
K lti
− (pi2 + pi1η)(rˆti(θ2, ∅)− rˆti(θ1, σ1))
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which we can substitute back into (4.54,4.55) and rearrange to obtain
RtQt−1
Keti
Klti
= (pi2ξt − τNt) Y¯t
Klti
−
[
1
1− λeti(θ1, θ2)/λeti(θ1, θ1)
− pi1(1− η)
]
(rˆti(θ2, ∅)− rˆti(θ1, σ1))
RtQt−1
Keti
Klti
= (pi2ξt − τNt) Y¯t
Klti
+
λeti(θ2, ∅)/λeti(θ1, θ1)
1− λeti(θ2, ∅)/λeti(θ1, θ1)
Y¯t
Klti
ξt
−
[
1
1− λeti(θ2, ∅)/λeti(θ1, θ1)
− pi1(1− η)
]
(rˆti(θ2, ∅)− rˆti(θ1, σ1))
And we equate the right hand sides to solve
Y¯tξt
K lti(rˆti(θ2, ∅)− rˆti(θ1, σ1))
=

λeti(θ1, θ2)
λeti(θ1, θ1)
/
λeti(θ2, ∅)
λeti(θ1, θ1)
− 1
λeti(θ1, θ2)
λeti(θ1, θ1)
− 1

Note that
λeti(θ1, θ2)
λeti(θ1, θ1)
> 1, and
λeti(θ2, ∅)
λeti(θ1, θ1)
< 1, making the right hand side strictly greater
than 1. The left hand side is the ratio of productive risk to the possible amount of risk
sharing following loan restructuring. The equation shows how an increase in the ratio of
productive risk to risk sharing increases the entrepreneurs’ marginal rates of substitution
for consumption across idiosyncratic states. These marginal rates of substitution in turn
determine entrepreneurs’ precautionary reductions in wage and capital hiring compared
with the first best efficient levels, through the wedges specified in equations (4.22) and
(4.23). Substituting these factor wedges in place of the marginal rates of substitution
yields
Kbt−1i[rˆti(θ2, ∅)− rˆti(θ1, σ1)] = Y¯ti
[
pi2ξt − τNti
pi2 + pi1η
]
(4.28)
Now we can use this solution to solve for the the leverage ratio
Y¯ti
RtQt−1Ket−1i
=
(pi2 + pi1η)τNti
[pi2ξt − τNti][pi1ηξt + τNti] , (= (4.30 RHS))
and also the ratio of household’s to entrepreneurs’ capital in terms of the loan coupon
interest rate spread [rˆti(θ2, ∅)− rbt ].
Kbt−1i
Ket−1i
([rˆti(θ2, ∅)− rbt ]− pi1κ) = RtQt−1
[
pi1(1− η)τNti
pi1ηξt + τNti
]
+ pi1κ (4.31)
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4.D.3 DERIVATION OF EQUATION 4.34
From the national income equation (??) and the entrepreneurs’ optimality condition for
relative demand for labour and capital (??), we can derive the labour share of national
income as a function of the labour wedge:
NtWt = (1− α)(1− τNt)Yt
We can use the expression for leverage (4.30) to eliminate income Yt,
NtWt = (1− α)(1− τNt)L(ξt, τNt)RtQt−1Ket−1i
= (1− α)(1− τNt)L(ξt, τNt) β
e
1− βe
1
λet−1
Rt (using 4.25)
= (1− α)(1− τNt)L(ξt, τNt) 1
β
βe
1− βe
λht−1
λet−1
Rt
Et−1(Rtλht )
. (using 4.38)
Eliminating wages with the representative households’ first order condition for labour
(4.37) yields
NtU
h
2 (Ct, Nt) = (1− τNt)Lt(ξt, τNt)
(
1− α
1− βe
)
βe
β
λht−1
λet−1
[
Rtλ
h
t
Et−1(Rtλht )
]
. (4.34)
4.E MODEL DYNAMICS
187
Financial Contracts and Business Cycles
Figure 4.3: Log-linearised model dynamics: Total factor productivity shock. Systemic
risk markets open (red,—), closed (black,– –).
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Figure 4.4: Log-linearised model dynamics: Risk shock. Systemic risk markets open
(red,—), closed (black,– –).
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CHAPTER 5
MONETARY POLICY AND HERDING
When wage, debt or other contracts are not indexed to the price level, fluc-
tuations in the price level resulting from monetary actions redistribute real
wealth between agents. An increase in the price level reduces the real value of
fixed nominal payments. A nominal output targeting monetary policy regime
permits higher price inflation during recessions than an inflation targeting
regime. This results in the redistribution of real wealth from creditors to bor-
rowers in downturns and the redistribution of real wealth from borrowers to
creditors in booms. Cunning agents might well alter their behaviour in an-
ticipation of these distributional effects of monetary policy. Compared with
inflation or price level targeting, nominal output targeting provides agents
with an additional incentive to undertake projects which are highly correlated
with the state of the economy, increasing business cycle volatility.
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INTRODUCTION
This chapter introduces a different type of private information than we have studied in
earlier chapters. Here, we assume that firms face a trade-off between idiosyncratic risk
and aggregate risk, and that firm insiders’ choices about this trade-off are private infor-
mation, unobservable to outside investors. In addition to this private information friction,
we will also consider the restriction of factor payment and managerial compensation con-
tracts to nominal terms. Essentially, restrictions of this sort are required for monetary
non-neutrality and the study of monetary policy.
When contracts are not indexed to the price level, fluctuations in the price level redis-
tribute real wealth between agents. An increase in the price level reduces the real value
of fixed nominal liabilities, and the value of fixed nominal assets. This means that mon-
etary policy actions will affect the real distribution of wealth. For example, a nominal
output targeting monetary policy regime permits higher price inflation during recessions
in comparison with an inflation targeting regime. This results in the redistribution of real
wealth from creditors to borrowers in downturns (and the redistribution of real wealth
from borrowers to creditors in booms). Cunning agents might well alter their behaviour
in anticipation of these fluctuations in wealth arising from monetary policy actions. The
message of this paper is that compared with inflation or price level targeting, nominal
output targeting provides agents with an additional incentive to undertake projects which
are highly correlated with the state of the economy, thereby increasing business cycle
volatility. This is an example of the phenomenon known as herding.
It turns out that herding enables agents to take advantage of the nominal output target-
ing regime. Under nominal output targeting, the price level is inversely correlated with
total output. Agents who choose projects which are correlated with the market can typ-
ically benefit from high inflation following project failures and low inflation following
project successes. This paper supports this idea with three different examples. In the first
example, banks with fixed nominal deposit liabilities outstanding choose to allocate their
portfolio of assets across uncorrelated and correlated securities or loan products. The
worst possible outcome for these banks is that bad loan performance occurs at the same
time as low inflation. This is because low inflation increases the real value of their deposit
liabilities. By aligning their loan portfolios with the market, they can ensure that inflation
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will be high when loan performance is bad—essentially receiving a bailout with the costs
passed on to their depositors. In the second example, firm managers are compensated
with nominal contracts increasing in individual firms’ output. Under nominal output tar-
geting, managers can capitalise on the negative correlation between aggregate output and
inflation by herding investment projects with the market, which results in an increase in
expected consumption.
These individual examples differ in important ways. In the first example, which con-
siders sticky factor payments to capital, bargains between individual depositors and firms
would not necessarily improve outcomes. The real repayment to an individual depositor
is not contingent on the portfolio allocation of their bank in equilibrium. Rather, the real
value of individual deposits is dependent on the average portfolio allocation decisions
across all banks. Social costs resulting from the actions of any bank are shared across all
agents. So there is not necessarily an incentive for individual depositor-bank pairs to re-
solve herding issues. In the second example, this is not the case. There is a greater conflict
between the owners of the firm and the managers, and better contract design/monitoring
would yield private and social welfare gains. In the first example, bankers have nominal
deposit liabilities, and it is risk aversion which discourages banks from specialising in
niche products—which would diminish the value of the implicit bailout associated with
the nominal output targeting. In the second example, the manager has a nominal compen-
sation asset, and it is risk tolerance which enables them to take advantage of the nominal
output targeting regime. Conversely, in the model presented in this paper, there is never
a herding equilibrium under an inflation targeting or a price level targeting regime. This
is formalised in Proposition 5.1. This is because the source of pecuniary externalities
resulting in strategic complementarities is the correlation between the price level and real
output. This correlation is eliminated under inflation or price level targeting, which re-
moves any systematic correlation between the price level and output.
The behaviour studied in this paper is an example of rational herding, which is a
form of strategic complementarity. It is in each agent’s best interests to follow a certain
action, if and only if they expect their peers to undertake the same action. Even under
nominal output targeting, the price level will not be volatile if all agents choose diversified
projects—as this would mean that real output volatility would be low, and nominal output
can be stabilised with little volatility in the price level. It is the expectation that other
agents will choose to herd into the correlated project which implies the expectation that
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the price level will be volatile and inversely correlated with real output, and it is this
inverse correlation between real output and the price level which encourages herding into
highly correlated projects under nominal output targeting.
RELATION TO THE LITERATURE
Other examples of rational herding behaviour include bank runs. If as a depositor you
suspect that others will withdraw their funds from your bank, it may be rational to attempt
to withdraw your funds immediately (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). This is an example
of rational herding, because it is the expectation of others taking a certain action—in this
case by withdrawing deposits—which makes it rational for other agents to mimic that
same action.
In the context of firms’ project choices and banks’ lending decisions, it is difficult
to identify whether similarity across firms’ actions is the result of herding, which could
be a sign of constrained inefficiency, or merely that these highly correlated projects or
loan products are high yielding. There is definitely a perception that herding is prevalent
in financial markets, and there are a number of mechanisms that have been identified
to explain herding behaviour. An excellent introduction to the subject is provided by
Devenow and Welch (1996).
Perhaps most closely related to the present paper are Farhi and Tirole (2012) and
Chari and Phelan (2014). They argue that a failing bank is more likely to receive a direct
fiscal bailout if their failure coincides with weakness across peer banks—this is when
the systemic costs of bank failure are highest. Foreseeing this, individual banks have an
incentive to herd with their peers, ensuring that if they do fail they will likely receive a
bailout. Individual banks also know that if they are successful while others are failing,
they will be paying for the bailouts of others through higher taxes. Farhi and Tirole (2012)
also consider the role of credit easing policies undertaken by central banks in repairing
commercial banks’ balance sheets in the wake of a crisis and thereby encouraging risk
taking ex ante. The present paper shows that these concerns are also at the heart of the
design of monetary policy targets, through the correlation between the price level and real
output.
The link between monetary policy targets and the efficiency of fixed nominal financial
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contracts is also the subject of Koenig (2011) and Sheedy (2014). These authors find that
nominal output targeting can have a stabilising effect on macroeconomic aggregates. In
their models, debtors suffer comparatively large increases in marginal utility in recessions.
Debtors would wish to insure this business cycle risk with creditors, but incomplete mar-
kets prevent agents from achieving constrained efficient risk sharing with decentralised
trade. Nominal output targeting transfers real wealth to debtors in downturns, replicating
the missing insurance payments and resulting in a Pareto welfare gain. Those same real
wealth transfers are destabilising in the model presented in this paper. This distinction
is driven by private information about firm project decisions, which introduces a conflict
between incentive to herd and insurance against business cycle risk. Central bank actions
which dampen the effects of business cycle volatility on borrowers just encourage these
borrowers to increase their exposure to the business cycle, passing on much of the risks
to lenders and other agents in the economy.
Traditional studies of monetary policy focus on monetary non-neutralities arising from
price and wage setting rigidities, rather than fixed nominal debt contracts. Within the
benchmark New Keynesian model, optimal monetary policy stabilises inflation and con-
sequently the welfare relevant output gap (see Goodfriend and King, 1997 and Woodford,
2003, Ch. 6). There is much debate about the generalisability of this result. Generally,
when wages are sticky in nominal terms, nominal output targeting can have desirable
properties (Garı´n, Lester, and Sims, 2015). This is because nominal output targeting al-
lows a rise in goods price inflation during downturns, which corresponds to a decrease
in real wages. During recessions triggered by technology shocks, labour productivity is
low, and the fall in real wages associated with nominal output targeting can restore a tight
correlation between real wages and marginal labour productivity.1
Despite the considerable academic interest, no country has explicitly pursued a policy
of nominal output targeting. As of 2012, 27 central banks were operating under explicit
inflation targets (Hammond, 2012). The lack of historical data and experience with nom-
inal output targeting is the primary reason why this paper sticks to simple models that
present the intuition behind our results as clearly as possible, but which are not well
suited for an econometric evaluation of the relative merits of inflation targeting and nom-
inal output targeting monetary regimes.
1See also Hall and Mankiw (1994) and McCallum and Nelson (1999).
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5.1 THE MODEL
The model focuses on entrepreneurs’ and managers investment decisions, after they have
arranged contracts for compensation or factor inputs. After outlining the key features of
the framework, we consider two examples. In the first example, a bank with fixed nominal
deposits outstanding determines their portfolio of assets. This example could easily be
adapted to an entrepreneur operating in the non-financial sector with fixed nominal debts
or wage bill. The second example considers a manager of a non-financial firm, whose
nominal compensation contract is indexed to the individual output of the firm, but not
indexed to prices or aggregate productivity.
Within this Chapter, we only consider the entrepreneur’s or manager’s decision after
compensation and factor payments have been agreed. We do not solve the extensive form
of the game between factor owners and entrepreneurs. The reason for this is as follows.
In our framework, there is no herding externality under price level or inflation targeting,
regardless of the particular form of the factor contracts in place ex ante (so long as they
are constrained in their indexation to prices). It follows that in the extensive form game,
and furthermore in general equilibrium, herding equilibria will not exist under price level
or inflation targeting, but could exist under nominal output targeting.
5.1.1 ENTREPRENEURS AND PROJECTS
There exists a unit measure of firm insiders who can make decisions concerning firms’
project investments. We’ll refer to this group as entrepreneurs, although in one example
we consider it will make more sense to think of this group as managers, rather than firm
owners. Each entrepreneur has access to two projects, which we’ll name red and white.
The return of each white project is perfectly correlated with all other white projects,
while the return of each agent’s red project is independent of the white project and of
all other agents’ red projects. Paraphrasing Tolstoy, All white projects are alike, all red
projects succeed or fail in their own way. Red projects refer to a special individual skill
of each agent, while the white project is accessible to all agents. This is a slight departure
from typical herding models, where each agent is typically assumed to have access to all
projects, and individual projects are equally likely to emerge as the herding project. This
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distinction is not important for our results. The red project can be thought of as a departure
from the industry standard into new technologies, products or manufacturing processes,
whereas the white project can be thought of as following the industry standards closely.
Red and white projects produce consumption goods, yielding gross return θ units of
the consumption good with a production technology that is increasing and concave in the
labour input, F ′,−F ′′ > 0. Individual entrepreneurs’ are price takers in labour markets.
The productivity multiplier θ is equal to θ¯ with probability pi in the case of red projects
and pi′ < pi in the case of white projects. Otherwise θ = θ < θ¯. White projects are
not only correlated, but also earn a lower expected real return relative to red projects.2
Project returns are public information ex post. Each entrepreneur’s choice of project is
private information both ex ante and ex post. Entrepreneur j’s nominal compensation is
contingent on their individual project output θj and the price level P , and is given by
Z(θ, P ). Entrepreneurs enjoy real consumption according to strictly increasing utility
function U(Z(θ, P )/P ).
Agents choose which project to undertake, red or white. For ease of exposition, we
allow agents randomise over projects, choosing the probability of undertaking the white
projects q in order to maximise expected utility. The agents’ problem in the first period
can be written as follows:
max
q∈[0,1]
E q
(
pi′U
(
Z(θ¯, P (Q, θ¯))
P (Q, θ¯)
)
+ (1− pi′)U
(
Z(θ, P (Q, θ))
P (Q, θ)
))
+ (1− q)pi′
[
piU
(
Z(θ¯, P (Q, θ¯))
P (Q, θ¯)
)
+ (1− pi)U
(
Z(θ, P (Q, θ¯))
P (Q, θ¯)
)]
+ (1− q)(1− pi′)
[
piU
(
Z(θ¯, P (Q, θ))
P (Q, θ)
)
+ (1− pi)U
(
Z(θ, P (Q, θ))
P (Q, θ)
)]
,
(5.1)
where Q is the mean choice of q across all agents. The equilibrium outcome Q influences
the price level P as we will see in the following section. When entrepreneurs choose the
white project, there are two possible outcomes. When their project output is high, the
price level will be that associated with high output, and vice-versa. When entrepreneurs
2In the examples we present in this paper, the assumption that the correlated white project earns lower
returns than the uncorrelated red projects does not conflict with the Consumption Capital Asset Pricing
Model, which predicts that the market returns of marketable financial assets that are highly correlated with
real output should be higher than those of uncorrelated assets.
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choose the red project, there are four possible outcomes. High or low individual output
can occur at the same time as high or low aggregate output and associated price levels.
5.1.2 MONETARY AUTHORITY
Goods prices are flexible, the monetary authority can implement any price level it chooses.
This means that there are no monetary policy errors in equilibrium—the monetary author-
ity always hits their target. This assumption is quite strict, but provides a useful bench-
mark. As there are no monetary policy errors in this framework, price level targeting is
equivalent to inflation targeting. We’ll analyse two monetary policy regimes: price level
targeting and nominal output targeting.
Definition 5.1 Under price level targeting, the monetary authority chooses P = 1.
Under nominal output targeting, we set the expected price level equal to that under price
level targeting, and nominal output constant across white project outcomes. Define Q as
the mean of the population of individual agents’ choices of q, and θw is the outcome of
the white project. Also, let real output be denoted by
Y (Q, θw) = Qθw + (1−Q)[piθ¯ + (1− pi)θ]. (5.2)
The first term on the right hand side captures the total output of all agents who have
chosen the white project. The second term captures the total output of all agents who
have chosen their individual red projects.
Definition 5.2 Under nominal output targeting, the monetary authority chooses P (Q, θw)
such that
(1) E[P (Q, θw)] = pi′P (Q, θ¯) + (1− pi′)P (Q, θ) = 1 and
(2) P (Q, θ)Y (Q, θ) = P (Q, θ¯)Y (Q, θ¯).
The first condition ensures that the expected price level under nominal output targeting is
equal to that under price level targeting. The second condition states that nominal output
is constant across white project outcomes.
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It will be helpful to re-write our definition of nominal output targeting as a function
mapping agents’ actions to the price level. Lemma 5.1 provides this result.
Lemma 5.1 Under nominal output targeting, the price level is contingent on the share of
agents selecting the high white project (Q) and the outcome of the white project (θw). The
price level is given by
P (Q, θ¯) =
Qθ + (1−Q)[piθ¯ + (1− pi)θ]
Q[(1− pi′)θ¯ + pi′θ] + (1−Q)[piθ¯ + (1− pi)θ]
P (Q, θ) =
Qθ¯ + (1−Q)[piθ¯ + (1− pi)θ]]
Q[(1− pi′)θ¯ + pi′θ] + (1−Q)[piθ¯ + (1− pi)θ] (5.3)
The proof of lemma 5.1 is contained in Appendix 5.A.
Our definition of monetary policy rules does not permit errors. That is, the monetary
authority hits their selected target with certainty. This is a strong assumption, and in
practise, it is likely that there are not only policy errors, but that these errors will be
correlated with business cycle shocks in a predictable way. Nevertheless, under inflation
or price level targeting, we should see less volatility in the price level, and therefore less
opportunity to manipulate actions in order to take advantage of fluctuations in the real
value of nominal contracts over the business cycle. Under nominal output targeting, which
aims to produce a predictable negative correlation between output and price inflation,
we would expect there to be greater opportunity to manipulate actions in order to take
advantage of this negative correlation.
5.1.3 COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM
Definition 5.3 A schedule of actions {Q,P} is a competitive equilibrium under a given
monetary policy regime if and only if q∗ = Q and P (Q, ·) is consistent with the given
monetary policy regime.
a. A symmetric equilibrium is called a herding equilibrium if and only if all agents
choose the common white project with probability 1, (Q = 1).
b. A symmetric equilibrium is called a diversification equilibrium if and only if all
agents choose their individual red projects with probability 1, (Q = 0).
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It is important to note that rational herding in financial economics is a term reserved
for situations where agents pursue a given action because they expect other agents to
pursue the same action. The herding equilibria that we identify in this paper share this
property—it is the expectation that others will choose the white project which encourages
agents to choose the white project. In general, the observation that investment decisions
are highly correlated is not necessarily evidence of herding, but could merely be an indi-
cation that the highly correlated project offers high returns.
The symmetric equilibrium concept we employ in this paper is narrow, particularly
so given that the subject of the paper is monetary policy and business cycles—typically
analysed in dynamic general equilibrium models. In this paper, agents’ compensation
schemes are taken as given and do not respond to monetary policy regimes nor to expec-
tations of output and herding. It is likely that in practise, compensation contracts as well
as project sizes and factor prices would respond to expectations of agents’ actions and
monetary policy regimes.
Proposition 5.1 ensures us that this abstraction away from the endogenous nature of
contracts and factor prices under subgame perfect or general equilibrium is not important
for the main finding of this paper. Proposition 5.1 states that under weak conditions,
namely that agent’s compensation is increasing in output and that the red project has a
greater expected return than the white project, there is no herding equilibrium under the
price level targeting regime. It follows that even in more richly specified models, these
conditions are sufficient to ensure that any model will not exhibit a herding equilibrium
under price level or inflation targeting, but may indeed exhibit a herding equilibrium under
nominal output targeting.
Proposition 5.1 If agents’ compensation is strictly increasing in project output (Z(θ¯, P ) >
Z(θ, P ) for all P ) then the only symmetric equilibrium under price level targeting is the
diversification equilibrium where all agents choose their individual red projects (Q = 0).
Proof. By Definition 5.1, the price level P is equal to 1 in all states under price level
targeting. Substituting this into the agents’ objective function (5.1) yields
max
q∈[0,1]
E q
[
pi′U
(
Z(θ¯, 1)
)
+ (1− pi′)U (Z(θ, 1))]
+ (1− q) [piU (Z(θ¯, 1))+ (1− pi)U (Z(θ, 1))]
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Recall that the expected return of agents’ individual red projects is greater than that of the
correlated white project by assumption, pi > pi′. It follows that all agents will choose their
respective red projects, q∗ = 0. In symmetric equilibrium, Q = q∗ = 0, consistent with
the diversification equilibrium.
We’ll now consider two quite different examples of our model in which a herding
equilibrium exists under nominal output targeting. In both examples, Proposition 5.1
holds, so there is no herding equilibrium under price level targeting. In the first example,
banks with nominal deposit liabilities choose portfolio allocations. In the second example,
managers with nominal compensation contracts choose investment projects.
5.2 EXAMPLE 1: BANKS
In this example, the agents will be banks. Banks enter the period with a fixed stock of
nominal deposit liabilities outstanding D, which are due at the end of the period. Banks
hold portfolios of risky loan assets, with nominal repayment rates that are increasing in
the price level—it is easier for mortgagors to repay their debts when inflation is high.
For simplicity, we’ll assume that the nominal revenue of each bank is proportional to the
price level. Consequently, bank revenue is equal to Pθ. Rather than choosing investment
projects as before, here we assume that banks allocate their funds into different loan prod-
ucts. Banks choose the portfolio weight q that is allocated to the white product, which is
highly correlated with other banks. For example, the white product may be residential
mortgage loans, or maturity mismatch as in Farhi and Tirole (2012). The remaining hold-
ings of the bank ((1 − q) share of their portfolio) is allocated to the individual bank’s
red product, which is uncorrelated with the rest of the market. This is considered to be
a product in which the bank can develop a specialisation, for example agricultural real
estate, trade finance or credit card products.
We assume that the bank’s exposure to the red and white projects is not contractable—
depositors cannot demand that the bank specialise in their individual red project—but it
is important to note that the source of risk to depositors is fluctuations in the price level,
which are dependent on the common actions across all banks. Given that deposits are risk
free in nominal terms, each depositor is indifferent between the portfolio choices of their
own individual bank, which have no discernible effect on the volatility of the price level.
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Each individual bank’s nominal income is the difference between revenues and deposit
liabilities:
Z(θ, P ) = θP −D. (5.4)
Herding in this example will be driven by an aversion to bad outcomes. More generally,
any form of weak concavity in the preference function U would be sufficient. For this
example we will impose a particular form of risk aversion suitable for considering the
incentives facing banks. We will assume that when bank income falls below θ−D, a real
resource cost of the product of e and the shortfall will be paid. This cost can be considered
as the cost of raising additional equity in response to particularly bad outcomes. Bank
utility is defined as follows:
U
(
Z(θ, P (Q, θw))
P (Q, θw)
)
=

Z(θ, P (Q, θw))
P (Q, θw)
when
Z(θ, P (Q, θw))
P (Q, θw)
≥ θ −D,
Z(θ, P (Q, θw))
P (Q, θw)
− e
[
(θ −D)− Z(θ, P (Q, θw))
P (Q, θw)
]
otherwise.
(5.5)
Of course, under the price level targeting regime, where P (Q, θw) = 1, income will
always be sufficiently high to avoid cost e. Under nominal output targeting, the equity
cost will be triggered when bank income is low and the price level is also low. The price
level will be low when total output is high. It follows that banks can eliminate these
equity issuance costs by choosing the white project, which ensures that they receive high
real income when the price level is low.
This comes at a cost for depositors. Under inflation targeting, the real value of de-
posits is constant. Under nominal output targeting, when banks choose correlated white
projects the real value of deposits will be subject to risk, decreasing when output is low
and increasing when output is high. This result is formalised by Proposition 5.2:
Proposition 5.2 1. Under price level targeting, the only symmetric equilibrium is the
diversification equilibrium. 2. Under nominal output targeting: (a) if e > (pi−pi
′)
pi′(1−pi)(1−pi′)
then there are two equilibria, a diversification equilibrium and a herding equilibrium; (b)
otherwise, there is only the diversification equilibrium.
The proof of 5.2 is contained in Appendix 5.B.
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5.3 EXAMPLE 2: MANAGERS
In this example, our agents will be risk tolerant (modeled as risk neutral) managers with
nominal compensation contracts that are increasing in the real output of the firm. For
example, managers’ nominal bonuses may be linked to sales targets. Managers can choose
to follow industry trends (the white project) with the result that their output will be highly
correlated with the market. Alternatively they may attempt to specialise their output into a
niche product (their individual red project) in which case their output will be uncorrelated
with that of their peers.
For each type of project, managers must exert some utility cost e > 0 in order to
attain success probabilities pi, pi′, otherwise projects enjoy success with probability zero.
Agents’ compensation contracts are incentive compatible if the nominal payoff to agents
following successful projects Z(θ¯) is greater than the nominal payoff to agents following
unsuccessful projects plus the effort cost scaled up by the expected price level,
Z(θ¯) ≥ Z(θ) + E[P (Q, θw)]e. (5.6)
By definitions 5.1 and 5.2 which specify our monetary policy regimes, the expectation
of the price level is equal to 1 under both regimes, E[P (Q, θw)] = 1. Assuming that the
incentive compatibility constraint is binding, equation 5.6 can be re-written as follows,
Z(θ¯) = Z(θ) + e. (5.7)
As the managers’ project choices are not verifiable, only project returns θ are con-
tractable. A financial contract is specified by state contingent consumption allocations
of the agent, written in nominal terms (Z(θ¯), Z(θ)).
We can re-write (5.1) to reveal each individual manager’s objective function,
max
q∈[0,1]
E q
[
pi′
Z(θ¯)
P (Q, θ¯)
+ (1− pi′) Z(θ)
P (Q, θ)
]
+ (1− q)pi′
[
pi
Z(θ¯)
P (Q, θ¯)
+ (1− pi) Z(θ)
P (Q, θ¯)
]
+ (1− q)(1− pi′)
[
pi
Z(θ¯)
P (Q, θ)
+ (1− pi) Z(θ)
P (Q, θ)
]
. (5.8)
204
CHAPTER 5
We now solve for symmetric equilibria across monetary policy regimes. Under price
level targeting, Proposition 5.1 holds. There is only one equilibrium, where managers
diversify across projects. Under nominal output targeting the story changes. As long as
the expected return of the white project is not too low, there will be two equilibria. The
herding equilibrium where all managers choose the white project, and the diversification
equilibrium where all managers choosing their individual red projects.
Proposition 5.3 1. Under price level targeting, the only symmetric equilibrium is the
diversification equilibrium. 2. Under nominal output targeting: (a) if θ¯
θ
> pi
1−pi
1−pi′
pi′ ,
then there are two equilibria, a diversification equilibrium and a herding equilibrium; (b)
otherwise, there is only the diversification equilibrium.
The proof of Proposition 5.3 is contained in Appendix 5.C.
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5.A PROOF OF LEMMA 5.1
Proof. Definition 5.2 part (1) can be re-written as
1 = pi′P (Q, θ¯) + (1− pi′)P (Q, θ)
Rearranging part (2) of Definition 5.2 in terms of P (Q, θ¯) allows us to eliminate this term
from the above condition:
P (Q, θ¯) = P (Q, θ)
Y (Q, θ¯)
Y (Q, θ)
,
1 = pi′P (Q, θ)
Y (Q, θ¯)
Y (Q, θ)
+ (1− pi′)P (Q, θ).
Recall from Equation 5.2 that real output is given by
Y (Q, θw) = Qθw + (1−Q)[piθ¯ + (1− pi)θ].
Substituting this into the previous condition yields
1 = pi′P (Q, θ)
Qθ¯ + (1−Q)[piθ¯ + (1− pi)θ]
Qθ + (1−Q)[piθ¯ + (1− pi)θ] + (1− pi
′)P (Q, θ),
P (Q, θ) =
Qθ + (1−Q)[piθ¯ + (1− pi)θ]
Q[pi′θ¯ + (1− pi′)θ] + (1−Q)[piθ¯ + (1− pi)θ] .
From here, we can substitute this solution into part (2) of Definition 5.2 to complete the
proof:
P (Q, θ¯) = P (Q, θ)
Qθ¯ + (1−Q)[piθ¯ + (1− pi)θ]
Qθ + (1−Q)[piθ¯ + (1− pi)θ]
=
Qθ¯ + (1−Q)[piθ¯ + (1− pi)θ]
Q[pi′θ¯ + (1− pi′)θ] + (1−Q)[piθ¯ + (1− pi)θ] .
5.B PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5.2
Proof. Part 1 follows directly from Proposition 5.1. To consider Part 2, first we substitute
the conditions for bank income (5.4) and bank preferences (5.5) into the general agents’
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problem specified by equation 5.1:
max
q∈[0,1]
E q
(
pi′
(
θ¯P (Q, θ¯)−D
P (Q, θ¯)
)
+ (1− pi′)
(
θP (Q, θ)−D
P (Q, θ)
))
+ (1− q)pi′
 pi
(
θ¯P (Q, θ¯)−D
P (Q, θ¯)
)
+(1− pi)
(
θP (Q, θ¯)−D
P (Q, θ¯)
− e
[
(θ −D)− [θP (Q, θ¯)−D]
P (Q, θ¯)
])

+ (1− q)(1− pi′)
[
pi
(
θ¯P (Q, θ)−D
P (Q, θ)
)
+ (1− pi)
(
θP (Q, θ)−D
P (Q, θ)
)]
. (5.9)
We can simplify the bankers’ problem by eliminating D and price level terms P (Q, θw)
where possible,
max
q∈[0,1]
q
(
pi′θ¯ + (1− pi′)θ)+ (1− q) [piθ¯ + (1− pi)θ]
− (1− q)pi′(1− pi)θe E
[
1− P (Q, θ¯)
P (Q, θ¯)
]
. (5.10)
The first term of equation 5.10 is the expected real return of the white product. The
second term is the expected real return of the red product. The third term is the expected
real resource cost associated with equity issuance under circumstances when both real
revenues and the price level are low. Individual bankers will place a high portfolio weight
q on the correlated white project if the difference in expected incomes between red and
white projects is smaller than their expected cost of equity issuance in states where their
individual red project fails and the price level is low. We can rearrange to solve for q,
q∗ = 1 if
(
pi′θ¯ + (1− pi′)θ) > [piθ¯ + (1− pi)θ]− pi′(1− pi)θe E [1− P (Q, θ¯)
P (Q, θ¯)
]
(5.11)
and q∗ = 0 otherwise.
We can use the definition of nominal output targeting and equation 5.3 replace P (Q, θ¯)
and re-write the condition in terms of Q and parameters. Further rearranging yields
q∗ = 1 if e E
[
Q(1− pi′)(θ¯ − θ)
Qθ + (1−Q)[piθ¯ + (1− pi)θ]
]
>
(pi − pi′)(θ¯ − θ)
pi′(1− pi)θ (5.12)
and q∗ = 0 otherwise.
A diversification equilibrium requires that q∗ = Q = 0. The right hand side of
equation 5.12 is strictly positive. When E[Q] = 0, the left hand side is equal to zero for
all positive values of e. It follows that q∗ = 0 and the model permits a diversification
equilibrium.
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A herding equilibrium requires q∗ = Q = 1. Substituting Q = 1 into equation 5.12
reveals that a herding equilibrium can occur when
e >
(pi − pi′)
pi′(1− pi)(1− pi′) . (5.13)
When the correlated white portfolio offers returns which are close to the higher returning
red portfolio (that is, when pi − pi′ is small), the herding equilibrium is permitted even
when risk aversion or the resource costs of equity issuance e are small.
5.C PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5.3
Proof. Part 1 holds by Proposition 5.1. The proof of part 2 follows.
First, use the incentive compatibility constraint (5.7) to eliminate Z(θ¯) from the man-
agers’ objective function (5.8). Then eliminate constants Z(θ), e to obtain:
max
q∈[0,1]
E q
pi′
P (Q, θ¯)
+ (1− q)pi
[
pi′
P (Q, θ¯)
+
(1− pi′)
P (Q, θ)
]
. (5.14)
It follows that
q∗ = 1 if E
pi′
P (Q, θ¯)
> E pi
[
pi′
P (Q, θ¯)
+
(1− pi′)
P (Q, θ)
]
, (5.15)
and q∗ = 0 otherwise. Rearranging yields
q∗ = 1 if E
P (Q, θ)
P (Q, θ¯)
>
pi
1− pi
1− pi′
pi′
(5.16)
and q∗ = 0 otherwise. Substituting in the monetary policy rule specified in equation 5.3
yields
q∗ = 1 if E
Qθ¯ + (1−Q)[piθ¯ + (1− pi)θ]
Qθ + (1−Q)[piθ¯ + (1− pi)θ] >
pi
1− pi
1− pi′
pi′
(5.17)
and q∗ = 0 otherwise. After rearranging we obtain
q∗ = 1 if E [Q] > 1 +
θ
pi
1− pi
1− pi′
pi′
− θ¯
(θ¯ − θ)
(
1 + pi
[
pi
1− pi
1− pi′
pi′
− 1
]) (5.18)
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and q∗ = 0 otherwise. Given that Q ∈ [0, 1], q∗ = Q = 1 can only be a symmetric
equilibrium when the second term on the right hand side is negative. This occurs when
θ¯
θ
>
pi
1− pi
1− pi′
pi′
. If so, then q∗ = 1 when E[Q] = 1. That is, a herding equilibrium will
exist. Otherwise, the only equilibrium is the diversification equilibrium.
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